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A bstract
This thesis studies the effects of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on human 
capital investment and women’s empowerment in Bangladesh.
Chapter Two studies how the entry of NGOs in primary education has affected 
educational outcomes of girls and examines the mechanisms which account for the 
relative performance of NGO versus state schools in improving female educational 
outcomes. The results show that the entry of NGO schools has significantly in­
creased girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. The two most prominent characteris­
tics of NGO schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female 
teachers and having Parent-Teacher Associations. NGO schools show strong effects 
in improving children’s test scores.
Chapter Three analyzes the factors which affect teacher presence, student atten­
dance, and community participation in primary schools in Bangladesh. The results 
show that, after controlling for other factors, NGO school teachers are more likely 
to be present in school, NGO schools are associated with higher student attendance 
rates, and guardians of NGO school students, in particular mothers, are more likely 
to participate in school meetings. Motivation appears the most important factor ex­
plaining teacher presence among NGO school teachers. Teacher attendance rate and 
other factors relating to curriculum and school facility explain student attendance in 
NGO schools.
Chapter Four investigates the effects of having the Grameen Bank in the village of
residence on fertility decisions and women’s empowerment. The results suggest that 
the Grameen Bank affects fertility decisions in the direction towards lower fertility. 
The changes include a reduction in women’s ideal number of children and the number 
of births in the year prior to the survey, and an increase in husband’s approval rate, 
and actual use, of family planning methods. Having the Grameen Bank in the village 
shows positive relationship with women’s empowerment as measured by contribution 
to family support and mobility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies the effects of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on human 
capital investment and women’s empowerment in Bangladesh. The thesis focuses 
on the impacts of NGOs on educational outcomes and fertility decisions, with an 
emphasis on how NGOs affect women’s empowerment in these areas. It consists 
of two main parts. The first part (Chapters Two and Three) analyzes the impacts 
of NGO schools, while the second part (Chapter Four) studies the effects of micro- 
credit.
Specifically, Chapter Two studies how the entry of NGO schools affects the edu­
cational outcomes of girls, while Chapter Three analyzes how motivation and school 
inputs affect teacher absenteeism and other educational outcomes in NGO schools 
as well as other types of schools. Chapter Four investigates the effects of having the 
Grameen Bank in the village of residence on fertility decisions and women’s empow­
erment, as measured by contribution to family support, mobility, and discussion with 
husband regarding family planning.
Non-governmental organizations have become important providers of public goods 
in many developing countries today. Understanding how NGOs perform, and the 
impacts they have on welfare is therefore an important issue. This thesis aims
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to contribute to the economic understanding of the effects of NGOs on educational 
outcomes and fertility decisions, both of which are key determinants of welfare.
The term “non-governmental organization” was used first at the founding of the 
United Nations. NGOs are defined by the United Nations Interagency Commit­
tee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific (1992) as having six 
key characteristics: they are voluntary, non-profit, service and development oriented, 
autonomous, have a high degree of motivation and commitment, and some form of 
formal registration (Besley and Ghatak, 1999). NGOs range from a small local 
NGO consisting of just a few people working towards one objective, to large inter­
national NGOs with a worldwide operation. NGOs work in many areas, including 
the provision of aid and relief, the delivery of social service, and the implementation 
of development projects. The number and roles of NGOs around the world have 
increased significantly in recent years.1
With the increasing roles of NGOs in service delivery, studies have documented 
their strengths and weaknesses. The most notable strength of NGOs lies in their 
comparative advantage in grassroots and community level activities compared to pub­
lic agencies. This is mainly due to the NGO institutional and incentive structures. 
NGOs in general use participatory methodologies and tools, which allow them to reach 
poor people and voice their concerns and needs. Also, NGOs have comparative ad­
vantage in cost effectiveness and the ability to innovate and adapt (e.g. Sobham 
(1997) and the World Bank (1998)). The weaknesses of NGOs that are often quoted 
are limited financial and management expertise, high degree of reliance on external 
resources, and lack of understanding of the broader social context.
Bangladesh is documented as having one of the most active NGOs in the world. 
This makes the country an ideal place to study the impacts of NGOs. The number of
1 Between 1990 and 2000 the number of international NGOs has grown by almost 20% to 37,281 
(Human Development Report, 2000). Domestic NGOs have increased even faster, for example, in 
Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, at present the number is at least 
65,000 (The Economist, 2000).
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NGOs in Bangladesh has significantly increased from when NGOs started to emerge 
in 1971. At present, there are about 20,000 NGOs operating in Bangladesh’s 86,000 
villages providing education, health, small loans, and agricultural extension services. 
NGOs in Bangladesh influence people’s fives in many ways. As one observer com­
ments: “In some villages, you can send your child to an NGO school, receive medicine 
from an NGO health center, sell your milk to an NGO diary, talk on an NGO phone, 
and borrow money from an NGO bank. ”
Prior to Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971, social welfare activities were 
mainly undertaken by the Christian missionaries. NGOs as a sector started to emerge 
after the war of independence in 1971, in response to the need for massive relief and 
rehabilitation activities (Ahmad, 1999). At that time, most of the NGOs were aid 
and relief agencies. However, as it became clear that Bangladesh’s problems needed 
more than simple relief, NGOs started to re-orient their work to have a stronger and 
more long-term development focus (Sobham, 1997). Soon after they began their de­
velopment projects, however, many NGOs found that the projects benefited relatively 
well-off rural farmers instead of the very poor because of the structure of the rural 
power. This led to the adoption of an empowerment model of development by many 
NGOs. An emphasis was put on social mobilization and conscientisation through 
education and training. However, by the 1980s those NGOs learned that group co­
hesion was difficult when members were economically marginalized. NGOs began 
to experiment with the provision of micro-credit and income generating activities in 
addition to the provision of health and education services. This came to be known 
today as the integrated rural development model.
NGOs in Bangladesh range from small local NGOs to large and internationally 
well-known NGOs. Two of the largest and most well-known NGOs in Bangladesh 
are the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen Bank. 
Chapters Two and Three of the thesis focus on NGO schools, the majority of which
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follow the BRAC model. Chapter Four studies the impacts of the Grameen Bank, 
which initiated group lending programs for the poor.
In Chapter Two, I study how the entry of NGOs in primary education has affected 
educational outcomes of girls and examine the mechanisms which account for the 
relative performance of NGO versus state schools in improving female educational 
outcomes. Bangladesh has seen a rapid increase in the enrollment rate of girls in 
recent years, such that the country became the first in South Asia to have achieved 
gender equity in primary enrollment. In particular, girls from rural areas and poorer 
households have a higher enrollment rate compared to boys. It is possible that NGOs 
have played a role in this, as NGOs provide non-formal primary education to poor 
children. Currently 1.4 million children, or 8% of children enrolled in primary schools 
are in NGO schools.
NGO schools aim to provide basic education to the poorest children who did not 
have a chance to attend formal schools. NGO schools have many characteristics 
that differ from formal schools in order to suit the needs of poor children in remote 
areas. For example, a school is usually built in the village nearby to children’s homes, 
because one of the reasons parents do not send their children, especially girls, to 
school is the long distance from home to school (Jalaluddin and Chowdhury, 1996). 
A school is usually a one-room construction easily built, with one teacher (mostly 
female) and no more than 33 children. The community helps select the location 
of the schools, and often helps build the schools. Parents and the teacher decide 
together on the timing of the lessons and vacation schedules. The flexible schedule 
allows the children to work outside of the school time, and has contributed to the 
high attendance rate. The teaching is child-centered and participatory, and activities 
include field trips, singing, dancing, and role-playing.
The largest NGO in the field of education in Bangladesh is the Bangladesh Rural
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Advancement Committee (BRAC).2 1.2 out of 1.4 million children in NGO schools are 
in BRAC schools. BRAC innovated non-formal education in 1985, after recognizing 
that cost-effective supplements to the formal school system were needed in order for 
the poorest children to receive some education. After 2 years BRAC developed a 
model of primary education programme that has today become highly successful, 
and most other NGOs in primary education follow the BRAC model. The success is 
believed to come from the fact that BRAC schools target girls, and are relevant to 
the needs of the rural poor.
Chapter Two uses large, nationally representative data from the Education Watch 
Project in Bangladesh to study the impacts of NGO schools on girls’ educational 
outcomes. The data has information on the households, schools, and test scores. 
First I study how the entry of NGO schools affects girls’ enrollment and class passed 
as compared to boys. I then analyze the characteristics of NGO and state schools 
which affect girls’ enrollment. Finally, I investigate the learning outcomes of students 
attending NGO and state schools.
To find out whether NGO schools increase enrollment for girls as compared to 
boys, I use data for children aged 11 to 20 years old. I construct cohorts from cross- 
sectional data using year of birth and year of NGO school establishment and show that 
cohorts which were exposed to NGO schools have higher probability of enrollment, 
and the effect operates mainly through girls. Next I analyze data for primary school 
aged children, i.e. children aged 6 to 10, and find that living in a village with at 
least one NGO school, or a village with higher NGO school involvement, is associated 
with higher probability of enrollment for girls as compared to boys, controlling for 
other factors. When rural and urban areas are studied separately, the effects of NGO 
schools in increasing girls’ enrollment are found mainly in the rural areas. Moreover,
2 BRAC started in 1972, after Bangladesh’s liberation war, as a relief and development agency 
and later on evolved into a multi-faceted NGO with several programmes aimed at poverty alleviation 
and empowerment of the poor.
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the effects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment axe stronger for BRAC 
target households3 compared to non-target households, suggesting that NGO schools 
increase girls’ enrollment more for poorer households as BRAC target households are 
the poorest group of the population.
Overall, the results in Chapter Two show that the entry of NGO schools has sig­
nificantly increased girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. I find that the two most 
prominent characteristics of NGO schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the 
high percentage of female teachers and having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). 
Moreover, I investigate how the students are learning as a result of attending NGO 
schools and find that being enrolled in an NGO school has positive and strongly 
significant effects on children’s test scores, as measured by Assessment of Basic Com­
petencies (ABC) test.
As NGO schools enrol children from the poorest households who were non-enrolled 
or have dropped out of school, it is surprising that NGO school students have higher 
attendance rates compared to government school students. Moreover, NGO school 
students have high test scores as measured by the ABC test. One reason believed 
to have contributed to NGO schools’ performance is the school characteristics which 
are designed to suit the needs of the rural poor. For example, the fact that the 
schools are built nearby to children’s homes and the timing of the lessons is decided 
by the teacher and the parents is likely to contribute to the high attendance rate of 
NGO school students. Also, another important factor believed to have contributed 
to NGO schools’ performance is the motivation and incentives of the parties involved. 
This includes teachers’ motivation and parents’ interest in their children’s schooling.
Chapter Three analyzes the factors which affect teacher absenteeism, student at­
tendance, and parents’ participation in school meetings in NGO schools and other 
types of schools. Statistics from the Education Watch data show that NGO school
3BRAC target households are defined as households with less than 0.5 acre of land and at least 
1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year (Nath, 1999).
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teachers have much higher attendance rates compared to teachers in other types of 
schools. This is in spite of the fact that NGO school teachers are paid much less com­
pared to teachers in government or private schools.4 Students in NGO schools also 
have much higher attendance rates compared to students in government or private 
schools, although NGO school students are from the more disadvantaged households. 
Moreover, parents of NGO school students participate more often in school meetings 
although they are poorer and have less education compared to parents of students 
attending government or private schools.
Teacher absenteeism is a major problem in the delivery of education in many de­
veloping countries. Survey statistics from several countries show that teacher absence 
rates can be very high, and prevalent among many schools in different geographical 
areas in a country. For example, teacher absence rates are found to be as high as 
25% and 27% in India and Uganda, respectively (Chaudhury et al., 2005). Studies 
by Chaudhury et al. (2005) and Kremer et al. (2005) find that working conditions 
and administrative monitoring are correlated with absence.
Chapter Three uses school level data from the Education Watch project to examine 
the effects of school types and school characteristics on teacher presence and student 
attendance in primary schools in Bangladesh. I focus on three types of schools: 
government schools, private schools, and NGO schools. I also find out whether 
there are school characteristics which affect teacher presence and student attendance 
differently for NGO schools compared to other types of schools. Moreover, I focus 
only on NGO school teachers and explore the factors correlated with NGO teacher 
presence. Using household level data, I then analyze the determinants of parents’ 
participation in school meetings, controlling for the type of school that the child was 
attending together with other household characteristics.
4NGO school teachers receive a monthly salary of approximately 12 US dollars per month. This 
is much lower than average monthly salary of teachers in government and private schools, which 
is around 4 times higher. However, most NGO school teachers are housewives who consider their 
work as a part-time job bringing in extra income to the family.
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The results in Chapter Three show that, after controlling for other factors, NGO 
school teachers are more likely to be present in school, NGO schools are associ­
ated with higher student attendance rates, and guardians of children attending NGO 
schools are more likely to participate in school meetings. When compared to other 
types of schools, teacher motivation, monitoring, and school facility appear to play a 
role in the high teacher attendance in NGO schools. Among NGO school teachers, 
motivation appears the most important factor explaining teacher presence. Moti­
vation is captured by whether the school has only one teacher, whether the teacher 
received training from the NGO, and the number of refreshers’ courses that the teacher 
attended during the past year. When the school has only one teacher, if the teacher 
does not come to school there would be no schooling on that day. Therefore the sense 
of responsibility is a possible explanation of why teachers are more likely to show up 
when they are in one-teacher schools. One possible source, or signal, of professional 
motivation is whether the teacher has received teacher training. Refreshers’ course 
could also increase intrinsic motivation.
High student attendance rate in NGO schools could be explained by high teacher 
attendance rate, as well as other factors relating to curriculum and school facility. 
Guardians of NGO school students appear to attend school meetings regardless of 
their education. For NGO school students, their mothers are much more likely to 
attend school meetings compared to students in other types of schools. This is likely 
because NGOs work mainly with women, and encourage women’s participation in 
development projects such as micro-credit and income generating activities. These 
NGO activities possibly have an impact on women’s mobility and other areas of 
empowerment. I further explore this possibility in Chapter Four of the thesis.
Besides the provision of non-formal primary education, NGOs in Bangladesh un­
dertake a wide range of development activities such as health, income-generating ac­
tivities, and micro-credit. Micro-credit, initiated by the Grameen Bank, has become
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a development phenomenon in recent years. The Grameen Bank’s model of group- 
lending has been duplicated in over 40 countries around the world. In Bangladesh, 
micro-credit has become one of the most important activities of NGOs. Besides the 
Grameen Bank, BRAC, the Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and other 
smaller NGOs also provide micro-credit.
Chapter Four of the thesis investigates the effects of having the Grameen Bank 
in the village of residence on fertility decisions and women’s empowerment. Micro­
credit may affect fertility decisions in many ways. For example, by increasing income 
micro-credit might increase the demand for children. Moreover, having micro-credit 
programs in the village of residence may affect people’s perception regarding fam­
ily size and family planning, as well as their knowledge of family planning methods. 
Another channel through which micro-credit programs may affect fertility decisions 
is through increasing women’s empowerment. In the case of the Grameen Bank, over 
95% of its members are women. By having access to credit and joining weekly group 
meetings, it is possible that being members of the Grameen Bank affects women’s 
empowerment. As women’s empowerment and fertility have been found to be nega­
tively correlated, it is possible that by affecting women’s empowerment micro-credit 
programs have an impact on fertility decisions.
Micro-credit was initiated by the Grameen Bank in 1976. Muhammad Yunus, an 
economics professor who founded the Grameen Bank, felt that lack of capital was the 
main obstacle to productive self-employment among the poor. He started by lending 
some villagers his own money, and the Grameen Bank formally began functioning as 
a specialized bank in 1983. The Grameen Bank provides credit to members who 
form self-selected groups of five. Collateral is replaced with peer monitoring, as all 
members in the group become ineligible for further loans if any member defaults. 
The groups meet weekly to make repayments on their loans as well as mandatory 
contributions to savings and insurance funds. The Grameen Bank’s weekly meetings
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may affect women’s perception regarding family size and family planning. At the 
meetings members jointly recite the “sixteen decisions” , which include the following: 
“We will keep our families small.”
The Grameen Bank may also affect women’s empowerment in some areas. Em­
powerment has been defined as the process by which the powerless gain greater con­
trol over the circumstances of their lives (Baltiwala, 1994). Variables used to proxy 
for women’s empowerment include decision-making authority, mobility, freedom from 
threat, and access to economic resources (Jejeebhoy, 2000). By providing access to 
credit, the Grameen Bank is likely to improve women’s access to economic resources. 
Moreover, the weekly meetings mean that women have to travel from their homes to 
the meeting place, which possibly increases their mobility. Furthermore, by having 
the Grameen Bank in the village, social norms regarding women’s roles may change, 
in which case the Grameen Bank may have an effect on women who are non-members 
as well.
Chapter Four uses nationally representative data from the Bangladesh Demo­
graphic and Health Survey (BDHS) to study the changes in fertility decisions and 
women’s empowerment between 1993 and 1996. I divide the villages into four 
groups; those with the Grameen Bank both in 1993 and 1996, those with the Grameen 
Bank only in 1993 (the Grameen Bank left between 1993 and 1996), those with the 
Grameen Bank only in 1996 (the Grameen Bank entered between 1993 and 1996), and 
those where the Grameen Bank never entered. To address the non-random program 
placement of the Grameen Bank, I use pooled cross-sectional analysis and study the 
changes over time in different groups of villages. This is possible because the 1993 
and 1996 rounds of the BDHS surveyed the same villages. Because of the possi­
bility of self-selection of Grameen Bank members, where more active women might 
self-select themselves into joining the program, I study all individuals in the village 
rather than focusing on members of the Grameen Bank. Therefore any effect found
20
includes both the direct effect of the Grameen Bank on its members and the spill-over 
effect of social norms.
Results in Chapter Four suggest the role of the Grameen Bank in affecting people’s 
perception regarding family size and family planning. In villages where the Grameen 
Bank is well established, between 1993 and 1996 there has been a reduction in women’s 
ideal number of children and the number of births in the year prior to the survey, and 
an increase in the use of family planning methods. In villages where the Grameen 
Bank entered between 1993 and 1996 there has been an increase in husbands’ approval 
of family planning methods. Moreover, having the Grameen Bank in the village is 
associated with an increase in women’s empowerment in terms of contribution to 
family support and mobility. There is evidence that women with a high level of 
mobility are likely to want fewer children, and women aged 10 to 29 who contribute 
to family support or have a high level of mobility are less likely to have given birth 
in the year prior to the survey.
Overall, the findings in Chapters Two, Three, and Four point to the role of non­
governmental organizations in improving human capital and women’s empowerment 
in Bangladesh. Chapter Two provides evidence that NGO schools contribute to an 
increase in the education of girls. Education is considered an important determi­
nant of female empowerment. Chapter Three shows that motivation is an integral 
part in the performance of NGO schools, which have extremely low teacher absence 
rates compared to other types of schools. Findings in Chapter Four suggest that 
the Grameen Bank affects fertility decisions in the direction towards lower fertility. 
Moreover, the Grameen Bank is associated with an increase in women’s empowerment 
in terms of mobility and contribution to family support.
Both NGO schools and micro-credit programs are the innovations of NGOs. These 
innovations originated from actually observing the needs of the poor and designing 
the programs to suit the needs. The aim of this thesis is to provide an economic
21
understanding of such innovations, and the impacts that they have on overall welfare.
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Chapter 2
The Entry o f NGO Schools and 
G irls’ Educational O utcom es in  
Bangladesh
A bstract
This chapter uses household, school, and test score data from Bangladesh to com­
pare and contrast the effectiveness of NGO-run and state-run schools in the provision 
of primary education. I study how the entry of NGOs in primary education has af­
fected educational outcomes of girls and examine the mechanisms which account for 
the relative performance of NGO versus state schools in improving female educational 
outcomes. The results show that the entry of NGO schools has significantly increased 
girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. Constructing cohorts from cross-sectional 
data using year of birth and year of NGO school establishment, I show that cohorts 
which were exposed to NGO schools have higher probability of enrollment and the 
effect operates mainly through girls. The two most prominent characteristics of NGO 
schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female teachers 
and having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). NGO schools show strong effects 
in improving children’s test scores.
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2.1 Introduction
There has been a significant increase in the number and roles of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) around the world in the last few decades.1 In developing coun­
tries NGOs have become heavily involved in the provision of public goods and services 
including health care, education, and rural credit.2 As NGOs are rapidly becoming 
important providers of public goods in developing countries, a key issue is to under­
stand how they perform relative to the state.
The objective of this chapter is to examine how NGO expansion affects educational 
attainment. Education is one area which has typically been preserved for the state 
but has seen an increasing role for NGOs, where NGO involvement is often intended 
to overcome state failure in the delivery of education. Whether and how NGO 
involvement affects educational outcomes is an important issue which has attracted 
the interests of several researchers. For example, Miguel and Kremer (2003) find that 
an NGO program of school-based mass treatment with deworming drugs in Kenya 
is effective in reducing school absenteeism. Banerjee et al. (2003) find an NGO 
remedial education program in India, where young women from the community are 
hired to teach children who lag behind in class, to be effective in improving children’s 
test scores. A school meals program implemented by an NGO is found to increase 
school participation in Kenya (Vermeersch, 2002).
One of the key problems with studying NGOs and evaluating their effects relative 
to the state is the fact that they are highly heterogeneous group. This motivated 
the study’s focus on Bangladesh, where there is one large NGO in primary education. 
With a large NGO operating under a single model, I can make clear comparisons
1In the U.S. there axe approximately 2 million NGOs, most of which were formed in the past 
30 years, while in Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, at present 
the number is at least 65,000 (The Economist, 2000). Between 1990 and 2000 the number of 
international NGOs has grown by almost 20% to 37,281 (Human Development Report, 2002).
2Besley and Ghatak (2001) analyze how ownership matters in public good provision, with ap­
plications to NGOs.
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between NGO-run and state-run schools and identify the characteristics of each type 
of school that affect educational outcomes.
Using a large, nationally representative data from the Education Watch Project 
in Bangladesh, the chapter studies the effects of NGO schools on the educational 
outcomes of girls. Bangladesh is an important case study because the country is 
home to a large number of active NGOs3, and NGOs play an important role in 
the provision of primary education. Moreover, there has been a rapid increase in 
the enrollment rate of girls in recent years such that Bangladesh has become the 
first country in South Asia to have achieved gender equity in primary enrollment.4 
Eliminating gender disparity in primary education is a key part of the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals.5 The education of girls is recognized as crucial to 
development, leading to higher economic productivity, lower infant and maternal 
mortality, and improved health. Understanding what factors led to gender parity 
in primary education and identifying the role that NGOs played in this process is a 
key challenge. Bangladesh’s experience can provide useful policy lessons for other 
countries aiming to achieve gender equity in primary enrollment.
NGOs in Bangladesh initiated non-formal primary education in the middle of 
1980s as it was perceived that primary education provided by the government could 
not reach the poorest children in remote areas. Non-formal education has many char­
acteristics that differ from formal education. For example, parents and the teacher 
decide together on the timing of the lessons and vacation schedules. The schools 
usually have one classroom and one teacher. In most cases teachers are female, which
3 NGOs in Bangladesh are documented as being one of the most active in the world. There 
are about 20,000 NGOs operating in Bangladesh’s 86,000 villages providing education, health, small 
loans, and agricultural extension services (The Economist, 1998).
4In 1980, net primary enrollment rates for boys and girls were 62% and 47%; in 2000 the 
corresponding rates were 79.8% and 79.9%, respectively.
5Goal 3, namely “Promote gender equality and empower women”, has the specific target to 
“Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all 
levels of education no later than 2015.” Details of the Millennium Development Goals can be found 
at www.im.org/millenniumgoals/ and www.developmentgoals.org.
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is believed to encourage the enrollment of girls. At present, around 1.4 million chil­
dren or 8% of the children enrolled in primary schools are in NGOs’ non-formal 
schools (henceforth NGO schools). Figure 2.1 shows the expansion of NGO schools 
in Bangladesh. The largest NGO in the field of education is the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC), which provides non-formal education to 1.2 out 
of 1.4 million children receiving non-formal education. Even schools which are run 
by NGOs other than BRAC tend to follow the BRAC model. I therefore have the 
advantage of comparing a largely homogenous group of NGO schools with state-run 
schools.
Nationally representative data from the Education Watch Project show that, in 
1998, gender gap in primary enrollment in favor of boys existed only in the case 
of urban households which reported their economic status as ‘surplus’. As Figures 
2.2A, 2.2B, and 2.2C show, girls from rural areas, and girls from poorer households 
appear to do better than boys in terms of net primary enrollment. In particular, girls 
from rural BRAC target households, which are the poorest households in Bangladesh, 
and girls from households which reported their economic status as ‘always in deficit’ 
have notably higher enrollment rate compared to boys. In many other developing 
countries, the opposite is true. For example, in India and Nepal, gender gap in favor 
of boys is greatest in rural areas and for poorer households, as Figures 2.3A and 2.3B 
show. Why do girls from rural areas and poorer households in Bangladesh have such 
high enrollment rates relative to boys? One possible explanation could be the works 
of NGOs such as BRAC, as NGO schools in Bangladesh target poorer households.
To investigate these issues I use household, school, and test score data from the 
Education Watch Project to analyze the effects of NGO schools on the educational 
outcomes of girls in Bangladesh. Combining household and school data, I first study 
how the entry of NGO schools affects girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. I then 
analyze the characteristics of NGO and state schools which affect girls’ enrollment.
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Finally, I investigate the learning outcomes of students attending NGO and state 
schools using test score data.
Constructing cohorts from cross-sectional data using year of birth and year of 
NGO school establishment, I show that cohorts which were exposed to NGO schools 
have higher probability of enrollment, and the effect operates mainly through girls. 
Moreover, for primary school aged children, living in a village with at least one NGO 
school, or a village with higher NGO school involvement, is associated with higher 
probability of enrollment for girls as compared to boys, controlling for other factors. 
When rural and urban areas are studied separately, the effects of NGO schools in 
increasing girls’ enrollment are found mainly in the rural areas. Moreover, the ef­
fects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment are stronger for BRAC target 
households6 compared to non-target households, suggesting that NGO schools in­
crease girls’ enrollment more for poorer households as BRAC target households are 
the poorest group of the population. The two most prominent characteristics of NGO 
schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female teachers 
and having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). Being enrolled in an NGO school 
has positive and strongly significant effects on children’s test scores, as measured by 
Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) test.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical frame­
work showing how NGO school entry might affect girls’ educational outcomes. Sec­
tion 2.3 discusses the institutional background and the data. Section 2.4 describes 
the methodology and presents the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
6 BRAC target households are defined as households with less than 0.5 acre of land and at least 
1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year (Nath, 1999).
29
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The simple model in this section attempts to capture how NGO schools might affect 
the enrollment of girls as compared to boys. The main assumption is that there 
exists a disutility associated with sending a child to school, which differs by gender 
and by school type.7
Given household characteristics and characteristics of schools available, household 
i chooses expenditure on the education of child i to maximize the following household 
utility function:
B (xs) -  pskj + U ( Y -  ckj -  x s) (2.1)
where B(-) and U(-) are household z’s perceived benefits of education and utility from 
current consumption, respectively.8 B(-) and £/(•) are assumed to be increasing and 
concave. x 3 is expenditure on the education of a child of sex s, s = male (m) and 
female (/). pskj is the disutility associated with sending a child of sex s to school 
type k in village of residence j .  Here k =  government school (g) and NGO school 
(n ). Y  is household i ’s income, and is the opportunity cost of time of a child 
when enrolled in school type k in village j .
The main assumption of the model is that, for each village j ,  pjgj > pmgj = 
Pmnj = Pfnj • The disutility of sending a child to a government school is higher for 
girls compared to boys. In the context of Bangladesh, this could be thought of as the 
worry of having the child far away from home, which is usually greater in the case of 
girls, or the disutility of having a girl taught by male teachers. The average distance 
between a government school and children’s homes is 3.2 kilometers, and over 60%
7 Possible reasons for gender differences in human capital investments include different expected 
returns by gender, different costs of investment, and tastes, which may reflect social and cultural 
norms (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). For example, Alderman and King (1998) assume different rates 
of returns and different expected transfers to explain differences in school enrollment. Garg and 
Morduch (1998a and 1998b) assume higher rates of return for males.
8 Subscript i  is omitted for simplicity.
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of teachers in government schools are male (Jalaluddin and Chowdhury, 1996). The 
disutility of sending a child to an NGO school is assumed to be the same for boys and 
girls, and is equal to the disutility of sending a boy to a government school. NGO 
schools have some characteristics that should be associated with lower disutility for 
girls compared to government schools. For example, NGO schools are usually built 
in the village nearby to children’s homes, and over 90% of NGO school teachers are 
female.
The benefit function, £(•), is assumed to be the same for boys and girls, and the 
same for government schools and NGO schools. The opportunity cost of time is 
assumed to be the same for boys and girls9, and higher in the case of government 
schools compared to NGO schools. This is because NGO schools are located nearby 
to children’s homes and have class times decided by parents and the teacher to allow 
children to work outside of school time.
Let x*(Y) be the solution to the maximization problem (1), and let V (Y) be the 
maximum value function, given pskj and . If household i decides not to enrol the 
child, the household utility is U(Y). The condition for household i to enrol the child 
is therefore:
V (Y) -  U(Y) > 0 (2.2)
It is straightforward to show that initial enrollment is non-decreasing with respect 
to Y , and non-increasing with respect to pskj and c^-.10 This is intuitive, since high 
income makes it more ‘affordable’ to enrol a child, while high disutility associated 
with sending a child to school and high opportunity cost make it more ‘expensive’ to 
enrol a child.
Let Y*kj be the threshold level of income above which a household will enrol a
9 Girls may help with child care and household chores while boys may work in the farm, thus in 
general it is inconclusive whether the opportunity cost of time is higher for girls or boys (Strauss 
and Thomas, 1995).
10 Applying the envelope theorem, the derivative of the left-hand side of (2) is =
dU^Y ~QYj ~ X'^  ~  dUdY  ^ > 0 si1106 U(- )  is concave. Moreover, ■^ }Vk : =  —1 < 0 and =  —f y  < 0 .
child of sex s in school type k in village j ,  i.e., V(Y*kj) — U(Y*kj) = 0. Since 
Pfnj — Pmnj — Ptngj ^  Pf9j Qij ^  ^9j j ^  follows that.
Ym  = K m  < K m  < Y;gj (2.3)
R esu lt 2.1: NGO schools contribute to an increase in the enrollment rates of 
boys and girls, with stronger effects for girls.
Let us further assume that NGOs target poor households with income less than 
Y tg. Suppose Y ts is such that (i) =  Yf'n < Y£g < Y tg < Yfg, or (ii) Y£n = Y/n <
Y tg < Y;ag < Yf„.
R esu lt 2.2: The effects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment relative 
to boys will be stronger for NGOs’ target households. Moreover, gender gap in 
enrollment disappears for target households, but exists for non-target households.
2.3 The Program
With over 20,000 NGOs working in areas such as health, education, micro-credit and 
agricultural services, Bangladesh is documented as having one of the most active 
NGOs in the world. NGOs in Bangladesh started to emerge after the War of Inde­
pendence in 1971, when the country was in a state of upheaval and many refugees 
were returning home. At that time, most NGOs were aid and relief agencies. As the 
needs of society changed, many NGOs evolved into development agencies. The num­
ber of NGOs has also increased significantly. NGOs in Bangladesh range from small 
local NGOs to large and internationally well-known NGOs such as the Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen Bank. In the area of ed­
ucation, NGOs in Bangladesh play a vital role in the provision of non-formal primary
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education.
Primary education in Bangladesh was initially the responsibility of the state. Af­
ter independence, under an Act of Parliament all primary schools in Bangladesh were 
nationalized in 1973 (Jalaluddin and Chowdhury, 1996). Prom the second half of 
1980s, however, the state has allowed NGOs to experiment with a variety of delivery 
mechanisms to cater for basic education needs of the disadvantaged households. The 
objective of NGOs’ non-formal schools is to provide education to the poorest children 
who did not attend or have dropped out of formal schools.
Primary education in Bangladesh is 5 years in length, starting at age 6. There are 
11 types of primary schools.11 Currently, around 1.4 million children, or 8 percent 
of children enrolled in primary schools, are in NGO-run schools. Around two-thirds 
are enrolled in government schools, and another 20 percent in registered privately 
managed schools. For other types of schools, the percentage of children attending 
each type is 2% or smaller. As Figure 2.1 shows, NGO schools are relatively new. The 
majority of NGO schools in the rural areas were set up after 1992. For the urban 
areas, most NGO schools were established after 1995. In the case of government 
schools, most were established before 1990, with only 2 out of 354 schools under the 
survey established after 1990.
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is the single largest 
NGO in non-formal primary education with over 30,000 non-formal primary schools. 
BRAC started the Non-Formal Primary Education (NFPE) in 1985 in response to 
demands from parents whose children did not have a chance to go to school. After 
2 years BRAC developed a model of non-formal schools which has become highly 
successful.12
11 These are: government schools, registered privately managed schools, unregistered privately 
managed schools, primary schools attached to high schools, PTI’s experimental schools, indepen­
dent religious schools, religious schools attached to high madrassas, kindergarten, satellite schools, 
community schools, and NGO schools (World Bank, 2000).
12 When BRAC started non-formal schools, the objective was to provide basic education to chil­
dren, and continuation into the fourth grade in the formal system was not expected. However,
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This unique characteristic of having one large NGO in education makes it possible 
to compare how NGO and state schools function, which is usually not possible since 
NGOs in education are heterogeneous in most other countries.13 Using nationally 
representative data from the 1998 Education Watch Project, this paper examines how 
the expansion of NGO schools affects the educational outcomes of girls, and which 
characteristics of NGO and state schools matter for those outcomes.
Table 2.1 gives means and standard deviations of the main variables.14 Panel A 
shows individual level means of boys and girls aged 6 to 10 years old for all Bangladesh, 
and separately for rural and urban areas. The enrollment rate of girls has surpassed 
that of boys for all Bangladesh and the rural areas. Girls’ enrollment rate has 
increased significantly in recent years.15 The table also shows differences between 
rural and urban areas in certain family characteristics, such as parental education 
and household economic status. Despite having parents who have less education, 
girls in rural areas are more likely to be enrolled overall than urban girls and more 
likely to be enrolled than rural boys.
The expansion of NGO schools into a village is captured by ‘the involvement of 
NGO schools in a village’, defined as the percentage of children aged 6 to 10 years 
old enrolled in NGO schools among children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in school 
in each village. ‘The involvement of government schools’ is similarly defined. Panel 
B gives village level means of ‘the involvement of NGO schools’ and ‘the involvement 
of government schools ’.
out of over 1.67 million students who have graduated from BRAC schools, 90% have gone on to 
government schools. Nath et al. (1999) find that graduates of BRAC schools have a high level of 
basic competency compared to other types of schools.
13 See, for example, Miguel and Kremer (2003).
14 Details on the Education Watch data are contained in the Data Appendix.
15 The increase in girls’ enrollment rate is believed to have been brought about by a number of 
‘positive discriminatory’ actions taken by the state and NGOs in favor of girls and poor children in 
the rural areas. Among these are: (i) non-formal primary education; (ii) Female Stipend program, 
where the state provides stipends to girls in secondary school and does not charge any tuition; and 
(iii) Food for Education program, where the state provides a food ration to children from rural 
poorer families for attending school (Chowdhury et al., 2001).
34
In general NGOs target villages with low enrollment rates. NGO schools are 
usually built in villages where there is demand for the school, i.e. villages with many 
dropout and non-enrolled children. For BRAC, in villages where BRAC has its 
development activities, a survey is conducted to find out the number of children who 
are non-enrolled or have dropped out of school, and one school is open for 33 children.
Panel C gives the school level means of the characteristics of NGO schools and 
government schools. The differences between the two types of schools can be seen 
in many areas. For class size, NGO schools have much smaller class size, on average 
around 30 students in one class16, while government schools’ average class size is 
55. Teacher absenteeism appears higher in the case of government schools; the 
percentage of teachers present on the day of school visit is 97% for NGO schools and 
86% for government schools. The percentage of female teachers is much higher for 
NGO schools, 92% compared to 35% in the case of government schools. Teachers’ 
education is on average lower in the case of NGO schools. Government school teachers 
have on average almost 12 years of education, compared to 10 years for NGO school 
teachers.17 NGO school teachers also have much fewer years of experience, on average 
2.65 years compared to almost 20 years for government school teachers.
2.4 Em pirical Analysis
To answer the question of how the entry of NGO schools affects girls’ educational 
outcomes, I start by analyzing how NGO schools affect girls’ enrollment. For children 
aged 11 to 20 years old, I find out how exposure to NGO schools affects the probability 
of having been enrolled, and whether the effect differs between boys and girls. I also 
study whether, for primary school aged children, being in a village with at least one
NGO school, or a village with higher NGO school involvement, affects girls’ enrollment
16For BRAC schools, class size is set at 33 children for each school, which is usually a one-room 
construction with one teacher.
17BRAC has a policy of hiring female teachers who have completed 9 or more years of school.
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as compared to boys. Next I find out the characteristics of NGO and state schools 
which affect female participation in education. Finally, I investigate the quality of 
NGO schools by analyzing the learning outcomes of boys and girls attending NGO 
and state schools.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of how the entry of NGO schools affects girls’ enroll­
ment. I show the percentage of children with no schooling in villages with at least 
one NGO school and villages with no NGO school. I focus on two age groups, 17 
to 20 and 11 to 14, as most 17 to 20 year olds were not exposed to NGO schools 
while children in the 11 -14  year range were.18 Comparing columns (1) and (4), it 
appears that NGO schools entered villages with a higher percentage of children with 
no schooling. This is in line with the targeting policy of NGOs, where more schools 
are built in villages with demand for the schools, i.e. villages with many dropout 
or non-enrolled children. Columns (2) and (5) show that, for 11 to 14 years old 
children, girls in villages with at least one NGO school do better than girls in villages 
with no NGO school. For boys, however, the opposite is true. Columns (3) and 
(6) show that the reduction in the percentage of children with no schooling has been 
fastest for girls in villages with at least one NGO school. In fact, from being the 
worst-off group before NGO schools entered, they became the group with the highest 
percentage of children having been enrolled. This issue is further explored in the 
following analysis.
As Table 2.2 shows, NGOs appear to enter villages with low initial enrollment. 
Table 2.3 confirms NGOs’ targeting policy. NGO school involvement is greater in 
villages where adults have lower average schooling, as defined by (i) average class 
passed for adults 21 years and above, and (ii) percentage of adults 21 years and 
above with no schooling.19 As NGO school placement is a function of the initial level
18 As Figure 2.1 shows, most NGO schools started on or after 1992. Children aged 17 to 20 in 
1998 were 11 or older in 1992, thus most of them were not exposed to NGO schools as NGO schools 
usually enrol children aged 8 to 10 years old.
19In Table 2.3, the dependent variable is the involvement of NGO schools in a village, and
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of education in the village, there is a possible endogeneity problem where the results 
found are due to the targeting policy of NGOs and not the activities of NGO schools. 
To deal with this possible endogeneity problem, I control for village fixed effects when 
analyzing children aged 11 to 20 years old. This is possible because for each village I 
can divide the children into those who were exposed to NGO schools and those who 
were not, using year of birth and year of NGO school establishment. In interpreting 
the results, the identification assumption is that there is no omitted time-varying and 
region specific effects correlated with the placement of NGO schools. When analyzing 
children aged 6 to 10 years old, I control for several village characteristics.20 Results 
showing similar patterns emerge from analyzing 11 to 20 years old and 6 to 10 years 
old, suggesting that under the assumption that there is no time-varying component 
the results found are not driven by NGO school placement.
2.4.1 Entry of NGO Schools and Girls’ Enrollment
A. Basic R esults
First I explore the key question of this paper - does the entry of NGO schools con­
tribute to the increase in girls’ enrollment as compared to boys?
To find out whether being exposed to NGO schools has different effects on the 
enrollment status of girls as compared to boys, I estimate the following equation:
Pr(<5ij =  l )  — Qio “l- ot,\E X P ij -f- a 2G ir l  * E X P ij  -1- cx^Cij -I- Oi^Givl * Cij
+a5Girl -F a 6VJ- +  error term (2.4)
explanatory variables are village characteristics as listed. The education of adults 21 years and 
above is not affected by whether there is an NGO school in the village, as those 21 years and above 
in 1998 would be 11 years or older in 1988, and in 1988 there were hardly any NGO schools at all 
(as shown in Figure 2.1).
20 As all children aged 6 to 10 years old are exposed to NGO schools, it is not possible to control 
for village fixed effects.
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where Sij is equal to 1 if individual i in village j  has been enrolled in school, and 
0 otherwise. Here I focus on the age range of 11 to 20, as this age range includes 
children who were exposed to NGO schools as well as those who were not. EXPij 
is equal to 1 if individual i in village j  has been exposed to an NGO school in the 
village, and 0 otherwise. An individual is considered exposed to an NGO school if 
he/she was 10 years old or younger when the first NGO school in the village was 
established, as most NGO schools enrol 8 to 10 years old children.21 Girl is the 
dummy variable for being a girl. I control for a number of individual and family 
characteristics, represented by vector Cij, and village fixed effects, Vj. Equation 
(2.4) is estimated by maximum likelihood logit. In this specification, and all others 
that follow, standard errors are clustered at the village level.22
I control for the following child and family characteristics to account for unob­
served heterogeneity that might drive enrollment: age of the child, number of adults 
in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether 
the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, 
household’s self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, 
whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least 
one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.4 show that being exposed to NGO schools increases 
the probability of having been enrolled for girls as compared to boys. Interaction 
terms with Girl axe not included in column (1), and are included in column (2). 
Column (1) shows that, compared to those who were not exposed to NGO schools, 
being exposed to NGO schools increases the probability of having been enrolled for 
all children. In column (2), the interaction term ‘Girl*Exposed to NGO school’
211 constructed this variable using the age of an individual and the year when the first NGO 
school was established in the village of residence.
22See Deaton (1997).
is positive and strongly significant, while the level term ‘Exposed to NGO school’ 
becomes insignificant. This suggests that compared to children who were not exposed 
to NGO schools in the village, being exposed to NGO schools increases the probability 
of having been enrolled for girls as compared to boys. The marginal effect suggests 
that being exposed to NGO schools increases girls’ probability of having been enrolled 
by 3% compared to boys.
Columns (3) and (4) look at children who were exposed to NGO schools and 
those who were not. I split the sample in this way to allow for child and family 
characteristics to have different effects on children who were exposed to NGO schools 
and whose who were not.23 For the group of children who were exposed to NGO 
schools, girls are more likely to be enrolled compared to boys, controlling for other 
factors. The coefficient of ‘Girl’ is positive and strongly significant in column (3). 
On the other hand, for children who were not exposed to NGO schools, the coefficient 
of ‘Girl’ is marginal and insignificant.
Taken together, the results suggest that being exposed to NGO schools in the 
village significantly increases the probability of having been enrolled for girls as com­
pared to boys.
Next I investigate whether the exposure to NGO schools leads to an increase in 
class passed, defined as the last class which a child has completed, and whether the 
effects are stronger for girls as compared to boys. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 
2.4 show the results from estimating equation (2.4) using the last class passed as 
the dependent variable. The results are similar to those in the case of enrollment: 
being exposed to NGO schools increases class passed for all children, and the effect 
operates mainly through girls. The marginal effect suggests that being exposed to 
NGO schools increases class passed for girls by 0.23 year as compared to boys.
Columns (7) and (8) report the results from splitting the sample into those who
23It is possible that for children who were exposed to NGO schools, parents may become more 
sensitive towards girls’ needs for education due to NGO activities in the village of residence.
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were exposed to NGO schools and those who were not. For the group of children who 
were exposed to NGO schools, girls appear to have significantly higher class passed 
compared to boys. The coefficient of ‘Girl’ is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
For children who were not exposed to NGO schools, the coefficient of ‘Girl’ is much 
smaller in magnitude and less strongly significant24 compared to the case of children 
who were exposed to NGO schools.
Taken together, the results suggest that the entry of NGO schools increases girls’ 
enrollment and class passed compared to boys.
Table 2.5 shows the results from using a different identification strategy, where I 
analyze how the intensity of NGO schools in the village affects enrollment and class 
passed of children bom in different years.25 The year of birth and the village of birth 
jointly determine an individual’s exposure to NGO schools. As Figure 2.1 shows, 
over 95% of NGO schools were established in or after 1992. Since NGO schools 
usually enrol children aged 8 to 10 years old, those who were 11 or older in 1992 were 
not exposed to NGO schools. At the time of the survey in 1998, children who were 
17 years or older form the cohort who were too old to benefit from NGO schools. 
I compare the effects of the intensity of NGO schools in the village of residence on 
children who were young enough to be exposed to the schools versus those who were 
too old to benefit from them. If exposure to NGO schools increases class passed 
rates for children, we would expect to find no effect for those 17 years or older, and 
increasing effects for younger children.26
I estimate the following equation:
Yijk = ao +  oliNPj * Tik +  a2Tik +  a 3Cijk +  a 4V$ +  error term (2.5)
24For children who were not exposed to NGO schools, the coefficient of ‘Girl’ is significant at 10% 
level.
25 The intensity of NGO schools in a village is measured by the number of NGO schools in the 
village per 100 children aged 11 to 20 years old.
26This is the same identification strategy as in Duflo (2001).
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where Yijk is (i) whether individual i in village j  who is of age k has ever been 
enrolled27, and (ii) the last class passed for individual i in village j  who is of age k , 
where 11 < k <  20. N P j  is the number of NGO schools in village j  per 100 children 
aged 11 to 20 years old. is the treatment dummy indicating the age of individual 
i. Cijk denotes child and family characteristics of individual i in village j  who is of 
age k.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.5 show that exposure to NGO schools has positive 
effects on the probability of having been enrolled for girls. The coefficients of ‘Number 
NGO schools*age fc’ are positive and significant for girls aged 12 to 15, and positive 
though insignificant at the 10% level for boys of the same age range. For both boys 
and girls, there appears to be little or no effect on those aged 17 and above. Here 
age 20 is the omitted category. The results show that NGO schools increase the 
probability of having been enrolled for children who were exposed to the schools, 
with stronger effects in the case of girls. Results regarding class passed, as shown 
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.5, are similar to those regarding enrollment. The 
coefficients of ‘Number NGO schools*age k ’ are positive and significant for girls aged 
15 and below, and positive though mostly insignificant at the 10% level for boys of 
the same age range.
Overall, the results in Table 2.5 point to the same direction as those in Table 2.4: 
NGO schools appear to increase girls’ enrollment and class passed as compared to 
boys.
Next I look at whether being in a village with an NGO school increases the 
probability of being enrolled for children aged 6 to 10 years old. While studying 
the enrollment history of children 11 to 20 years old has the advantage of comparing 
between those who were exposed to NGO schools versus those who were not, focusing
27The variable is equal to 1 if the individual has ever been enrolled and 0 otherwise.
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on 6 to 10 years old, the primary school age in Bangladesh, allows for the analysis of 
the current primary enrollment situation in Bangladesh.
I estimate the following equation:
Pr(5ij =  1) =  &0 +  OL\Nij +  a 2Girl * Nij +  ot$Gij -f- ot^Girl * Gij +  ot^Cij
+  aeGirl * Cij +  a 7Girl +  a&Aj +  agVcj +  error term (2.6)
where represents two different measures of supply of NGO schools in village j . 
One is whether there is at least 1 NGO school in village j  , and the other is the 
involvement of NGO schools in village j .  ‘The involvement of NGO schools in a 
village’ is defined as the percentage of children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in 
NGO schools among children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in school in each village, 
excluding the child from the sample. This variable shows the relative importance 
of NGO schools in a village. G^  is similarly defined for government schools.28 Aj 
represents the stratum in which village j  is located, and Vcj is a vector of village- 
level characteristics. Village characteristics included are percentage of adults with 
no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic 
status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with members 
who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, 
and percentage of Muslims in the village. All other variables are as defined above.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.6 show the main findings. In column (2), the 
interaction term ‘Girl*At least 1 NGO school’ is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that being in villages with at least 1 NGO school is associated with 
higher probability of being enrolled for girls as compared to boys. The marginal 
effect suggests that the magnitude of this effect is 3%, which is similar to the case of 
11 to 20 years old. The interaction term ‘Girl*Fraction NGO’ in column (4) is also
28 As there are 11 types of primary schools in Bangladesh, the involvement of NGO schools and 
the involvement of government schools in a village do not add up to one.
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positive and significant at the 10% level. Both results point to the same direction 
that NGO schools increase girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. On the other hand, 
having at least 1 government school in the village or having more government school 
involvement does not show different effects on the probability of being enrolled for 
girls as compared to boys. This suggests that it is exposure to NGO schools and not 
government schools that drives up girls’ enrollment relative to boys.
Column (3) shows that NGO school involvement is associated with lower proba­
bility of being enrolled for all children. As Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest, NGOs appear 
to target villages with low enrollment rates.
To conclude, the results in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 point to the role of NGO 
schools in increasing girls’ enrollment. Being exposed to NGO schools significantly 
increases enrollment and class passed for girls as compared to boys. Moreover, living 
in a village with at least one NGO school, or a village with higher NGO school 
involvement, is associated with higher enrollment for girls as compared to boys.29
B. Extensions
Results in the previous subsection lead to the conclusion that NGO schools have 
contributed to the increase in female enrollment in Bangladesh. However, given the 
characteristics of NGO schools which aim to suit the needs of the poorest children, 
it is possible that NGO schools may increase female enrollment for some groups (e.g. 
rural versus urban, BRAC target versus non-target households) and not others. Also, 
to draw out policy implications it is useful to find out how NGO schools affect female 
enrollment for different groups of the population.
Here I analyze whether the effects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment
29 Appendix 2, Table 2.12 shows the effects of child and family characteristics on the probability of 
being enrolled for boys and girls. Most of the child and family characteristics have the expected sign, 
although there are some exceptions. In line with Figure 2C, being from a household which reports 
their economic status as ‘surplus’ has a negative and significant relationship with the probability of 
being enrolled for girls in the urban areas.
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vary between rural and urban areas, and between BRAC target and non-target house­
holds. The rural and urban areas in Bangladesh differ in many aspects which possibly 
impact how NGO schools affect female enrollment. For example, in the urban areas 
schools are more likely to be closer and there are more infrastructures such as roads.
In the case of BRAC target and non-target households, when BRAC started its 
NGO schools the main objective was to provide education to children from BRAC 
target households, defined as households with less than 0.5 acre of land and at least 
one person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year (Nath, 1999). How­
ever, as there were many children from non-target households who did not have an 
education, BRAC schools also enrol children from non-target households. BRAC 
target households are the poorest group of the population, and whether NGO schools 
affect target and non-target groups differently should provide insights into how NGO 
schools affect female enrollment.
Panel A in Table 2.7 shows the results from estimating equation (2.4) separately 
for rural and urban areas, while Panels B and C show the results from estimating 
equation (2.6) for rural and urban areas. Columns (1) and (2) show that, for children 
aged 11 to 20 years old, the effect of being exposed to NGO schools on relative female 
enrollment can be found in both rural and urban areas, with the effect being stronger 
for the rural areas. Panels B and C show that the effects of NGO schools in increasing 
girls’ enrollment as compared to boys are found mainly in the rural areas. For Panel 
B, the coefficient of ‘Girl*At least 1 NGO school’ is positive and significant only for 
the rural areas. For Panel C, the coefficient of ‘Girl*Fraction NGO’ is positive and 
significant for the rural areas, and insignificant for the urban areas.
One possible reason NGO schools seem to increase relative female enrollment 
mainly in the rural areas is that in rural villages government schools and other types 
of schools are likely to be far away, therefore having an NGO school in the village 
would encourage parents to send the girls to school. As the theory suggested, the
44
disutility associated with sending a girl to school could be reduced by having NGO 
schools nearby to children’s homes. Moreover, in many cases the poorest children 
in urban areas who attend NGO schools are children of construction workers who 
often have to move from site to site, making it difficult for the children to continue 
in school.30
Table 2.8 shows the results from estimating equation (2.6) separately for BRAC 
target and non-target households. The results show that NGO schools have stronger 
effects in increasing relative female enrollment for BRAC target households as com­
pared to non-target households.31 The coefficients of 4Girl*At least 1 NGO school’ 
and ‘Girl*Fraction NGO’ are positive and significant in the case of target households. 
The effects on non-target households are positive though not statistically significant 
at the 10% level. The results suggest that the effects of NGO schools in increasing 
relative female enrollment is stronger for BRAC target households, although there is 
evidence of some effects in the case of non-target households as well. This is in fine 
with the fact that NGO schools also enrol children from non-target households.
In summary, it appears that NGO schools increase relative female enrollment 
mainly in the rural areas. Moreover, the effects of NGO schools in increasing relative 
female enrollment are stronger for BRAC target households compared to non-target 
households.32 These results make us more confident that the increase in female versus 
male primary school enrollment is being driven by exposure of poor rural households 
(and in particular BRAC target households) to NGO schools.
C. R obustness Checks
30I thank BRAC personnel who suggested this possibility.
31 As the criteria of land-owning is relevant only for the rural areas, the analysis focuses on BRAC 
target and non-target households in the rural areas.
32 As the condition of having ‘at least 1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a 
year’ may change each year, I also looked at the criterial of land-owning only. The results show 
that the effects of NGO schools in increasing relative female enrollment are positive and significant 
for households owning less than 0.5 acre of land and insignificant for households owning more than 
0.5 acre of land.
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R estric ting  to  B RA C schools
The largest NGO in non-formal primary education is the Bangladesh Rural Advance­
ment Committee (BRAC). The school data from the Education Watch Project shows 
that 73% of NGO schools are BRAC schools. Many smaller NGOs also follow the 
BRAC model in setting up and managing their schools.33 For a robustness check of 
whether the previous findings are driven by BRAC schools, here I restrict the analysis 
to BRAC schools only.
Table 2.9 shows that the main results regarding BRAC schools are very similar to 
those in the case of all NGO schools. Columns (1) to (6) show that, for children 6 to 10 
years old, BRAC school involvement is significantly associated with higher probability 
of being enrolled for girls as compared to boys, moreover, the effect is found mainly 
in the rural areas and the effects are stronger for BRAC target households compared 
to non-target households.34 These results are very similar to those found in the 
case of all NGO schools, and suggest that BRAC schools play an important role in 
increasing girls’ enrollment in Bangladesh and that the BRAC model of non-formal 
primary education contains certain characteristics which encourage girls’ enrollment.
2.4.2 What School Characteristics Determine Female Partic­
ipation in Education?
The previous section has shown that NGO schools contribute to an increase in female 
enrollment. The objective of this section is to uncover the mechanisms through which 
NGO schools affect female participation in education.
To find out the characteristics of NGO and government schools in the village of
33BRAC’s Education Support Programme provides support in the areas of technical, conceptual 
and human skills to 303 NGOs for 2,505 schools.
34 Similar results are found using ‘whether there is at least 1 BRAC school’ instead of ‘BRAC 
school involvement’.
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residence which affect enrollment, I estimate the equation:
P r(Sij = 1) =  <*0 + otiNcj + OL2Gcj 4- asCij + a±Aj + a 5Vcj +  error term (2.7)
where Ncj is a vector of aggregate village-level characteristics of NGO schools in 
village j ,  and Gcj is a vector of aggregate village-level characteristics of government 
schools in village j .  All other variables are as defined above. Here the analysis 
is restricted to villages with at least one NGO school, therefore the sample size is 
smaller compared to the previous section.
Interaction terms with Girl are included in the next equation to find out the 
different effects that village-level school characteristics have on the probability of 
being enrolled for girls as compared to boys.
P r(S^ =  1) =  ao +  aiNcj + a 2Girl * Ncj +  asGcj +  a^Girl * Gcj -1- a^Cij
-1- a^Girl * Cy +  a?Girl +  a%Aj +  agVcj +  error term (2.8)
The results are reported in Table 2.10. Column (1) shows that the most prominent 
NGO school characteristic which appears to encourage enrollment for all children is 
the high percentage of female teachers. The percentage of female teachers in NGO 
schools also appears to increase girls’ enrollment as compared to boys, the coefficient 
of ‘percentage of female teachers in NGO schools*Girl’ is positive and significant at 
the 5% level. For NGO schools, having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) also 
seems to encourage enrollment for all children.
For government schools, larger class size appears to discourage enrollment, and 
the effects appear similar for boys and girls. Having government school teachers with 
more experience seems to encourage girls’ enrollment, although there is no significant 
effect in the case of boys. Having School Management Committees (SMCs), on the
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other hand, appears to encourage boys’ enrollment with no effect in the case of girls.
Overall, the results suggest that high percentage of female teachers and having 
PTAs are important NGO school characteristics which encourage enrollment for both 
boys and girls. In particular, high percentage of female teachers appears to be the 
most prominent NGO school characteristic which encourages girls’ enrollment.35
2.4.3 How do NGO Schools Affect Learning Outcomes?
The impact of NGO schools on welfare depends not only on enrollment, but also on 
how the students are learning as a result of attending NGO schools. In this section 
I further investigate the quality of NGO schools using test score data. NGO schools 
use a different model of teaching compared to state schools, and there is no obvious 
reason why NGO school students should perform better or worse compared to those 
attending state schools.
Under the Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) survey, in each village 7 
boys and 7 girls aged 11-12 years old were randomly selected to take the ABC test.36 
Using this sample, I estimate the following equation:
Yij =  oto +  axTij +  OL^ Girl * +  OL^ Cij +  ct^Girl * Cij +  oc^ Vj
+ error term (2.9)
where represents (i) whether a child passed the ABC test or not, and (ii) test scores 
of life-skills, reading, writing, and numeracy sections. is the dummy variable for
35 As shown in Table 2.1, attendance rate is much higher in NGO schools compared to government 
schools (85% versus 55%). OLS regressions with attendance rate as dependent variable and school 
characteristics and school type dummies as explanatory variables show that the determinants of 
attendance are similar for boys and girls (results not shown). The single most important determinant 
of attendance is the percentage of teachers present on the day of school visit. Teacher absenteeism 
therefore appears to discourage attendance of both boys and girls. Teacher absenteeism is also quite 
common and is a major concern in other developing countries such as India (The PROBE team, 
1999).
36The Data Appendix contains detail on the ABC test.
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the type of school that the child was attending at the time of survey. I control for 
children who have dropped out of school, and the omitted category is the group who 
have never been enrolled. Other variables are as defined above.
A child is considered to have ‘basic education’, i.e. to pass the ABC test, if 
he/she satisfied the following criteria: (i) answering correctly at least 7 out of 10 life 
skills questions; (ii) answering correctly at least 3 of the 4 questions from the read­
ing comprehension passage; (iii) correctly communicating a given message through a 
letter; and (iv) answering correctly at least 3 of the 4 mental arithmetic questions 
(Chowdhury et al., 1999).
Table 2.11 shows that, for both boys and girls, attending an NGO school has 
positive and significant effects on the probability of passing the ABC test, and all 
test scores. Attending an NGO school also significantly increases the probability of 
passing the ABC test for girls as compared to boys. For each section’s test scores, 
however, the effects do not differ between boys and girls.
Attending a government school appears to significantly increase the probability of 
passing the ABC test for girls, although there seems to be no effect for boys. For all 
children, attending a government school significantly increases reading and writing 
scores. The effect on numeracy section is positive though not significant, and there 
appears to be no effect on life skills section.37 For each section, the effect of attending 
a government school do not differ between boys and girls.
The effects of attending an NGO school on test scores are larger than the effects of 
attending a government school. For reading skills38, compared to children who have 
never been enrolled, attending an NGO school increases the scores of reading skills by 
21% for boys and 22% for girls. For government schools, the corresponding effects are
37 The different effects of NGO schools and government schools on life skills section could be due 
to the curriculum. NGO schools emphasize more on matters such as health and personal hygiene, 
which are tested in the life skills section.
38 There are 4 questions for reading skills section.
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9% and 8% respectively. For writing skills39, attending an NGO school increases the 
scores by 26% for boys and 31% for girls, while the corresponding effects are 10% for 
both boys and girls in the case of government schools. Attending a government school 
does not show significant effects in improving scores for the fife skills and numeracy 
skills sections.
The strongest determinant of test scores for all sections is the last class passed. 
Listening to the radio, watching television, and reading newspaper are positively 
associated with the scores of life skills section. Listening to the radio and reading 
newspaper also significantly increase the probability of passing the ABC test. Most 
factors related to household economic status do not significantly affect children’s test 
scores. Most of the determinants of test scores appear similar for boys and girls.40
Results from Table 2.11 suggest that, controlling for other factors, attending an 
NGO school shows stronger effects in improving children’s test scores compared to 
attending a government school. For children who took the ABC test, those in NGO 
schools would have been in school for a shorter period of time compared to their peers 
in government schools, since NGO schools enrol children 8-10 years old while govern­
ment schools enrol children 6 years or above. Moreover, NGO school students are 
mainly those from the poorest families who were non-enrolled or have dropped out of 
school. As NGO schools use a different model of teaching, including a child-centered 
approach, simple textbooks which are relevant to rural fife, continuous evaluation 
instead of exams, and flexible class times, the strong effect of NGO schools on test 
scores is very likely the result of the NGO model of teaching.
Overall, the results indicate that NGO schools significantly improve children’s 
competencies in all areas tested by the ABC test. Moreover, attending an NGO
39 The full score for writing skills section is 9.
40 The most notable exception is that being from economically well-off families has a positive and 
significant relationship with the reading and writing scores for girls compared to boys. In fact, 
being from well-off families appears to have a negative effect on reading and writing scores for boys, 
a rather surprising result.
50
school significantly increases the probability of passing the ABC test for girls as 
compared to boys. The effects, however, do not appear to differ between boys and 
girls for each section’s test scores.
2.5 Conclusion
Bangladesh has achieved gender parity in primary enrollment in spite of being one 
of the poorest countries in the world. More surprisingly, it is among the poorest 
households in the rural areas where net enrollment rate of girls is most notably higher 
than that of boys. This is contrary to the situation in other low income countries. 
For Bangladesh, the entry of NGOs in primary education appears to be an important 
part of the success story. NGOs in Bangladesh are heavily involved in the provision 
of primary education, in particular to the poorest children.
Understanding what factors led to gender parity in primary enrollment is a key 
issue which has important policy implications. In this paper I identify the effects of 
NGO schools on girls’ enrollment and examine the characteristics which account for 
the relative performance of NGO versus state schools in improving girls’ educational 
outcomes.
The results show that the entry of NGO schools has significantly increased girls’ 
enrollment as compared to boys. For children aged 11 to 20 years old, being exposed 
to NGO schools significantly increases the probability of having been enrolled for 
girls as compared to boys. Moreover, for children aged 6 to 10 years old, living in a 
village with at least one NGO school or a village with higher NGO school involvement 
is associated with higher enrollment for girls as compared to boys. When divided into 
rural and urban areas, the effects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment are 
found mainly in the rural areas, where circumstances are likely to allow NGO schools 
to function well. Moreover, the effects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment
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axe stronger for BRAC target households, the original target group of NGO schools, 
compared to non-target households. The two most prominent characteristics of NGO 
schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female teachers 
and having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). NGO schools also show strong 
effects in improving children’s test scores.
The innovative ways of NGO schools and the resulting increase in girls’ enroll­
ment show what can be achieved when policies are designed to suit the needs of the 
poor. In this paper I have identified some characteristics of NGO schools which af­
fect educational outcomes. However, certain characteristics that are believed to have 
contributed to the success of NGO schools are those related to pedagogy practices 
and motivation. Such characteristics are difficult to capture in quantitative data. 
How dancing and singing are part of the curriculum and how NGO school teachers 
actually visited houses to convince parents to send their children to school are only 
some examples. There are other aspects of NGO schools that are beyond the scope 
of this paper.
2.6 A ppendix 1: D ata Appendix
The data used in this study came from the Education Watch Project. The Educa­
tion Watch project was initiated in 1998 by the Campaign for Popular Education 
(CAMPE), a coalition of more than 400 NGOs involved in non-formal primary edu­
cation, together with concerned individuals and organizations. The project aims to 
create more transparency in the education system in Bangladesh by collecting and 
providing accurate information relating to education, particularly primary education. 
CAMPE provided the secretariat for the project, while the Research and Evaluation 
Division of BRAC carried out the actual management and execution of the study. 
Three rounds of data have been collected; the first round in 1998, and the second and
52
third rounds in 2000. Each round of data contains information on certain aspects of 
education in Bangladesh. This paper uses the first round of data, which focuses on 
the internal efficiency41 of primary education system in Bangladesh.
The survey was conducted during October and November 1998, and data from 
42,584 households and 885 schools in 240 clusters covering all 64 districts in Bangladesh 
was collected. Out of 240 villages under the survey, 81 villages have at least 1 NGO 
school.
Three survey instruments were used to collect the data:
(1.) Household Survey Questionnaire (42,584 households from 312 villages in all 
64 districts with 31,092 children). This questionnaire has 4 sections: profile of each 
household member, schooling of the members aged 4-20 years, parental information, 
and household level information.
(2.) Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) Questionnaire (3,360 children: 7 
boys and 7 girls from each of the 240 clusters). This part of the survey is intended to 
provide information on the level of basic competencies of the children as an indicator 
of achievement. There are four sections: life skills/knowledge, reading, writing, and 
numeracy.
A child is considered to have ‘basic education’ if he/she satisfied the following 
criteria: (i) answering correctly at least seven of the ten fife skills questions; (ii) an­
swering correctly at least three of the four questions from the reading comprehension 
passage; (iii) correctly communicating a given message through a letter; and (iv) 
answering correctly at least three of the four mental arithmetic questions.
(3.) School Observation Checklist (885 schools). There are seven sections in the 
checklist: general information about the school, classroom information, teachers’ pro­
file, community participation, retention and dropout, school visit by the supervisors,
41 In education literature two types of efficiencies are identified: external and internal. External 
efficiency refers to broader social goals such as better health and productive person-power for the 
labour market, while internal efficiency refers to objectives which are internal to the education system 
such as enrollment and achievement (Chowdhury et al., 1999).
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and losses due to the flood of 1998.
The sampling procedure was designed in such a way that the data is nation­
ally representative. Because of variations in educational attainment in different 
geographical regions in Bangladesh, eight different surveys were carried out in each 
strata. The strata considered were six rural divisions, the metropolitan cities and the 
non-metropolitan urban areas.42 For each stratum the same sample size and similar 
sampling strategy were followed. Employing a multi-stage sampling procedure, at 
the first stage, for each stratum 30 thanas (pourashava for non-metropolitan urban 
areas) were selected through systematic random sampling technique with probability 
proportional to size (PPS). At the second stage, one union (or ward for the urban 
strata) for each selected thana/pourashava was selected randomly. At the third 
stage, one village (mahalla for the urban strata) was selected, again randomly, for 
each selected union/ward. In other words, 30 villages/mahalla were selected for each 
stratum, totalling 240 for the whole of Bangladesh. It came out that all 64 districts 
of the country were represented in the sample.
For each village/mahalla, the number of households interviewed varied between 
125 and 200, depending on the size of the village/mahalla. The interviewers started 
in the north-west corner of the village/mahalla, and surveyed the first household of 
the corner, and then moved anti-clockwise for the next household, and continued 
doing so. If the village/mahalla was small, and the number of households did not 
reach 125, then the interviewers moved to the closest village/mahalla and completed 
the interview. If there were more than 200 households in the village/mahalla, then 
the survey stopped at reaching the 200th household. For each village/mahalla, 14 
children (7 boys and 7 girls) aged 11-12 years, chosen randomly from the surveyed 
households, were interviewed for the ABC survey. For the school survey, all schools
42 The six rural divisions axe rural Dhaka, rural Chittagong, rural Rajshahi, rural Khulna, rural 
Barisal, and rural Sylhet, while the metropolitan cities and the non-metropolitan urban areas are 
located throughout the country.
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located in the selected village/mahalla and its adjacent village/mahalla were surveyed 
through the School Observation Checklist.
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TABLE 2.1 
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES
Panel A: Individual Level Means* All Bangladesh Rural Urban
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Enrollment rate .766 .791 .760 .793 .793 .784
(.42) (.41) (.43) (.41) (.41) (.41)
Number of adults in household 2.59 2.59 2.57 2.57 2.67 2.66
(1 3 7 ) (1.36) (1.31) (1.34) (1.56) (1.45)
Number of siblings 3.83 3.90 3.92 4.00 3.51 3.50
(1.72) (1 6 9 ) (1.72) (1.70) (1.68) (1.58)
Proportion of boys among siblings .67 .36 .66 .37 .68 .32
(2 3 ) (.23) (2 3 ) (.22) (.24) (2 4 )
Proportion of female headed households .030 .030 .032 .032 .024 .026
(.17) (.17) (1 8 ) (.18) (1 5 ) (1 6 )
Father’s education (class passed) 3.13 3.18 2.64 2.70 5.04 4.95
(4.22) (4.25) (3.77) (3.82) (5.19) (5.17)
Mother’s education (class passed) 1.99 2.00 1.58 1.62 3.57 3.41
(3.19) (3.17) (2.68) (2.72) (4.31) (4.17)
Proportion of households ‘always in deficit’ .33 .32 .35 .34 .24 .23
(.47) (.47) (4 8 ) (.48) (.43) (.42)
Proportion of households ‘sometimes in deficit’ .33 .34 .35 .36 .29 .29
(4 7 ) (4 8 ) (.48) (4 8 ) (4 5 ) (.45)
Proportion of households economically ‘balance’ .24 .24 .22 .22 .33 .32
(4 3 ) (.43) (.41) (.41) (-47) (.47)
Proportion of households economically ‘surplus' .09 .10 .08 .08 .15 .16
(.29) (.30) (.27) (.27) (3 6 ) (.37)
Proportion of households: mother access to NGO .18 .18 .19 .19 .12 .13
credit (.38) (.38) (3 9 ) (.39) (.33) (.33)
Proportion of household: mother involved in .25 .25 .27 .26 .19 .21
income generating activities (4 3 ) (4 3 ) (4 4 ) (-44) (.39) (.41)
Proportion of households: member sells labor at .48 .48 .51 .52 .37 .35
least 100 days/year (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.48) (.48)
Number of observations 15846 15187 12568 11965 3278 3222
Panel B: Village Level M eans All Bangladesh Rural Urban
Involvement of NGO schools .07 .066 .084
(.13) (1 3 ) (.15)
Involvement o f government schools .61 .65 .49
(2 9 ) (3 0 ) (.24)
Number of observations 240 180 60
Panel C: School Level M eans NGO schools Gov. schools
Class size 29.8 55.3
(5.1) (30.7)
Proportion of teachers present on day of visit .97 .86
(-15) (-18)
Proportion of female teachers .92 .35
(.26) (.33)
Teachers' education (years) 10.1 11.8
(1.3) (1 0 )
Teachers’ experience (years) 2.65 19.5
(2.4) (5.7)
Proportion of schools with PTAs .34 .70
(4 7 ) (4 6 )
Proportion o f schools with SMCs .77 .99
(4 2 ) (0 9 )
Attendance rate .85 .55
(.16) (.15)
Number of observations 215 353
* Individual Level Means are those of individuals aged 6-10 years old.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for detail on the 1998 Education Watch Data.
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TABLE 2.2
PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN WITH NO SCHOOLING 
BY COHORT AND VILLAGE OF RESIDENCE
NGO school availability in village o f  residence
At least 1 NGO school N o NGO school
Aged 17-20 Aged 11-14 % Change Aged 17-20 Aged 11-14 % Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls: .273 .126 -53.8 .244 .149 -38.9
(•44) (.33) (.43) (.36)
Boys: .234 .180 -23.1 .207 .165 -20.3
(.43) (.39) (.41) (.37)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
TA B LE 2.3
D ET ER M IN A N T S OF NGO SCH O O L LO C A T IO N
D ependent variable: The involvem ent o f  NG O  schools in a village
All Bangladesh Rural Urban
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V illage  ch aracteristics:
Average class passed (adults 21 +) -.025 -.025 -.022
(3 .3)*** (2 .3 )** (1.8)*
% adults (21+) with no schooling .259 .213 .399
(3.5)*** (2 .5)** (2 .5)**
NG O  m icro-credit in village .039 .053 .063 .066 -.025 -.012
(1.6) (2.1)** (1 .9 )* (2 .0 )** (.56) (.28)
Average econom ic status .023 .007 .038 .031 .011 .022
(.59) (.21) (.82) (-67) ( 1 6 ) (.34)
% landless households -.003 -.006 -.034 -.045 .108 .105
(.05) (.09) (.48) (.63 ) (.81) (.81)
% hh w / members who sell labor .050 .045 .031 .033 .108 .051
100 days/year + (.74) (.67) (.38) (-41) (.87) (.41)
% fem ale- headed households -.024 .007 -.003 .009 -.432 -.379
(.13) (.04) (.02) (.04) (1.0) (-91)
% M uslim s -.005 -.013 -.035 -.041 .125 .109
(.13) (.35) (.80) ( 9 2 ) (1 .5) (1 .3)
Stratum effects Y es Yes Y es Y es Y es Y es
Num ber o f  observations 240 240 180 180 60 60
Adjusted R-squared .14 .14 .10 .10 .25 .29
A bsolute t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10% , 5% , and 1% level, respectively.
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TABLE 2.4
ENTRY OF NGO SCHOOLS AN D  G IRLS’ ENROLLM ENT A N D  CLA SS PASSED: 
BOYS A N D  GIRLS AGED 11 TO 20
Dependent variable: Ever enrolled = 1 Dependent variable: Last class passed
All children Exposed N on­
exposed
All children Exposed N on­
exposed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposed to NGO school .182 .004 .207 .089
(2.0)** (.03) (1.7)* (.69)
Girl*Exposed to NGO school ,385 .231
(2.9)*** (2.8)***
Girl .065 -1.53 .308 .036 .102 -1.88 .290 .079
(1.3) (6.4)*** (2.7)*** (.70) (2.6)** (7.1)*** (3.1 )*** (1.9)*
Control for child and Yes Y es Yes Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
family characteristics
Village effects Yes Y es Yes Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Number o f  observations 43738 43738 4369 39264 43677 43677 4468 39209
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 .254 .258 .253 .257 .449 .449 .408 .449
For columns (1) -  (4), absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. For columns (5) -  (8), absolute t-statisiics are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village 
level. Child and family characteristics include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage 
of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s 
self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating 
activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion. A child is 
considered ‘exposed to an NGO school’ if he/she was 10 years old or younger when the first NGO school in the village was 
established.
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T A B LE 2.5
EN TR Y  O F NG O  SCH O O LS, E N R O L LM E N T, A N D  C L A SS PA SSE D : 
B O Y S A N D  GIRLS A G E D  ] 1 TO  20
D ep Var: Ever enrolled = 1 D ep  var: Last class passed
B oys Girls B oys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Num ber NG O  sch oo ls*agel 1 .003 .093 .231 .261
(.03) (1 .0) (1-6) (1 .9)*
12 .130 .162 .229 .269
(1 .4) (2 .1 )** (1 .8 )* (2 .1)**
13 .007 .177 .206 .245
(.08) (2 .3 )** (1 .5 ) (1 .7)*
14 .049 .161 .138 .294
(.38) (2 .2 )** (.93) (2 .1 )**
15 .102 .196 .194 .266
(1 .1) (2 .5 )** (1 .4 ) (2 .1)**
16 .012 .099 .088 .171
(.14) (1 .5 ) (.68) (1 .4)
17 -.020 .116 .030 .138
(.25) (1 .5) (.24) (1-1)
18 .030 .099 .010 .109
(-36) (1 .3 ) (-07) (.93)
19 -.042 .023 -.080 -.034
(.41) (.20) (.46) (.19)
Control for child and Yes Y es Y es Y es
fam ily characteristics
V illage effects Yes Y es Y es Y es
Num ber o f  observations 22081 21657 22052 21629
Pseudo R 2 /  Adjusted R 2 .238 .304 .448 .459
For columns (1) and (2), absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. For columns (3) and (4), absolute t- 
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Child and family 
characteristics include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, 
percentage o f boys among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father’s 
education, mother’s education, household's self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access 
to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one 
member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion. A child is considered 
‘exposed to an NGO school’ if  he/she was 10 years old or younger when the first NGO school in the 
village was established.
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TABLE 2.6
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school =  1
0 ) (2) (3) (4)
At least 1 NG O  school .013 -.114
(.15 ) (1 .2 )
G irl*At least 1 N G O  school .220
(2 .6 )***
At least 1 governm ent school .107 .089
(.71 ) (.54)
Girl*At least 1 governm ent school .045
(.36)
NG O  school involvem ent -.656 -.917
(1 .7 )* (2 .2 )**
G irl*NG O  school involvem ent .543
(1 .8)*
G overnm ent school involvem ent .075 -.006
(.47) (.04)
G irl*G ov. school involvem ent .168
(1 .3 )
Girl .114 -.748 .114 -.680
(2 .6 )*** (2 .6 )*** (2 .7 )*** (2 .3 )**
Control for child and fam ily Y es Y es Y es Y es
characteristics
Control for village characteristics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Stratum effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Num ber o f  observations 31033 31033 31033 31033
P seudo R2 .143 .146 .143 .146
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Child and family characteristics 
include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all 
siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s 
self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income- 
generating activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 
days/year, and religion. Village characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an 
NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage o f landless households, percentage of  
households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and 
percentage of Muslims in the village.
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TABLE 2.7
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: RURAL VERSUS URBAN AREAS
Rural versus urban
D ep var: Ever enrolled =  1 D ep var: Currently enrolled = 1
Rural Urban Rural Urban
0 ) (2) (3) (4)
P A N E L  A: 1 1 -20  y ea rs o ld
Exposed to NG O  school .010 -.104
(.08) (.58 )
Girl*Exposed to NG O  school .315 .594
(2 .2)** (1 .9 )*
Girl -1 .37 -2 .23
(4 4)*** (4. l)* * *
P A N E L  B: 6 -10  y ears o ld
M ea su re  o f  su p p ly  o f  N G O  sch o o ls  (1)
At least 1 NG O  school -.149 -.103
(1 .4 ) (.51 )
Girl*At least 1 NGO .195 .211
school (2 .0 )** (1 .5 )
At least 1 gov. school .015 .157
(.07) (.77 )
Girl*At least 1 gov. -.022 .020
school ( 1 3 ) (.14 )
Girl -.639 -.407
(2 .0 )** (.87 )
P A N E L  C: 6 -1 0  y ea rs o ld
M ea su re  o f  su p p ly  o f  N G O  sc h o o ls  (2)
Fraction: NGO schools -1 .02 -1 .88
(1 .9 )* (2 .5 )**
Girl*Fraction NGO .796 -.086
(2 .2 )** (-22)
Fraction: G ov. schools -.198 -.025
(1 .1 ) (.06 )
Girl*Fraction Gov. .116 .015
(.85) (-06)
Girl -.591 -.305
(1 .8 )* ( 6 0 )
Control for child and Y es Y es Yes Y es
fam ily characteristics
Control for v illage N o N o Yes Y es
characteristics
Stratum effects N o N o Y es Y es
V illage effects Y es Y es N o N o
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Child and family characteristics include: age o f the child, 
number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a 
female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic status, whether 
mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one 
member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion. Village characteristics include percentage 
of adults with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of 
landless households, percentage of households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female 
headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the village.
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TABLE 2.8
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: BRAC TARGET VERSUS NON-TARGET HOUSEHOLDS
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1
B R A C  target versus non -target hou seh old s
T arget Non-target Target N on-target
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least 1 N G O  school -.138 -.181
(1-0) (1-7)*
G irl*A t least 1 N G O  school .214 .169
(1-7)* (1 .5)
At least 1 governm ent school .187 -.299
(-88) (1 .2 )
Girl*At least 1 governm ent school -.259 .352
(1-4) (1 .4 )
N G O  school involvem ent - .7 3 7 -1 .39
(1 .1 ) (3 .4 )**
G irl*N G O  school involvem ent .872 .648
(2 .0 )** (1 .6 )
G overnm ent school involvem ent -.029 -.364
(.14 ) (1 .8 )
G irl*G ov. school involvem ent .198 -.026
(1 .1 ) (.14)
Girl -.403 -.608 -.6 8 4 -.216
(1-0) (1 .6 ) (1 .6 ) (.66)
Control for child and fam ily Y es Y es Y es Y es
characteristics
Control for v illage characteristics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Stratum effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
N um ber o f  observations 10331 14202 10331 14202
P seudo R2 .107 .142 .107 .142
Absolute z-statistics are in'parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Child and family characteristics 
include: age o f the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage o f boys among all 
siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father's education, mother’s education, household’s 
self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income- 
generating activities, whether there is at least one member o f the household who sells labor more than 100 
days/year, and religion. Village characteristics include percentage o f  adults with no schooling, whether there is an 
NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage o f landless households, percentage o f  
households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage o f female headed households, and 
percentage of Muslims in the village.
64
TABLE 2.9
BRAC SCHOOLS AND ENROLLMENT:
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10
D ependent variable: Currently enrolled  = 1
A ll Bangladesh Rural Urban Target N on-target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction: B R A C  schools -1 .42 -1.91 -1 .80 3 .34 -2 .00 -1 .63
(3 .4 )*** (5 .1)*** (4 .2 )*** (4.1 )*** (3 .7 )***
G irl*Fraction BRA C 1.05 1.27 -.1 4 4 1.61 .836
(2.3)** (3 .1 )* * * (-26) (3 .1 )*** (1 .8 )*
Fraction: G ov. schools .044 .037 -.234 .319 -.094 -.352
(.28 ) (.23) (1 .3 ) (.85) (.47) (1 .8 )*
Girl*Fraction G ov. .169 .126 -.031 .211 -.021
(1 .4) ( 9 1 ) (.12 ) (1-2) (.12)
Girl .116 -.680 -.6 0 6 -.169 -.716 -.226
(2 7)*** (2 .3)** (1 .9 )* (.3 2 ) (1 .7)* (.69)
Control for child and Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
fam ily  characteristics
Control for village Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
characteristics
Stratum effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Num ber o f  observations 31033 31033 24533 6 5 0 0 10331 14202
Pseudo R2 .146 .148 .151 .190 .109 .142
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Child and family characteristics include: age o f the child, number o f adults in 
the household, number o f siblings, percentage o f boys among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, 
father’s education, mother’s education, household's self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, 
whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one member o f the household who sells labor 
more than 100 days/year, and religion. Village characteristics include percentage o f adults with no schooling, whether there is an 
NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with 
members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the 
village.
65
TABLE 2.10
SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS AND ENROLLMENT:
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1
Pooled Interacted
Level *Girl
(1) (2) (3)
Class size (NGO) .012 .004 .016
(.67) (.19) (.78)
Class size (Gov.) -.008 -.007 -.001
(2.5)** (2 .2)** (.18)
% teachers present (NGO) -.577 -.304 -.811
(.22) (.11) (0.38)
% teachers present (G ov.) -.254 -.096 -.497
(.48) (.17) (1.1)
% female teachers (NGO) 1.41 .927 1.04
(4 ■})*** (2 .7)*** (2.3)**
% female teachers (Gov.) .165 .007 .276
(.30) (.01) (.67)
Teachers' education (NGO) -.026 .002 -.056
(.31) (.02) (.89)
Teachers' education (Gov.) .056 .003 .133
(.39) (.02) (1.2)
Teachers' experience (NGO) -.013 -.027 .019
(.44) (.67) (-47)
Teachers’ experience (G ov.) .034 .006 .065
(L 3) (.23) (2.7)***
% o f  schools with PTAs (NGO) .367 .364 -.005
(1.8)* (1.7)* (.03)
% o f schools with PTAs (G ov.) -.047 -.025 -.078
(.28) (-15) (.50)
% o f schools with SM Cs (NGO) .316 .474 -.331
(1.4) (2 .0)** (1.7)*
% o f schools with SM Cs (G ov.) 1.84 2.72 -1.97
(1.5) (1.9)* (1.5)
Control for child and Y es Yes
family characteristics
Control for village Yes Y es
characteristics
Stratum effects Yes Yes
Number o f  observations 8611 8611
Pseudo R2 .158 .168
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Child and family characteristics include: age of 
the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether 
the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother's education, household’s self-perceived 
economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating 
activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and 
religion. Village characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro­
credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with 
members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and percentage of 
Muslims in the village.
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TABLE 2.11
TEST SCORES: B O Y S A N D  GIRLS AG ED 11 TO 12
ABC L ife skills Readin oa Writing Numeracy
Level *Girl Level *Girl Level *Girl Level *Girl Level *Girl
(1) (2) (3) (4) ■ (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Currently attending .902 2.02 .708 .498 .838 .053 2.35 .468 : .384 .105
NGO school (1.6) (2.5)** (2 .6)*** (1.4) (4 .6)*** (.20) (5.6)*** (-79) ; (2 .3)** (.45)
Currently attending -.046 1.51 -.132 .269 .361 -.030 0.89 .015 .212 -.068
government school (.10) (1.9)* (.56) (.88) (2.6)** (.16) (3.1)*** (.04) ; (1-4) (.30)
Indicator: Girl -1.48 -.850 .604 .383 i -.943
(L I ) (1 .5 ) (1.9)* (.73) ;(4 0)* * *
Class passed .761 -.062 .399 -.049 .525 -.005 1.08 .025 : .226 .102
(8.6)*** (.53) (9 3)*** (.87) (17.4)*** (.12) (17.5)*** (-31) (9 0)*** (2 7)***
Listen to the radio .526 -.494 .226 .029 .136 -.026 .200 -.201 ; -.014 .074
(3.1)*** (2.0)** (2.5)** (.23) (2.1)** (.28) (1.6) (1.0) ; (.26) (9 4 )
Watch television -.058 .140 .208 -.061 .041 -.110 -.013 -.061 .039 -.144
(.32) (.62) (2 .0)** (-46) (.55) (1-1) (-10) (.33) - (-71) (1.7)*
Read newspaper .973 .078 .366 .048 -.090 .427 -.030 .686 -.023 .218
(2 9)*** (.18) (2 .6)** (.20) (.90) (2 .9)*** (.15) (2 .0)** i (-38) (1.9)*
Father’s education .035 .005 .016 .001 .019 .002 .051 .004 1 -.002 -.000
(1.4) (.14) (1 .1) (-03) (1.8)* (.15) (2 .7)*** (.14) - (-22) (-02)
M other’s education .054 -.028 .011 .024 -.018 .013 -.003 .019 .010 -.003
(1.5) (.58) (.56) (-96) (1.4) (.75) (.11) (.55) : (1 .1) (.18)
A lw ays in deficit -.206 .341 .096 .017 -.073 .013 -.159 .047 : .034 .059
(.83) (1-0) (.71) (-10) ( 8 1 ) (-11) ( 8 9 ) (•19) ; (.43) (.53)
Som etim es in deficit -.252 .331 -.078 .006 -.066 .086 -.256 .180 I -.010 .106
(1 .3) (1-1) (.63) ( 0 4 ) (.83) (.71) (1.7) (-78) j (-15) (1.2)
Surplus -.540 .708 -.153 .022 -.237 .343 -.614 .683 ; -.072 .181
(1.9)* (1.9)* (.99) (.11) (2.0)** (2.1)** (2 .7)*** (2.2)** 1 (-92) (1.5)
Mother: access to NGO credit -.037 .294 .156 -.026 -.070 .146 -.164 .089 ! .035 .028
( 1 6 ) (.95) (1 .4) (.16) (.70) (1.2) (.86) (.38) 1 (-53) (.29)
Mother: involve in incom e .010 -.125 , -.067 .115 -.051 -.031 -.122 -.138 : .030 -.030
generating activities (.05) (.48) (.62) (.78) (.64) (.29) (.78) (-69) ;  (-50) (.33)
At least 1 member o f  hh .215 -.179 .026 -.170 .037 -.153 .052 -.197 i  .029 .060
sells labor 100 days/year + (1.1) (.65) (.26) (1.2) (.52) (1.6) (.35) (1.0) 1 (-53)
i
(.70)
Control for other fam ily charac. Yes Yes Y es Y es 1 Yes
and other school types
V illage effects Yes Y es Y es Y es Y es
Number o f  observations 3061 3324 3324 3324 j 3324
Pseudo R2 /  Adjusted R2 .339 .363 .518 .577 1 .295
For colum ns (1) and (2), absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. F o r colum ns (3) to (10), absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significance a t the 10%, 5% , and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Child and family 
characteristics include: age o f the child, num ber o f  adults in the household, num ber o f siblings, percentage o f  boys am ong all siblings, 
w hether the household is a fem ale headed household, father’s education, m other’s education, household’s self-perceived econom ic status, 
w hether m other has access to N G O  credit, w hether m other is engaged in incom e-generating activities, w hether there is a t least one m em ber o f 
the household w ho sells labor m ore than 100 days/year, and religion.
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FIGURE 2.1: EXPANSION OF NGO SCHOOLS IN BANGLADESH
Notes: All variables refer to  the cum ulative num ber of NGO schools. The variables 
are constructed  using inform ation from the  1998 E ducation W atch data.
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FIGURE 2.2A: NET ENROLLM ENT IN B A N G L A D ESH
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FIGURE 2.2B: NET ENROLLM ENT A N D  SELF PERCEIVED ECONOM IC  
STATUS IN R U R A L BAN G LADESH
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FIGURE 2.2C: NET ENROLLM ENT A N D  SELF PERCEIVED ECONOM IC  
STATUS IN U R BA N  BAN GLADESH
Notes: The variables are constructed using inform ation from th e  1998 Education 
W atch data . The D ata A ppendix provides a full description of the  data. BRAC 
ta rge t households are defined as households w ith less th a n  0.5 acre of land and at 
least 1 person engaged in m anual labor for a t least 100 days a year (N ath, 1999).
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FIGURE 2.3A: NET ENROLLMENT IN BANGLADESH, INDIA, AND NEPAL:
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FIGURE 2.3B: NET ENROLLMENT IN BANGLADESH, INDIA, AND NEPAL:
BY ECONOMIC STATUS
Notes: The variables are constructed using inform ation from the  Demographic and 
H ealth  Survey (Bangladesh 1999, India 1998/99, and N epal 2001), as reported  in 
the d a ta  sheet in support of Film er (2003).
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2.7 A ppendix 2
TABLE 2.12
DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1
All Bangladesh Rural Urban
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NGO school involvement -.862 -.444 -.870 -.403 -1.73 -2.10
(2.2)** (-1.0) (1.7)* (7 7 ) (2.3)** (2.0)**
Government school involvement .039 .130 -.140 -.142 .045 -.063
(.24) (-71) (.75) (.73) (.10) (1 0 )
Number adults .080 .080 .094 .111 .019 -.018
(3.9)*** (4.1)*** (4.2)*** (5.0)*** (.40) (.49)
Number siblings -.036 -.058 -.057 -.074 .059 -.004
(2.3)** . (3.5)*** (3.5)*** (4.1)*** (1.7)* (.10)
Percentage of boys -.447 .174 -.463 .168 -.382 .197
(5.0)*** (1.5) (4.5)*** (1-3) (2.1)** (-82)
Female head of household -.213 -.052 -.257 -.082 .070 .129
(1.9)* (.38) (2.1)** (.53) (.21) (.39)
Father's education .078 .107 .093 .116 .042 .090
(8.6)*** (10.4)*** (8.9)*** (10.7)*** (2.2)** (4.1)***
Mother's education .139 .140 .128 .126 .193 .188
(10.5)*** (9.2)*** (8.3)*** (6.7)*** (7.1)*** (6.6)***
Always in deficit -.530 -.536 -.512 -.571 -.642 -.311
(7.6)*** (7.1)*** (6.7)*** (6.8)*** (4.2)*** (2.0)**
Sometimes in deficit -.106 -.100 -.143 -.184 .005 .199
(1.7)** (1-3) (2.1)** (2.2)** (0 4 ) (1.3)
Surplus .168 -.432 .120 -.111 .315 -.731
(1 6 ) (3.1)*** (.94) (.75) (1.7)* (3.3)***
Mother: access to NGO credit .257 .285 .172 .189 .667 .637
(3.3)*** (3.6)*** (2.1)** (2.3)** (4.1)*** (3.4)***
Mother: income generating -.009 -.132 .054 -.108 -.391 -.333
activities ( 16 ) (1.9)** (.84) (1.3) (3.6)*** (2.7)***
At lease 1 household member -.490 -.357 -.537 -.364 -.308 -.394
sells labour 100 days/year + (9.7)*** (6.2)*** (9.6)*** (5.7)*** (2.9)*** (3.3)***
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number o f observations 15846 15187 12568 11965 3278 3222
Pseudo R2 .143 .153 .140 .162 .191 .185
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Child and family characteristics include: age of the 
child, number of adults in the household, number o f siblings, percentage o f boys among all siblings, whether the 
household is a female headed household, father's education, mother's education, household’s self-perceived economic 
status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether 
there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion. Village 
characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, 
average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage o f households with members who sell labor 
more than 100 days/year, percentage o f female headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the village. 
Percentage of adults with no schooling has a negative and significant relationship with the probability o f being enrolled 
for both boys and girls. Percentage of households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year has a positive 
and significant relationship with the probability o f being enrolled for boys. All other village characteristics are 
insignificant.
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Chapter 3
M otivation, School Inputs, and  
Educational Outcom es: Evidence 
from NGO Schools in Bangladesh
A bstract
This chapter uses nationally representative data to study teacher absenteeism, 
student attendance, and community participation in primary schools in Bangladesh. 
The study focuses on government, private, and NGO schools. The results show that, 
after controlling for other factors, NGO school teachers are more likely to be present 
in school, NGO schools are associated with higher student attendance rates, and 
guardians of NGO school students, in particular mothers, are more likely to partic­
ipate in school meetings. Motivation appears the most important factor explaining 
teacher presence among NGO school teachers. Teacher attendance rate and other 
factors relating to curriculum and school facility explain student attendance in NGO 
schools. There is evidence that guardians’ participation in school meetings is posi­
tively correlated with test scores.
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3.1 Introduction
Although the importance of education is universally accepted1, there are still major 
problems in the delivery of education in many developing countries. One of the key 
problems is teacher absenteeism. The 1999 Public Report on Basic Education in India 
(The PROBE team, 1999) brought to attention the severe state of teacher absenteeism 
in North Indian states. Nationally representative data show that teacher absence 
rates are as high as 25% and 27% in India and Uganda, respectively (Chaudhury et 
al., 2005). Teachers in Kenya were absent from school 20% of the time and absent 
from their classrooms even more frequently (Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer, 2004).
The prevalence of teacher absenteeism has led several researchers to address this 
problem. Chaudhury et al. (2005) analyze nationally representative data on pri­
mary school teacher absence in six countries2, and find that working conditions and 
administrative monitoring are correlated with absence. On the other hand, proxies 
for intrinsic motivation, community monitoring, and salary levels do not explain ab­
sence. Kremer et al. (2005)3 find that teacher absence in India is correlated with 
daily incentives to attend work such as school inspection and infrastructure, while 
compensation does not appear to affect absence.4 Banerjee and Duflo (2005) provide 
evidence from a number of randomized experiments designed to address the problem 
of absence of teachers and health providers in developing countries. The evidence 
suggests that teachers do respond to incentives, however, the constraint seems to be 
in getting the incentives implemented.
theoretical growth models, such as Lucas (1988) and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), 
emphasize the role of human capital in the form of educational attainment. Several cross-country 
studies, for example Barro and Lee (1994) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001), confirm the positive 
correlation between education and growth. Micro evidence of the return to education include Duflo 
(2001) and a survey in Card (1999).
2The six countries are Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, and Uganda.
3 Kremer et al. (2005) use the data for India which come from the same data base as Chaudhury 
et al. (2005).
4 One way of interpreting the results is that overall teacher compensation has little effect on 
absence because teachers cannot be fired and attendance rates do not affect compensation.
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Together with teacher absenteeism, low student attendance is another pressing 
concern in many developing countries. While teacher absence is likely to discourage 
student attendance, student absence may also be caused by several other factors 
including poor health, families’ need for child labor, and school quality. Miguel and 
Kremer (2003) find that a program of school-based mass treatment with deworming 
drugs in Kenya is effective in reducing school absenteeism. Providing cash grants 
to mothers conditional on children’s school attendance is found to increase school 
participation in Mexico (Schultz, 2001).
Moreover, guardians’ interests in their children’s education can also play an im­
portant role in improving educational outcomes. For example, Jimenez and Sawada 
(1999) find that guardians’ participation in school meetings and monitoring improves 
learning outcomes and student attendance.
In this chapter I analyze the factors which are correlated with teacher absen­
teeism, student attendance, and guardians’ participation in school meetings. Using 
nationally representative data from the Education Watch project in Bangladesh, I 
examine the effects of school types and school characteristics on teacher presence and 
student attendance. I focus on three types of schools: government schools, regis­
tered non-government schools (henceforth private schools), and NGOs’ non-formal 
schools (henceforth NGO schools). Although there are 11 types of primary schools 
in Bangladesh, the above three types together enrol more than 90% of the students 
in primary schools.
NGO schools in Bangladesh employ a different model of education delivery com­
pared to government and private schools. NGO schools were initiated in the middle 
of the 1980s with the objective of providing basic education to the poorest children 
who were non-enrolled or have dropped out of school. NGO school characteristics 
are designed to suit the needs of the poor. For example, parents and the teacher 
decide together on the timing of the lessons. The community is usually involved in
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the management and supervision of the schools. A school is usually a one-room 
construction built inside the village with one teacher and up to 33 children. Over 
90% of NGO school teachers are female, and the curriculum is child-centered and 
includes dancing and singing. At present, around 1.4 milhon children are in NGO 
schools.5 The single largest NGO in education is the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), which provides non-formal education to 1.2 milhon children.
Data from the Education Watch project show that teacher absence rates vary 
greatly among different types of schools. For government schools and private schools, 
teacher absence rates are 14% and 21%, respectively. For NGO schools, teacher 
absence rate is only at 3%. Moreover, the student attendance rate is much higher 
in NGO schools compared to government and private schools (84% versus 55% and 
49%, respectively).
Although the main response to poorly functioning or inadequate formal schools 
has been non-formal schools run by NGOs or the community, it is not always the case 
that non-formal schools perform better than state schools with regards to teacher 
absence. For example, Kremer et al. (2005) find that locally controlled non-formal 
schools in India have higher absence rates than schools rim by the state government. 
Using data from a survey of 60 non-formal education centers run by an NGO in 
Udaipur, Duflo and Hanna (2005) find that the average absence rates for teachers in 
these education centers was 36%.
Why do NGO schools in Bangladesh have such high teacher presence and stu­
dent attendance rates? To investigate this issue, I analyze how school character­
istics affect teacher presence differently for NGO schools compared to other types 
of schools. Moreover, I focus on NGO school teachers and test several hypotheses 
regarding factors which might affect teacher presence. Using school-level data on 
student attendance rates, I find out how school characteristics affect student atten­
5 This is approximately 8% of the children enrolled in primary schools.
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dance differently for NGO schools compared to other types of schools. As community 
participation is an important characteristic of NGO schools which possibly affect ed­
ucational outcomes, I also analyze the factors which affect guardians’ participation in 
school meetings, and whether the factors are similar or different among students at­
tending government, private, and NGO schools. Finally, I investigate the relationship 
between guardians’ participation in school meetings and test scores.
The empirical analysis shows that, after controlling for other factors, NGO school 
teachers are more likely to be present in school, NGO schools are associated with 
higher student attendance rates, and guardians of children attending NGO schools 
are more likely to participate in school meetings. Teacher motivation, monitoring, 
and school facility appear to play a role in the high teacher attendance in NGO schools 
when compared to other types of schools. Motivation appears the most important 
factor explaining teacher presence among NGO school teachers. High student atten­
dance rate in NGO schools could be explained by high teacher attendance rate, as well 
as other factors relating to curriculum and school facility. Guardians’ participation 
in school meetings appears positively correlated with certain sections’ test scores.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of primary 
education in Bangladesh with an emphasis on NGO schools. Section 3.3 discusses 
the data and section 3.4 contains the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background
Primary education in Bangladesh is 5 years in length, starting at age 6. There are 
11 types of primary schools.6 Presently about two-thirds of students are enrolled in 
government schools, around 20% are in private schools, and 8% are in NGO schools.
6The 11 types of primary schools are: government, non-government registered, non-government 
unregistered, primary schools attached to high schools, PTI’s experimental schools, Ebtedayee 
Madrassas (independent), Ebtedayee attached to high madrassas, kindergarten, satellite schools, 
community schools, and non-formal schools run by NGOs.
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In Bangladesh, NGOs play an important role in the provision of non-formal educar 
tion. Prom the second half of 1980s, the state has allowed NGOs to experiment with 
a variety of delivery mechanisms to cater for basic education needs of the disadvan­
taged households, and non-formal education has been accepted as a complementary 
approach to formal education.
The largest NGO working in the field of education in Bangladesh is the Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), which has over 30,000 non-formal primary 
schools and more than 1.2 milhon students. BRAC initiated the Non-Formal Primary 
Education program (NFPE) in 1985 in response to demands from the parents who 
took part in BRAC’s adult functional literacy class, and whose children did not have 
a chance to attend formal schools.
In 1985 BRAC set up 22 experimental village schools, with the help of a staff of 
educators and a consultant from Dhaka University School of Education. After the 
first two years, BRAC developed a model of primary education program that has 
today become highly successful.7 The success is believed to come from the fact that 
BRAC’s schools target girls, and are relevant to the needs of the rural poor. Studies 
such as Nath et al. (1999) and Chowdhury et a!. (1999) find that graduates of BRAC 
schools have a high level of basic competency compared to other types of schools.
Using nationally representative data from the Education Watch project8, Table 3.1 
gives means and standard deviations of several characteristics of government primary 
schools, private schools, and NGO schools. The differences between NGO schools 
and government and private schools can be seen in the following areas:
Teacher presence and studen t attendance: The percentage of teachers present
on the day of school visit is much higher in the case of NGO schools compared to
7 When BRAC started non-formal primary education in 1985, the main objective was to provide 
basic education to the children who did not have an opportunity to attend formal schools. Continu­
ation into the fourth grade in the formal system was not expected. However, out of over 1.67 million 
students who have graduated from BRAC schools, 90% have gone on to government schools.
8 Details of the data are discussed in the next section.
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government schools and private schools. NGO schools also have much higher student 
attendance rate compared to government and private schools.9
School visit: The percentage of schools with at least one school visit during the 
last month before the survey is much higher in the case of NGO schools. 60% of 
NGO schools had at least one school visit during the last month before the survey, 
compared to 36% and 25% in the case of government and private schools, respectively. 
BRAC schools are visited by program organizers and program assistants. Govern­
ment schools and private schools are visited by Thana Education Officers (TEOs) 
and Assistant Thana Education Officers (ATEOs).
Com m unity participation: A smaller percentage of NGO schools have Paxent- 
Teacher Associations compared to government schools and private schools, however, 
the percentage of members who attended the last PTA meeting is highest in the case 
of NGO schools. For School Management Committee (SMC), almost all government 
schools and private schools have SMC, whereas 77% of NGO schools do. Similar to 
the case of PTA, however, the percentage of members who were present at the last 
SMC meeting is highest for NGO schools, showing a stronger community involvement 
in the case of NGO schools.10
Teacher characteristics: For government and private schools, there are on average
4-5 teachers per school. On the other hand, the average number of teachers in 
NGO schools is 1.1. BRAC schools usually have one teacher who remains with the 
student until graduation. Around one in three teachers in government schools and 
private schools axe female. On the other hand, the percentage of female teachers
9The average student attendance rate in NGO schools is 84%, compared to 55% and 49% in 
government schools and private schools, respectively.
10For BRAC schools, the community is usually involved in the planning, management, and super­
vision of BRAC schools. They help select the location of the school, the students, and the teacher. 
For government schools, as noted in Jalaluddin and Chowdhury (1996), there is a general feeling in 
the rural areas that SMCs and PTAs are “committees on paper”.
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in NGO school is 92%.n  Teachers in NGO schools on average have fewer years of 
education compared to government and private schools. Moreover, as NGO schools 
are relatively new, NGO school teachers’ experience is only 2.6 years on average 
compared to almost 20 years in the case of government schools and 10 years in the 
case of private schools. The average number of refreshers’ courses attended in the 
past year is highest in the case of NGO school teachers. For NGO school teachers, 
refreshers’ courses are organized by NGOs. Government and private school teachers 
attend refreshers’ courses provided by government institutes.
BRAC school teachers are given 12 days of initial teacher training in basic concepts 
of Learning Theory, English, Mathematics, Science and Social Studies. Once they 
start teaching, they have to attend a one-day refresher course each month, and a 
six-day refresher course at the end of the first year.
The government has large training facilities. There are 53 Primary Training 
Institutes (PTIs) which offer a one-year Certificate-in-Education course for primary 
school teachers. The National Academy for Primary Education (NAPE) also provides 
training. A scheme of continuous training has been introduced, where all teachers of 
a sub-cluster attend a one-day training session every two months with their respective 
Assistant Thana Education Officers.
C lassroom  conditions and  school facilities: Class size is much smaller in the
case of NGO schools.12 Average class size in NGO schools is 30, while government 
and private schools have average class size of 54 and 47, respectively. Moreover, the 
level of classroom crowdedness, as measured by ‘the number of students registered in 
the class’ divided by ‘the number of students that can sit with ease’ as observed by the 
interviewer, is highest for private schools and lowest for NGO schools. BRAC schools
11 For BRAC schools, female teachers are employed whenever possible. Teachers must be married 
residents of the village (to avoid losing personnel due to spousal transfers) who have completed nine 
or more years of school.
12 For BRAC schools, in general there are 33 students in each BRAC school.
are usually a one-room construction, with an earthen floor, bamboo or mud-walled, 
and a thatched or tin roof with students sitting on the floor on bamboo mats in a 
U-shape around the room. On the other hand, government and private schools are 
generally permanent structures, mostly brick-built and consist of 3-5 classrooms.13
Compared to government and private schools, a much smaller percentage of NGO 
schools have toilet and drinking water facilities. Only one-third of NGO schools have 
toilet facilities, and only one in ten have drinking water facilities. The majority of 
government schools and private schools have toilet facilities, and 60% of government 
schools and 43% of private schools have drinking water facilities.
Table 3.2 presents individual level means of children aged 6 to 10 years old 
attending government, private, and NGO schools. Parents’ level of education is 
lowest in the case of NGO school students and highest in the case of government 
school students. For self-perceived economic status, NGO school students appear to 
be from the poorest group of households, while students in government and private 
schools appear to be from similar economic backgrounds.
Guardians’ participation in school meetings is highest among NGO school stu­
dents. 61% of NGO school students had at least one person from the household 
who attended a school meeting during the past year, compared to 29% in the case of 
government and private school students. The main difference comes from mothers’ 
attendance in school meetings. While 39% of NGO school students reported that 
their mothers had attended a school meeting, only 5% of government school students 
and 4% of private school students did.
3.3 D ata
13 BRAC schools are usually built in the village, and the distance from children’s homes to a 
school ranges from less than 1 km to 2.5 km. For government schools, the average distance from 
children’s homes to a school is 3.2 km (Jalaluddin and Chowdhury, 1996).
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This study uses nationally representative data from the Education Watch project.14 
The data used is the first round collected under the project, and the focus of this 
data is on the internal efficiency of primary education system in Bangladesh.15
The survey was conducted during October and November 1998, and data from 
42,584 households and 885 schools in 240 clusters covering all 64 districts in Bangladesh 
was collected. Three survey instruments were used to collect the data:
(1.) Household Survey Questionnaire (42,584 households from 312 villages in all 64 
districts with 31,092 children). There are four sections: (i) profile of each household 
member, which includes age, sex, and education; (ii) schooling of individuals aged 4-20 
years, including enrollment status, type of school, and participation of the guardians 
in school meetings; (iii) parental information; and (iv) household information such as 
self-perceived economic status.
(2.) Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) questionnaire (3,360 children aged 
11-12 years old, 7 boys and 7 girls from each of the 240 clusters). This questionnaire 
is intended to provide information regarding the level of basic competencies of the 
children as an indicator of achievement.16 There axe four sections in the question­
naire: (i) Life skills/knowledge, which includes questions on health, population, and 
knowledge about the outside world; (ii) Reading skills; (iii) Writing skills; and (iv) 
Numeracy skills.
(3.) School Observation Checklist (885 schools). This questionnaire aims to 
collect information about the schools and other school related matters. There are
14The Education Watch project was initiated in 1998 by the Campaign for Popular Education 
(CAMPE), a coalition of more than 400 NGOs involved in non-formal primary education, together 
with concerned individuals and organizations. The project aims to create more transparency in 
the education system in Bangladesh by collecting and providing accurate information relating to 
education.
15 In the education literature two types of efficiencies are identified: external and internal. External 
efficiency refers to broader social goals such as better health and productive person-power for the 
labour market, while internal efficiency refers to objectives which are internal to the education system 
such as enrollment and achievement (Chowdhury et al., 1999).
16The ABC questionnaire was developed in 1992-1993 to assess basic educational level of the 
children of Bangladesh (Chowdhury et al., 1994).
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seven sections: general information, classroom information, teachers’ profile, retention 
and dropout, community participation, school visit, and loss due to the floods of 
1998. In particular, the teachers’ profile contains information on whether a teacher 
was physically present at the school on the day of school visit.
The multi-stage sampling procedure was designed such that the data is nation­
ally representative. The geographical areas in Bangladesh were divided into eight 
different strata17, and for each strata the same sample size and similar sampling 
strategy were followed.18 At the first stage, for each stratum 30 thanas (pourashava 
for non-metropolitan urban areas) were selected through systematic random sam­
pling technique with probability proportional to size (PPS). At the second stage, 
one union (or ward for the urban strata) for each selected thana/pourashava was 
selected randomly. At the third stage, one village (mahalla for the urban strata) was 
selected randomly for each selected union/ward. In summary, 30 viflages/mahalla 
were selected for each stratum, totalling 240 for the whole of Bangladesh.
For each village/mahalla, the number of households interviewed varied between 
125 and 200, depending on the size of the village/mahalla. If the village/mahalla was 
small, and the number of households did not reach 125, then the interviewers moved 
to the closest village/mahalla and completed the interview. If there were more than 
200 households in the village/mahalla, then the survey stopped at reaching the 200th 
household. For each village/mahalla, 14 children (7 boys and 7 girls) aged 11-12 
years, chosen randomly from the surveyed households, were interviewed for the ABC 
survey. For the school survey, all schools located in the selected village/mahalla and 
its adjacent village/mahalla were surveyed through the School Observation Checklist.
17 This is because of variations in educational attainment in different geographical regions.
18 The strata considered were six rural divisions (Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, 
and Sylhet), the metropolitan cities and the non-metropolitan urban areas. The metropolitan cities 
and the non-metropolitan urban areas are located throughout the country.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Teacher Presence
First I explore the factors which affect teacher presence. Here, a teacher is considered 
present if he/she was physically present in school at the time of the unannounced 
school visit. Specifically, I analyze whether teacher presence is correlated with types 
of schools, school characteristics, and individual characteristics.
I estimate the following equation:
P*(Sijk =  1) =  «o +  aiTjfc +  a 2Zijk +  OL^ Cijk +  ot^Vj +  error term (3.1)
where Sijk is equal to 1 if teacher i in village j  in school type k was present on the 
day of the unannounced school visit, and 0 otherwise. T*, is the type of school. I 
focus on three main types of schools: government schools, private schools, and NGO 
schools.19 Zijk represents a vector of school characteristics, and Cy* represents a 
vector of individual characteristics of the teacher. I control for village fixed effects, 
Vj. Equation (3.1) is estimated by maximum likelihood logit. In this specification, 
and all others that follow, standard errors are clustered at the village level.20
The results are shown in Table 3.3. Columns (1) to (3) show that NGO schools 
are significantly associated with higher teacher presence when school and individual 
characteristics are not controlled for. Column (1) does not include any other con­
trol, while column (2) controls for other types of schools, village characteristics, and 
stratum fixed effects. Column (3) controls for other types of schools and village fixed 
effects.
Columns (4) and (5) include several school characteristics. NGO schools remain 
significantly associated with higher teacher presence. Most of the school character­
19I also control for the following types of schools: religious schools, kindergarten, and other types 
of non-formal schools which are not run by NGOs.
20See Deaton (1997).
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istics are not statistically significant. In column (5), where village fixed effects are 
controlled for, having Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) appears positively correlated 
with teacher present and the effect is significant at the 10% level.
Columns (6) and (7) include individual characteristics as well as school charac­
teristics. In both columns, NGO schools remain significantly associated with higher 
teacher attendance. Many individual characteristics are statistically significant. For 
both columns (6) and (7), being a male teacher, having received training from Primary 
Training Institute (PTI) and having a Bachelor of Education (BED) are associated 
with a higher probability of being present. On the other hand, being a head teacher 
is associated with a lower probability of being present. This might be because of 
official duties which require the head teacher to be absent from school. Another pos­
sible reason is that there is no other person to monitor the head teacher.21 Column 
(6) shows that higher education is associated with lower probability of being present, 
however, the effect becomes insignificant once village fixed effects are controlled for.22
Overall, the results suggest that NGO schools are significantly associated with 
higher teacher attendance, and that several individual characteristics are important 
determinants of teacher attendance.
Next, I further investigate whether there are school characteristics which affect 
teacher presence differently in the case of NGO schools compared to other types of 
schools.
I estimate the following equation which includes interaction terms between the 
dummy variable ‘NGO school’ and school characteristics:
P r(Sijk — 1) =  a 0 +  ot\Tk +  OL2Zijk +  a^NGO  * Zijk +  o^Vj +  error term (3.2)
21 Similar results are found in other countries. Chaudhury et al. (2005) find that head teachers 
are more likely to be absent in India and Peru.
22It is possible that teachers with higher education choose to locate in areas where there are other 
opportunities for income generating activities, and thus are absent from school more often.
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where NGO  is the dummy variable indicating an NGO school, and other variables 
are as defined above. The interaction terms between NGO  and school characteristics 
show how the school characteristics affect teacher presence differently in the case of 
NGO schools compared to other types of schools.
Table 3.4 shows the results from estimating equation (3.2). Column (1) controls 
for village characteristics, while column (2) controls for village fixed effects. For 
both columns, conditioned on being an NGO school, the number of teachers in the 
school is negatively correlated with the probability of being present. As 207 out 
of 216 NGO schools have only one teacher, the results suggest that a teacher in an 
NGO school is more likely to be present if he/she is the only teacher in the school. 
When a teacher is the only teacher in the school, if he/she is absent then there will 
be no school on that day. Therefore the sense of responsibility, or motivation, is 
one possible explanation why NGO school teachers are more likely to attend school 
if he/she is the only teacher in the school.
In column (2), ‘NGO*School visit’ is positive and almost significant (p-value =  
0.125). This suggests that monitoring might be one explanation for high teacher 
presence in NGO schools. On the other hand, having a  PTA does not seem to 
increase teacher presence for NGO schools. School facilities, in the case of toilet 
facility, appear to increase teacher attendance for NGO schools compared to other 
types of schools.
Taken together, the results suggest that, compared to other types of schools, 
higher teacher presence in NGO schools is likely due to teacher motivation, teacher 
monitoring, and school facilities in the case of toilet facility.
Next I explore the factors correlated with teacher presence among NGO school 
teachers. Based on Table 3.4 results, my hypothesis is that NGO school teacher 
presence is likely to be correlated with teacher motivation, teacher monitoring, and
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school facility.
By focusing on NGO school teachers, the number of observations drops to 233. 
Moreover, because 97% of NGO school teachers were present on the day of school 
visit, it is not possible to include the full set of controls as specified in equation (3.1). 
Instead I focus on certain explanatory variables to test my hypothesis.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3.5 test the hypothesis that motivation increases 
NGO school teacher attendance. Factors which are likely to explain motivation 
are (i) whether the school has one teacher, (ii) whether the teacher receives training 
from the NGO, and (iii) the number of refresher’s courses taken within the past one 
year. A sense of responsibility, or motivation, is a likely explanation for higher 
teacher presence in the case of one-teacher school, as discussed above. As stated in 
Chaudhury et al. (2004), one possible source (or signal) of professional motivation is 
whether the teacher has received teacher training. This is captured by ‘training from 
NGO’ as 77 % of NGO school teachers received training from the NGO.23 Moreover, 
a factor that could increase intrinsic motivation is in-service training (Chaudhury et 
al., 2004). Here in-service training is captured by the number of refresher’s courses 
taken within the past one year.
Columns (1) to (4) show that all three factors reflecting motivation are positive and 
significant, either when entered separately or together. Moreover, they remain sta­
tistically significant when several other explanatory variables are included, as shown 
in column (11). These results suggest that motivation plays an important role in 
determining teacher presence in the case of NGO schools.
Columns (5) to (8) explore factors related to monitoring. These are captured by
(i) whether there was a school visit within the past one month, (ii) whether the school 
has a Parent-Teacher Association (PTA), (iii) whether the school has a School Man­
agement Committee (SMC), and (iv) whether the teacher is a head teacher. School
23 Only 4 NGO school teachers received training from Primary Teaching Institute.
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visits axe a form of administrative monitoring by the NGO which runs the school. 
PTA and SMC possibly reflect informal monitoring by the community (Chaudhury 
et al., 2004). More powerful teachers, as captured here by whether the teacher is a 
head teacher, are less likely to be monitored.
The only factor relating to monitoring that appears statistically significant is 
whether there was a school visit within the past one month, as shown in column
(5). This variable becomes significant at the 10% level in column (9), when entered 
together with other factors relating to monitoring. Moreover, in column (11), when 
several other variables are included the variable becomes insignificant. All other 
factors relating to monitoring are statistically insignificant. The results suggest that 
monitoring is not an important factor in explaining high teacher presence in NGO 
schools.
Columns (10) and (11) show that school facilities, proxied by whether the school 
has a toilet facility, is not statistically significant either when entered separately or 
together with other explanatory variables. This suggests that, among NGO school 
teachers, whether the school has toilet facility does not significantly affect teacher 
attendance.
Overall, the results in Table 3.5 suggest that motivation is the most important 
factor explaining high teacher attendance in NGO schools. As Besley and Ghatak 
(2005) suggest in their theoretical analysis, workers in the mission-oriented sector24 
are typically motivated agents, i.e. agents who pursue goals because they perceive 
intrinsic benefits from doing so. The analysis in this section suggests that high teacher 
attendance in NGO schools derives mainly from teacher motivation, thus NGO school 
teachers are likely to be motivated agents.
To conclude, the results in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 point to the role of teacher 
motivation in explaining high teacher presence in NGO schools. Controlling for all
24 Organizations for the provision of collective goods cohere around a mission, thus production of 
collective goods can be viewed as mission-oriented (Besley and Ghatak, 2005).
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other factors, NGO schools are associated with higher teacher attendance compared 
to other types of schools. Teacher motivation, monitoring, and school facility appear 
to play a role in the high teacher attendance in NGO schools when compared to other 
types of schools. Among NGO school teachers, the most important factor explaining 
teacher presence is teacher motivation.
3.4.2 Student Attendance
The previous section has shown that NGO schools are associated with higher teacher 
attendance compared to other types of schools. In this section I analyze the deter­
minants of student attendance, in particular how NGO schools and teacher presence 
affect student attendance.
Using school-level data on student attendance rate, I estimate the following equa­
tion:
Ycsjk =  «o +  &iTk +  a 2Zcsjk +  a^Vj +  error term (3.3)
where Ycsjk is the attendance rate of class c in school s which is of school type k in 
village j .  ZCSjk is a vector of the characteristics of class c in school s together with the 
characteristics of school s. All other variables are as defined above. I also estimate 
equation (3.3) separately for the attendance rates of boys and girls.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3.6 show the results from estimating equation (3.3) 
without including classroom and school characteristics. In column (1), no other 
control is included except the dummy variables for the three types of schools as shown. 
Controls for other school types, village characteristics, and stratum fixed effects are 
included in column (2), while column (3) includes controls for other school types 
and village fixed effects. For all three columns, the dummy variable ‘NGO school’ 
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that NGO schools are associated 
with higher student attendance compared to other types of schools.
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Columns (4) and (5) include controls for several classroom and school character­
istics. Village characteristics and stratum fixed effects are included in column (4), 
while village fixed effects are controlled for in column (5). The dummy variable 
£NGO school’ remains positive and significant in both columns. The percentage of 
teachers present on the day of school visit is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting a strong positive correlation between teacher presence and student atten­
dance. The number of teachers in the school and drinking water facility are also 
positively and significantly associated with student attendance.25 The percentage 
of members who attended the last School Management Committee meeting is posi­
tively correlated with student attendance when village fixed effects are controlled for. 
An active School Management Committee possibly reflects community interest in the 
school, which might be one explanation for why an active SMC is positively correlated 
with student attendance. On the other hand, the level of classroom crowdedness26 
is negatively correlated with student attendance, suggesting that school facilities in 
terms of adequate space in the classroom might affect student attendance.
Columns (6) and (7) show the results from estimating equation (3.3) separately for 
boys and girls. The dummy variable ‘NGO school’ remains positive and statistically 
significant in both columns. Most correlates of student attendance appear similar 
for boys and girls. One main difference is that the percentage of female teachers 
in the school appears to increase the attendance rate of girls with no effect on the 
attendance rate of boys.
Together the results suggest that NGO schools are associated with higher student 
attendance rate, even after controlling for classroom and school characteristics. The 
percentage of teacher present appears an important determinant of student atten­
25 One possible reason student attendance is positively associated with the number of teachers 
in the school is that schools with more teachers are larger schools which often have more facilities 
and/or are located in areas that are easily accesible.
26The level of classroom crowdedness is measured by ‘the number of students registered in the 
class’ divided by ‘the number of students that can sit with ease’ as observed by the interviewer.
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dance. For girls, the percentage of female teachers also appears to increase atten­
dance.
Next I further explore whether there are school characteristics which affect student 
attendance differently for NGO schools compared to other types of schools. I estimate 
the following equation:
Ycsjk =  a 0 +  oliTfc +  a2Zcsjk +  a^NGO  * +  aAVj +  error term (3.4)
where the variables are as defined above. I also estimate the equation separately for 
boys and girls.
Table 3.7 shows the results from estimating equation (3.4). Column (1) shows the 
results for all students, while columns (2) and (3) show the results for boys and girls, 
respectively. As in Table 3.6, percentage of teachers present on the day of school visit 
is positive and statistically significant for all columns. Moreover, ‘NGO*% teacher 
present’ is positive for all columns, and statistically significant in column (2). This 
suggests that, conditioned on being an NGO school, teacher presence has an effect on 
boys’ attendance over and above the effect found in all types of schools. For girls, 
the effect of teacher presence on student attendance appears similar in the case of 
NGO schools and other types of schools.
£NGO*Class size’ is positive and significant across all columns. The results suggest 
that, conditioned on being an NGO school, larger class size is significantly associated 
with higher attendance for both boys and girls.27 The variable ‘NGO*Sing national 
anthem’ is also positive and significant across all columns. One characteristic of 
NGO schools is that singing and dancing is included in the curriculum and that 
children appear to enjoy the activity. Whether or not students in NGO schools sing 
the national anthem could be correlated with whether the school include singing as
27 One possible reason is that larger class size could be due to high community demand for NGO 
school, which might be because the particular teacher is good at teaching or because people in the 
community value education. Either of this would lead to higher attendance rate.
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a school activity. This interaction term possibly suggests that, for NGO schools, 
including singing as part of the curriculum leads to higher student attendance.
Conditioned on being an NGO school, the level of classroom crowdedness appears 
to discourage attendance rate of girls, with an effect over and above that found in all 
schools. Higher teacher education in NGO schools is correlated with lower attendance 
for boys, and the effect is significant at the 10% level. Conditioned on being an NGO 
school, teacher experience is positively correlated with the attendance of girls.
While the percentage of members who attended the School Management Commit­
tee meeting is positively correlated with attendance rate for all types of schools, this 
does not appear to be the case for NGO schools. While the level term is positive and 
significant, the interaction term ‘NGO*% attended SMC’ is negative and significant 
in the case of all students and girls. Therefore it appears that, for NGO schools, 
active SMC is not correlated with student attendance.
Overall, the results in Table 3.7 suggest that high student attendance rate in NGO 
schools could be explained by high teacher attendance rate, as well as other factors 
relating to curriculum and school facility.
3.4.3 Parents’ Participation in School Meetings
Results from the previous sections show that NGO schools are associated with high 
teacher presence and high student attendance rates. Besides teachers and students, 
in many cases parents also play an important role in determining their children’s 
educational outcomes.28 As NGO school personnel work closely with the community, 
especially the parents, it is possible that through their work they help to increase 
parents’ awareness of the importance of education.
In this section I analyze parents’ interest in their children’s schooling as proxied
28 For example, whether a child is enrolled in primary school or not is often the decision of the 
parents. Parents who are aware of the importance of education would encourage a child to spend 
time revising lessons at home and provide an environment conductive to a child’s learning.
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by whether they participated in school meetings during the past year.
Using data from the Household Survey Questionnaire, I estimate the following 
equation:
P r ( S i j k  = 1) =  a 0 +  aiTk +  a 2 C i j k  + a 3V j  +  error term (3.5)
where Sijk represents whether the following person in the household of child i in village 
j  who is enrolled in school type k attended at least one school meeting during the 
past year: (i) at least one person from the household, (ii) the father, (iii) the mother, 
and (iv) other member of the household. Sijk is equal to 1 if the person attended at 
least one school meeting, and 0 otherwise. Cijk is the individual characteristics of 
child i in village j  in school type k. Other variables are as defined above.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3.8 show the results from estimating equation (3.5) 
without including child characteristics. Compared to other types of schools, being 
enrolled in an NGO school significantly increases the probability that the child’s 
mother attended at least one school meeting during the past year. Being enrolled 
in an NGO school also increases the probability of another member of the household 
attending school meeting, the effect is significant at the 10% level. On the other 
hand, compared to being enrolled in other types of schools, children enrolled in a 
government school or a private school are less likely to have either their fathers or 
mothers attend school meeting, when child characteristics are not controlled for.
When child and family characteristics are controlled for in columns (5) to (8), 
the dummy variable ‘Child attends NGO school’ is positive and significant across all 
columns, with the effect strongest in column (7), in the case of mother’s participation. 
The results suggest that when a child is enrolled in an NGO school, the father, the 
mother, and another member of the household are all more likely to attend a school 
meeting. For children attending a government school, both the father and the mother 
are less likely to attend a school meeting, while for children attending a private school 
the mother is less likely to attend a school meeting compared to children attending
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other types of schools.
Several child and family characteristics appear strong determinants of whether 
the father, the mother, or another member of the household attend a school meeting. 
Education and economic status seem to play an important role. The level of education 
of the father increases the probability that he attends a school meeting, and likewise 
for the mother. When a parent has more education, it is likely that they axe interested 
in their children’s education and participate in school meetings. A household’s 
economic status is captured by whether a household is economically surplus, balance, 
sometimes in deficit, or always in deficit. Being economically surplus increases the 
probability that the father attends a school meeting, while being in deficit decreases 
the probability that the father and the mother attend a school meeting.
Household components also appear to play an important role. Children from 
households with more adults are more likely to have another member of the household 
attend a school meeting. Having more siblings increases the probability that the 
father attends a school meeting. A child with a higher percentage of boys in the 
family is less likely to have the mother attend a school meeting.29 A child from 
a female-headed household is more likely to have the mother or another member of 
the household attend a school meeting, and less likely to have the father attend a 
school meeting, as expected. When the mother has access to NGO credit, or when 
she is involved in income-generating activities, she is more likely to attend a school 
meeting.30
The results in Table 3.8 point to the role of NGO schools in increasing parents’ 
participation in school meeting. The effect appears strongest in the case of mother’s
29 One possible reason is that daughters can often help with household chores and taking care of 
younger siblings, thus allowing the mother to attend a school meeting.
30 This could be either because (i) having access to NGO credit or being involved in income- 
generating activities increases the mother’s mobility and confidence in interacting with other people 
which makes her more likely to attend a school meeting, or (ii) more active and confident mother 
is more likely to join an NGO credit or become involved in income generating activities and at the 
same time more likely to attend a child’s school meeting.
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participation.
I further investigate whether the factors affecting the probability of a parent’s 
participation in school meeting differ between children attending different types of 
schools. I estimate equation (3.5) separately for children attending government, 
private, and NGO schools. The results are shown in Table 3.9.
The main results are that the level of education appears to play a much less 
important role in explaining parents’ participation in school meeting when a child 
attends an NGO school. For government and private schools, the father’s education 
is significantly associated with whether he participated in school meeting. However, 
this relationship does not hold in the case of NGO schools. Mother’s education 
plays an important role in explaining whether at least one person attended a school 
meeting in the case of government school students. For NGO school students, the 
relationship is sigfinicant at the 10% level.
As students in NGO schools are mainly children from poor households who did 
not have a chance to attend a formal school, in many cases their parents are poor and 
have little or no education. The results in Table 3.9 suggest that NGO schools have 
been able to encourage parents of the students to attend school meetings regardless 
of their education.
Together the results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that parents, in particular the 
mother, and other members of the household are more likely to attend a school meet­
ing when a child is enrolled in NGO school. For parents of NGO school students, 
the level of education does not appear to be an important determinant of their par­
ticipation in school meetings.
As parents’ interest in their children’s education possibly affects the children’s 
learning outcomes, I further investigate whether parents’ participation in school meet­
ings has any effect on children’s test scores, as measured by the Assessment of Basic 
Competencies (ABC) test.
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Using the sample of 11-12 year-old children who took the Assessment of Basic 
Competencies test, I estimate the following equation:
y%jk =  a 0 +  cxiTk +  a2Cijk +  a^Vj +  error term (3.6)
where Yijk represents (i) whether a child passed the ABC test or not31, and (ii) test 
scores of life-skills, reading, writing, and numeracy sections. Tk is the dummy variable 
for the type of school that the child was attending at the time of survey. I control 
for children who have dropped out of school, and the omitted category is the group 
who have never been enrolled. C\jk is a vector of individual characteristics of child i 
in school type k in village j ,  which includes variables representing whether the child’s 
father, mother, or other member of the household attended any school meeting in the 
past year.
Table 3.10 shows that being enrolled in an NGO school has positive and significant 
effects on the probability of passing the ABC test, and all test scores. Being enrolled 
in a government school or a private school has positive and significant effects on the 
test scores of reading, writing, and numeracy skills sections.32
Father’s participation in school meeting shows a positive and significant associa­
tion with the probability of passing the ABC test. Also, as shown in column (6), the 
effect is positive and significant at the 10% level for the scores of reading skills sec­
tion when village fixed effects are controlled for. Mother’s participation is positively 
and significantly associated with the scores of writing skills section when village fixed 
effects are not included, although the effect becomes insignificant once village fixed
31A child is considered to have ‘basic education’, i.e. to pass the ABC test, if he/she satisfied 
the following criteria: (i) answering correctly at least 7 out of 10 life skills questions; (ii) answering 
correctly at least 3 of the 4 questions from the reading comprehension passage; (iii) correctly com­
municating a given message through a letter; and (iv) answering correctly at least 3 of the 4 mental 
arithmetic questions (Chowdhury et al., 1999).
32 For fife skills section, the different effects of NGO schools and both government and private 
schools could be due to the difference in the curriculum. NGO schools emphasize more on matters 
such as health care which are tested in the fife skills section.
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effects axe controlled for. Other member of the household’s participation in school 
meeting is positively and significantly associated with the scores of life skills section.
Several other child and family characteristics are significantly correlated with test 
scores. The last class passed is the strongest determinant of test scores for all sections. 
Girls tend to do worse than boys in all sections, especially numeracy skills. Father’s 
education is positively and significantly associated with the probability of passing the 
ABC test, and reading and writing scores.
Together the results in Table 3.10 show that parents’ participation in school meet­
ing is positively correlated with certain sections’ test scores. As parents’ participation 
in school meeting possibly reflects parents’ motivation and interest in their children’s 
education, the results suggest that of parents’ motivation improves children’s educa­
tional outcomes.
Overall, the results in Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 point to the role of NGO schools in 
encouraging parents’ participation in school meeting, in particular mother’s. Unlike 
the case of government and private schools, the level of education does not appear an 
important determinant of whether parents of NGO school students attend a school 
meeting or not. Parents’ participation in school meeting is positively correlated with 
certain sections’ test scores.
3.5 Conclusion
NGO schools in Bangladesh are an innovation aimed to reach the poorest children 
who did not have a chance to attend formal school. Although NGO school teachers 
are paid much less compared to formal school teachers, their attendance rate is much 
higher. NGO school students come from poor households and were non-enrolled or 
have dropped out of school, however, they have much higher attendance rate compared 
to students in government and private schools. Moreover, parents of NGO school
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students axe poorer and have less education compared to parents of government or 
private school students, yet they participate more in school meetings.
In this chapter I identify the factors which are correlated with teacher presence, 
student attendance, and guardians’ participation in school meetings. Using na­
tionally representative data, I first study the correlates for all types of schools in 
Bangladesh, and then focus on the case of NGO schools. The results show that, 
after controlling for other factors, NGO school teachers are more likely to be present 
in school, NGO schools are associated with higher student attendance rates, and 
guardians of NGO school students, in particular mothers, are more likely to partic­
ipate in school meetings. Motivation appears the most important factor explaining 
teacher presence among NGO school teachers. Teacher attendance rate and other 
factors relating to curriculum and school facility explain student attendance in NGO 
schools. Education appears to play a much smaller role in explaining guardians’ par­
ticipation in school meetings for NGO school students compared to students in other 
types of schools. There is evidence that guardians’ participation in school meetings 
is positively correlated with test scores.
Overall, it appears that the high teacher attendance rate in NGO schools comes 
from the motivation of the teachers rather than monitoring or school facilities. The 
motivation may either have come from the process of self-selection, where more moti­
vated persons choose to join NGO schools (as suggested in Besley and Ghatak, 2005), 
or NGOs might have motivated their teachers through NGO training and refreshers’ 
courses. It is not possible to identify the process of self-selection with the present 
data. However, evidence suggests that the latter must have played a role, as NGO 
school teacher presence is correlated with having received NGO training and refresh­
ers’ courses. As noted in Khan (2001), in the case of BRAC schools, motivational 
work is done by local staff before they open schools in the villages and “a sense of re­
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sponsibility in teaching poor children is developed.”33 This motivational work appears 
to have played a role in the high teacher presence in NGO schools.
These results contrast with earlier findings which suggest that monitoring and 
school facilities are correlated with teacher presence in formal schools, while motiva­
tion does not appear correlated (Chaudhury et al., 2005 and Kremer et al., 2005). 
In the case of formal schools, motivation may not play a role, however, the results 
in this chapter suggest that motivation is an underlying factor explaining the high 
teacher attendance rate in NGO schools.
33 Khan (2001), page 13.
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TABLE 3.1
SUMMARY OF SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS
S ch o o l L evel M ean s G overnm ent Private N G O
% teachers present on day o f  visit .86 .79 .97
(■18) (.22) (.15)
Student attendance rate .55 .49 .84
(.16) (.21 ) (.18)
% schools with school visit w ithin one month .36 .26 .59
(-49) (.44 ) (.49)
% schools with PTA .70 .41 .34
(.46) (-49) (.47)
% m em bers attended last PTA  m eeting .55 .74 .79
(-21) (.17) (-21)
% schools with SM C .99 .99 .77
(.09) (.09) (.42)
% m em bers attended last SM C  m eeting .70 .72 .89
(.17) (•16) (.16)
Num ber o f  teachers 4 .4 4 .0 1.1
(2 .3 ) (1 .6 ) (.43)
% fem ale teachers .35 .31 .92
(.33 ) (-28) (.26)
T eachers’ education (years) 11.8 11.4 10.1
(1 .0 ) ( 1 0 ) (1.3)
T eachers’ experience (years) 19.5 9.8 2.6
(5 .7 ) (5 .0 ) (2 .4)
T eachers’ number o f  refreshers’ courses 5.3 4 .3 9 .0
(2 .6 ) (3 .2 ) (4 .4)
C lass size 53.8 4 6 .4 30.4
(30 .6 ) (26 .2 ) (4 .7)
Level o f  classroom  crow dedness 1.67 1.9 1.01
(1 .0 ) (1 .0 ) (.23)
% schools with toilet facility .83 .72 .33
(.38 ) (.45) (-47)
% schools w ith drinking water facility .60 .43 .10
(.49 ) (.50 ) (.30)
Num ber o f  observations 353 116 215
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The numbers o f  observations for “Percentage o f  
m em bers attended last PT A  m eeting” and “Percentage o f  m em bers attended last SM C  
m eeting” are 196 and 3 4 0  for governm ent schools, 31 and 104 for private schools , and 58  
and 139 for N G O  schools, respectively. The numbers o f  observations for “Student dropout 
rate” are 331, 98 , and 9 4  for governm ent, private, and N G O  schools , respectively.
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T A B L E  3.2
SU M M A R Y  OF IN D IV ID U A L  CH A R A C T ER ISTIC S
In d iv id u a l L evel M ean s* Governm ent Private N G O
Number o f  adults in household 2 .6 2 .6 2.5
(1 .5) (1 .3 ) (1 .2 )
Number o f  siblings 3.9 3.8 3.5
(1 .7) (1 .7 ) (1 .5 )
% boys am ong siblings .51 .51 .49
(-27) (.27) (.28)
% fem ale headed households .03 .03 .03
(.16) (.17) (.18)
Father’s education (class passed) 3.5 2 .9 2.1
(4 .2) (3 .9 ) (3 .3)
M other’s education (class passed) 2 .2 1.9 1.1
(3 .1) (3 .0 ) (2 .3 )
% from households ‘alw ays in d efic it’ .30 .26 .32
(■46) (.44) (.46)
%  from households ‘som etim es in d efic it’ .35 .38 .38
(.48) (-49) (.48)
% from households ‘econom ically  b alance’ .25 .26 .25
(-43) (.44) (.43)
% from households ‘econ om ically  surplus’ .10 .10 .06
(.30) (.30) (-24)
% from households: m other has access to .19 .20 .27
N G O  credit (.39) (.40) (.44)
%  from households: m other is  involved  in .25 .29 .29
incom e generating activities (.43) (.45 ) (-45)
%  from households: m em ber se lls labor .44 .48 .52
at least 100 days/year (-50) (.50 ) (-50)
% at least one person from  household .29 .29 .61
attended school m eeting this year ( 4 6 ) (-45) (.49)
% father attended school m eeting this year .20 .22 .25
(-40) (.41 ) (.43)
% m other attended school m eeting  this year .05 .04 .39
(-21) (.19 ) (.49)
% another person from household attended .07 .05 .10
school m eeting this year (.25) (.22 ) (.30)
Num ber o f  observations 15288 3 097 1542
* Individual level m eans are those o f  individual aged 6 to 10 years old  attending the 
respective types o f  schools.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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TABLE 3.3
TEACHER PRESENCE: PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN BANGLADESH
Dependent variable: Whether the teacher was present or not
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Government school -0.214 0.021 0 .186 0.272 0.360 -0.131 -0.289
(1 .57) (0 .11) (0 .60) (1.16) (0.97) (0 .45) (0.66)
Private school -0.784 -0.487 -0.586 -0.035 -0.178 -0 .140 -0.432
(4 .55)*** (2 .09)** (1.74)* (0 .14) (0.47) (0 .51) (1 .07)
NGO school 1.604 1.828 2.042 2.479 2.421 2.912 2.524
(3.10)*** (3 .42)*** (3.34)*** (4.22)*** (3.60)*** (3 .88)*** (3 .29)***
Number o f  teachers 0 .024 0.028 0.019 0.016
(1.77)* (1 .39) (1 .37) (0.80)
Class size 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000
(1 .52) (0 .44) (0 .92) (0 .07)
% fem ale teachers -0.126 -0.154 0.256 0.253
(0.65) (0.52) (1 .00) (0 .68)
School visit within 1 month 0.028 0 .040 -0.022 -0.098
(0.22) (0.23) (0.16) (0.53)
Has PTA 0.279 0.501 0.237 0.466
(1.56) (1.93)* (1-22) (1.69)*
% attended PTA -0.189 -0.428 -0.254 -0.588
(0 .75) (1 .26) (0 .91) (1.58)
Has SM C -0.221 -0.758 -0 .070 -0.629
(0.59) (1 .61) (0 .18) (1-29)
% attended SMC 0.278 0.313 0.204 0.201
(1 .20) (1.00) (0.85) (0 .65)
Has toilet 0.151 0 .160 0.143 0.237
(1.05) (0 .83) (1.00) (1-21)
Has drinking water 0.094 -0.063 0.152 -0 .040
(0.79) (0 .39) (1.22) (0 .23)
M ale 0.400
(2.35)**
0.412
(2 .26)**
Head teacher -0 .466
(3 .04)***
-0 .554
(3 .14)***
Training: Primary 0.649 0.817
Training Institute (PTI) (3 .26)*** (3 .47)***
Training: Bachelor o f 0 .399 0.543
Education (BED) (2 .11)** (2 .46)**
Training: NGO 0.434
(0 .91)
0 .740
(1.84)*
Education (years) -0.073
(2 .13)**
-0.065
(1-57)
Experience (years) 0 .006
(0.69)
0 .007
(0.71)
Number o f  refresher courses -0.021 0.022
(1 0 7 ) (0.69)
Control for other school
types N o Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
V illage characteristic N o Y es N o Y es N o Y es N o
Stratum fixed effects N o Y es N o Y es N o Y es N o
V illage fixed effects N o N o Y es N o Y es N o Y es
Observations 4237 4237 3635 4142 3564 4027 3410
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.043 0 .096 0 .056 0 .107 0.075 0.131
A bsolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% , and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. O ther school types include three types o f  religious schools, 
kindergarten, and non-form al schools w hich are not run by N G O s. V illage characteristics include percentage o f  adults 
21 years and above with no schooling, w hether there is an N G O  m icro-credit in the village , average econom ic status, 
percentage o f  landless households, percentage o f households w ith m em bers w ho sell labor m ore than 100 days/year, 
percentage o f fem ale headed households, and percentage o f M uslim s in  the village.
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TABLE 3.4 
TEACHER PRESENCE:
DIFFERENCES BETW EEN NG O  AND OTHER TYPES OF SCHOOLS
D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le : W h e th e r  the  te a ch e r  w as  p re s e n t o r  n o t 
 ( 1) (2 )
Government school 0.278 0.369
(1.19) (1.00)
Private school -0.030 -0.181
(0.12) (0.47)
NGO school 5.676 3.237
(2.13)** (1.18)
Number o f  teachers 0.025 0.028
(1.79)* (1.42)
NGO*Number o f  teachers -4.107 -4.452
(3.99)*** (3 .73)***
Class size 0.003 0.002
(1.50) (0.48)
NGO*Class size 0.072 0.115
(0.88) (1.26)
% female teachers -0.129 -0 .160
(0.65) (0.52)
School visit within 1 month 0.027 0.025
(0.21) (0.14)
NG O *School visit 2 .140 2.821
(1.39) (1.53)
Has PTA 0.295 0.549
(1.62) (2 .03)**
NGO*Has PTA -2.329 -2.103
(2.07)** (1.16)
Has SMC -0.230 -0.781
(0.59) (1.60)
NGO*Has SMC -2.896 -1 .840
(1.82)* (1.01)
% attended SMC 0.279 0 .298
(1.21) (0.94)
NGO*% attended SMC -0.503 0 .154
(0.40) (0 .12)
Has toilet 0 .142 0 .138
(0.97) (0.69)
NGO*Has toilet 3.568 3.719
(3.54)*** (2 .93)***
Control for other school charac. Y es Y es
V illage characteristics Y es N o
Stratum fixed effects Y es N o
V illage fixed effects No Y es
Observations 4068 3499
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.107
A bsolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% , 
and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. O ther school 
types include three types o f religious schools, kindergarten, and non-form al schools which 
are not run by N G O s. V illage characteristics include percentage o f  adults 21 years and 
above with no schooling, w hether there is an N G O  m icro-credit in the village , average 
econom ic status, percentage o f  landless households, percentage o f  households with 
m em bers who sell labor m ore than 100 days/year, percentage o f  fem ale headed households, 
and percentage o f M uslim s in the village.
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T A B L E  3.5
TEACHER PRESENCE: THE C A SE  OF NGO SCHOOL TEACHERS
Dependent variable: W hether the teacher was present or not
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (ID
M otivation:
One teacher school 1.756
(2.24)**
1.743
(1.71)*
6 .509
(2 .68)***
Training NGO 1.762
(2.47)**
1.790
(4.52)***
2 .012
(1.90)*
Num ber refresher's 0.255 0.139 0 .289
course (4 .74)*** (2.15)** (4 .63)***
M on itoring:
School visit within 1.630 1.605 0 .787
one month (3.04)*** (1.70)* (1.34)
Has PTA -0.184
(0.21)
-0.224
(0 .21)
-1.911
(1 .30)
Has SM C 0.661
(0.80)
0.078
(0.05)
-2.541
(1.84)*
Head teacher 0 .074
(0.09)
-0.029
(0.03)
-1 .039
(0 .45)
F acility:
toilet -0.023
(0.03)
2 .057
(1 4 1 )
V illage characteristics Yes Yes Yes Y es Yes Yes Y es Y es Yes Y es Y es
Stratum Fixed effects N o N o No N o N o N o No N o N o No N o
V illage fixed effects N o N o No No N o No No N o No No N o
Observations 233 233 230 230 233 233 232 233 232 233 229
P seudo R2 0.260 0.259 0.379 0.441 0.265 0.215 0.222 0 .214 0 .266 0 .214 0 .502
A bsolute z-statistics are  in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are  clustered  at the  village 
level. V illage characteristics include percentage o f  adults 21 years and above w ith no schooling, w hether there is an N G O  m icro-credit in the village , average 
econom ic status, percentage o f  landless households, percentage o f  households w ith m em bers w ho sell labor m ore than 100 days/year, percentage o f  fem ale headed 
households, and percentage o f  M uslim s in the village.
TABLE 3.6
STUDENT ATTENDANCE: PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN BAN GLADESH
Government school
Private school
NGO school
% teachers present
Number o f  teachers
Class size
Level o f  classroom  
crowdedness 
% female teachers
Teachers* education
Teachers’ experience
School visit within 1 month
Has PTA
% attended PTA
Has SMC
% attended SMC
Has toilet
Has drinking water
Has flag
Sing national anthem
Control for other N o Y es
school types
V illage characteristics N o Y es
Stratum fixed  effects N o Y es
0.004 0.020 0.024 0.018 0.010
(0.14) (0.59) (0.63) (0.46) (0.23)
-0.065 0.010 -0.015 -0.010 -0.034
(1.80)* (0 .33) (0.43) (0.27) (0.91)
0.275 0.318 0.302 0.316 0.281***o
(6 .57)*** (5.43)*** (5.62)*** (4.56)***
0.098 0.108 0.099 0.124
(2.64)*** (2.33)** (2.02)** (2.52)**
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006
(3.33)*** (2.52)** (2.19)** (2.64)***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.55) (1-05) (0.95) (1-01)
-0.042 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035
(7.37)*** (6.84)*** (5.89)*** (6.24)***
-0.002 0.054 0.045 0.073
(0.09) (1.67)* (1.35) (2.12)**
0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.012
(0 .37) (1.22) (0.38) (1.55)
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.13) (1.08) (1.08) (1.14)
-0.003 -0 .010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.27) (0.58) (0.54) (0.51)
-0.022 0.001 0.009 0.012
(1 .24) (0.03) (0.36) (0.52)
0.001 -0.005 -0.019 0.004
(0.05) (0.19) (0.55) (0.13)
-0.020 -0.071 -0.090 -0.032
(0 .59) (1.82)* (2.04)** (0.80)
0.030 0.078 0.101 0.056
(1.12) (2.25)** (2.78)*** (1.61)
-0.005 0.012 0.019 0.013
(0 .31) (0.69) (0.93) (0.71)
0.038 0.029 0.025 0.027
(3.06)*** (1.83)* (1.44) (1.67)*
-0.001 -0.005 0.010 -0.016
(0 .05) (0.18) (0.37) (0.60)
0.036 0.022 0.027 0.014
(2.69)*** (1-47) (1.69)* (0.87)
Y es Y es Y es Yes Y es
N o Y es N o No N o
N o Y es N o N o N o
Yes N o Y es Yes Y esVillage fixed effects N o  N o
Observations 3553 3553 3553 3381 3381 3267 3241
R-squared___________________ 0.09 0 .16 0.39 0 .26  0.46 0.39 0.41
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Other school types include three types of religious schools, 
kindergarten, and non-formal schools which are not run by NGOs. Village characteristics include percentage of adults 
21 years and above with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village , average economic status, 
percentage o f landless households, percentage of households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, 
percentage of female headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the village.
Dependent variable: Attendance rate o f students in each class
All students B oys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.035 -0.045
(1.10) (1.17)
-0.085 -0.090
(2.52)** (2.17)**
0.226 0.222
(6.23)*** (4.94)***
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T A B L E  3.7  
ST U D E N T  ATTEN D A N C E:
DIFFEREN CES BETW EEN NG O  A N D  OTHER TY PES O F SCHOOLS
D ependent variable: Attendance rate o f  students in each class________
________________________________ All___________ B oys____________ Girls
_________________________________0 ) ____________ (2)______________ (3)
G overnment school 0.033 0.028 0 .016
(0 .87) (0 .68) (0 .41)
Private school -0.003 0 .006 -0 .026
(0 .10) (0 .15) (0 .75)
N G O  school 0 .145 0.077 0 .132
(0 .40) (0 .21) (0 .35)
% teachers present 0.098 0 .089 0.113
(2 .16)** (1 .85)* (2 .33)**
NGO*%  teachers present 0.191 0 .2 8 0 0 .186
(1-29) (3 .17)*** (0 .92)
Number o f  teachers 0 .005 0 .004 0 .005
(2 .42)** (1 .95)* (2 .59)**
N G O *N um ber o f  teachers 0.041 0 .057 0 .034
(0 .88) (1-14) (0 .75)
C lass size 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0 .74) (0 .66) (0 .67)
N G O *C lass size 0.011 0 .012 0.013
(2 .90)***“ (2 .52)** (3 .71)***
L evel o f  classroom -0.034 -0 .033 -0 .034
Crowdedness (6 .62)*** (5 .68)*** (6 .00)***
N G O *L evel o f  classroom -0.116 -0.113 -0 .166
Crowdedness (2 .06)** (1 .57) (2 .77)***
% fem ale teachers 0.035 0.031 0.051
(1 .06) (0 .88) (1 .45)
NGO*%  fem ale teachers -0.026 -0 .038 -0.041
(0 .42) (0 .63) (0 .61)
Teachers’ education -0.003 0.005 -0 .008
(0 .43) (0 .54) (0 .98)
N G O *Teachers’ education -0.028 -0.033 -0 .020
(1.72)* (1 .86)* (1 .13)
Teachers’ experience 0.002 0 .002 0 .002
(1 .08) (1 .30) (0 .99)
N G O *Teachers’ experience 0.006 -0 .005 0.013
(1-12) (0 .82) (2 .20)**
School visit within 1 month -0 .020 -0 .028 -0 .016
(1 .06) (1 .50) (0 .78)
N G O *School visit 0 .007 0 .0 6 0 -0 .019
(0 .21) (1 .61) (0 .56)
Has PTA 0.000 0.005 0.015
(0 .01) (0 .20) (0 .65)
NG O *PTA -0.065 -0 .043 -0.105
(1 .22) (0 .80) (1.75)*
% attended PTA 0.008 -0.001 0.014
(0 .25) (0 .04) (0 .42)
NGO*%  attended PTA -0.021 -0 .029 0.001
(0 .35) (0 .37) (0 .01)
Has SM C -0.061 -0.063 -0 .013
(1 .16) (1 .08) (0 .24)
N G O *H as SM C 0.016 -0.028 -0 .002
(0 .20) (0 .30) (0 .03)
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TABLE 3.7 
STUDENT ATTENDANCE:
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NGO AND OTHER TYPES OF SCHOOLS 
(CONTINUED)
Dependent variable: Attendance rate o f students in each class
All B oys Girls
(1) (2) (3)
% attended SMC 0.080 0.091 0.067
(1.97)* (2.10)** (1.63)
NGO*% attended SMC -0.097 -0.043 -0.125
(1.89)* (0.69) (2.45)**
Has toilet 0.004 0.009 0.006
(0.20) (0.42) (0.30)
NGO*Has toilet 0.029 0.026 0.024
(0.66) (0.55) (0.54)
Has drinking water 0.033 0.028 0.032
(2.03)** (1.55) (1.94)*
NGO*Has drinking water -0.094 -0.079 -0.116
(1.68)* (1.50) (1.68)*
School has flag 0.003 0.019 -0.008
(0.09) (0.67) (0.26)
NGO*Flag -0.022 -0.037 -0.016
(0.37) (0.60) (0.25)
Sing national anthem 0.017 0.022 0.006
(1.02) (1.32) (0.37)
NGO*Sing national anthem 0.086 0.097 0.086
(2.33)** (2.28)** (2.21)**
Control for other school Yes Y es Y es
types
Village characteristics No No No
Stratum fixed effects No N o No
Village fixed effects Yes Y es Y es
Observations 3381 3267 3241
R-squared 0.47 0.41 0.42
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Other school types 
include three types of religious schools, kindergarten, and non-formal schools which are not run 
by NGOs. Village characteristics include percentage of adults 21 years and above with no 
schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village , average economic status, 
percentage of landless households, percentage of households with members who sell labor more 
than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the 
village.
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T A B LE 3.8
PA R E N T S’ PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL M EETINGS: 
PRIM ARY SCHOOLS IN B A N G L A D E SH
Dependent variable: Whether the fo llow in g  person attended school m eeting this year
At least 
one
Father Mother Other
member
At least 
one
Father Mother Other
m ember
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ... (8)
Child attends gov. -0.304 -0.273 -0.515 -0.013 -0 .134 -0 .156 -0.276 0.073
school (3.49)*** (3.34)*** (3 .62)*** (0.12) (1 .67)* (2.06)** (2 .07)** (0.66)
Child attends private -0.344 -0.283 -0.667 -0.001 -0 .197 -0.175 -0.505 0.117
school (2 .54)** (2 .02)** (2 .89)*** (0.00) (1-51) (1 .28) (2.26)** (0.60)
Child attends NGO 1.229 0.125 1.836 0.388 1.648 0.461 2.219 0.606
school (5.82)*** (0.77) (7 .55)*** (1.94)* (7 .80)*** (2.83)*** (9 .34)*** (3 .05)***
Girl 0 .023 0.027 0.019 0 .000
(0 .62) (0 .67) (0.28) (0.00)
A ge 7 0 .109 0.032 0.084 0.208
(2 .29)** (0 .57) (0.84) (2 .43)**
A ge 8 0 .126 0.077 0.090 0.139
(2 .45)** (1-37) (0.98) (1.60)
A ge 9 0 .226 0.212 0.205 0.115
(4 .56)*** (3.76)*** (1.83)* (1-16)
A ge 10 0.195 0.199 0.049 0 .144
(4 .06)*** (3.62)*** (0.49) (1.69)*
Number adults 0 .046 -0 .016 -0.048 0.205
(2 .50)** (0 .76) (1.75)* (8.39)***
Number siblings 0.035 0.057 -0.040 -0 .020
(2 .24)** (3.11)*** (1.65)* (0.78)
Percentage o f  boys -0 .083 0.016 -0.264 0.128
(1 .04) (0 .18) (2.15)** (0 .91)
Female head o f -0 .312 -3.301 0.615 1.091
household (2 .23)** (6.89)*** (3.20)*** (6 .72)***
Father’s education 0.072 0.092 -0.013 0.022
(9 .61)*** (11.12)*** (1 .13) (1 .78)*
M other’s education 0 .050 0.013 0.156 0.021
(5 .83)*** (1.26) (11 .3)*** (1 .64)
A lw ays in deficit -0 .250 -0.201 -0 .184 -0 .206
(3.21)*** (2.27)** (1.65)* (1.79)*
Som etim es in deficit -0.058 0.025 -0.222 -0 .066
(1 .05) (0 .42) (2 .38)** (0.76)
Surplus 0.191 0 .196 -0.058 0.307
(2 .36)** (2 .18)** (0.50) (2 .37)**
Mother: access to 0.068 -0.055 0.389 -0 .040
NG O  credit (1 .13) (0 .77) (4 .51)*** (0.38)
Mother: incom e 0.154 0 .120 0.330 -0.030
Generating activities (2 .44)** (1.74)* (3.41)*** (0.33)
At least 1 household -0 .220 -0 .335 0.328 -0.105
M em ber sells labour (3 .38)*** (4.94)*** (3.28)*** (1 .21)
V illage fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 23905 23905 19150 21882 2 3866 23866 19124 21843
Pseudo R2 0.130 -0.273 0.220 0.089 0.169 0.158 0.254 0.117
A bsolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance a t the 10% , 5% , and 1% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the village level. 1 also control for w hether the relig ion  o f  the child  is Islam  o r H indu.
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TABLE 3.9
PARENTS' PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL M EETINGS: 
EACH TYPE OF SCHOOLS
Dependent variable: Whether the follow ing person attended school m eeting this year
Government schools Private schools NGO schools
One person Father One person Father One person Father
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl 0.027 0.058 0.068 0.103 -0.281 -0.410
(0.59) (1-16) (0.58) (0 .87) (1.53) (2.10)**
Age 7 0.169 0.107 -0.082 -0.257 0.076 -0.238
(2.56)** (1.39) (0.56) (1 .61) (0.29) (1.05)
Age 8 0.156 0.135 0.022 -0.157 0.313 -0.090
(2.35)** (1.83)* (0.15) (1 .04) (1 0 1 ) (0.32)
A ge 9 0.247 0.252 0.059 -0.077 0.436 0.144
(4.03)*** (3.55)*** (0.37) (0 .46) (1.60) (0.49)
A ge 10 0.254 0.279 0.073 -0.066 0.071 -0.040
(4.09)*** (4.01)*** (0.61) (0.50) (0.24) (0.13)
Number adults 0.046 -0.012 0.030 -0.045 0.029 -0.032
(1.91)* (0.46) (0.66) (1 .07) (0.39) (0.30)
Number siblings 0.051 0.060 -0.067 -0.013 0.006 0.089
(2.57)** (2.62)*** (1.95)* (0.37) (0.10) (1 .16)
Percentage o f boys -0.041 0.024 -0.176 -0.021 -0.453 -0.446
(0.38) (0.21) (0.83) (0.09) (1.43) (1.35)
Female head of -0.313 -3.416 -0.932 -3.396 -0.070 -2.207
household (1.77)* (4.83)*** (2.44)** (3.07)*** (0.13) (2.77)***
Father’s education 0.066 0.091 0.116 0.117 0.017 0.059
(7.42)*** (9.14)*** (4.89)*** (5 .04)*** (0.49) (1-52)
Mother’s education 0.050 0.006 0.039 -0.005 0.082 0.006
(4.55)*** (0.51) (1.48) (0.19) (1.89)* (0 .15)
Alw ays in deficit -0.236 -0.153 0.075 0.035 -0.398 -0.508
(2.39)** (1.38) (0.34) (0 .15) (1.71)* (1.90)*
Som etim es in deficit -0.005 0.059 0.056 0.145 -0.273 0.170
(0.07) (0.76) (0.36) (0 .89) (1.25) (1.06)
Surplus 0.205 0.180 0.507 0.441 -0.596 -0.236
(2 .02)** (1.59) (1.67)* (1 .33) (1.48) (0.64)
Mother: access to -0.047 -0.112 0.290 0.151 0.307 -0.402
NGO credit (0.64) (1.27) (1.91)* (0.84) (1.47) (1.92)*
Mother: income 0.226 0.157 0.099 0.065 0.387 0.238
Generating activities (3.00)*** (1.98)* (0.60) (0 .34) (1.62) (1.22)
At least 1 household -0.278 -0.355 -0.314 -0 .404 -0.138 -0.552
Member sells labour (3.54)*** (4.17)** (1.78)* (2.43)** (0.65) (3.21)**
V illage fixed effects Y es Yes Y es Y es Yes Y es
Observations 15155 14898 2877 2821 1390 1323
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.165 0.186 0.172 0.294 0.183
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % level, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 1 also control for whether the religion of the 
child is Islam or Hindu.
110
TABLE 3.10
TEST SCORES AND PARENTS’ PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL MEETINGS
Dependent variable: Test scores o f
ABC_______________ Life skills________________Reading_________________Writing_______________ Numeracy
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Government 0.339 0.606 0.014 -0.021 0.269 0.333 0.774 0.902 0.244 0.177
(1 1 4 ) (1.59) (0.09) (0.13) (2.72)*** (3.17)*** (3.91)*** (4.31)*** (2.15)** (1.48)
Private 0.605 0.894 0.205 0.165 0.288 0.394 0.926 0.970 0.303 0.271
(1.79)* (1.91)* (1 0 9 ) (0.80) (2.30)** (2.96)*** (3.33)*** (3.17)*** (2.64)*** (2.09)**
NGO 1.689 1.840 1.158 0.940 0.946 0.849 2.958 2.610 0.539 0.431
(4.48)*** (3.87)*** (5.59)*** (4.29)*** (6.85)*** (5.81)*** (9.45)*** (7.85)*** (4.20)*** (3.05)***
Father: 0.255 0.280 0.109 0.033 0.091 0.113 0.060 0.136 0.006 0.002
School meeting (2.15)** (1.97)** (1.24) (0.37) (1.55) (1.86)* (0.52) (1-11) (0.13) (0.04)
Mother: 0.140 -0.046 0.150 0.064 0.153 0.063 0.393 0.186 0.090 0.049
School meeting (0.71) (0.19) (1 2 1 ) (0.48) (1.57) (0.64) (2.00)** (1 0 2 ) (1.47) (0.78)
Other member: 0.052 -0.063 0.409 0.261 0.004 -0.015 -0.138 -0.189 0.055 0.039
School meeting (0.32) (0.31) (3.26)*** (2.05)** (0.05) (0-17) (0.89) (1.21) (0.86) (0.56)
Girl -0.314 -0.414 -0.126 -0.135 -0.130 -0.126 -0.315 -0.294 -0.477 -0.472
(2.84)*** (3.20)*** (1.61) (1.69)* (2.65)*** (2.47)** (3.06)*** (2.79)*** (9.63)*** (9.12)***
Class passed 0.619 0.717 0.356 0.376 0.524 0.518 1.100 1.083 0.264 0.272
(11.8)*** (11.5)*** (12.0)*** (12.7)*** (24.5)*** (22.6)*** (24.3)*** (22.1)*** (15.9)*** (14.9)***
Father’s 0.034 0.039 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.052 0.053 -0.001 -0.002
education (2.58)*** (2.29)** (1.88)* (1.70)* (2.56)** (2.68)*** (3.84)*** (3.76)*** (0.15) (0.40)
Mother’s 0.017 0.037 0.015 0.024 -0.015 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.009
education (0.96) (1 5 9 ) (1.11) (175)* (1.80)* (1.33) (0.10) (0.26) (0.03) (1.15)
Other child charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village charac. Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Stratum effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Village effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3311 3065 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.258 0.332 0.31 0.42 0.48 0.56 0.54 0.61 0.25 0.35
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
Other child characteristics include: whether the child listens to the radio/ watches television/ reads newspaper, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys 
among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, household’s self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is 
engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion. Village characteristics include 
percentage o f adults 21 years and above with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village , average economic status, percentage of landless 
households, percentage o f households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage o f female headed households, and percentage o f Muslims in 
the village.
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C hapter 4
M icro-credit, Fertility D ecisions, 
and W om en’s Em powerm ent in  
Bangladesh
A bstract
This chapter investigates how micro-credit provided by the Grameen Bank affects 
fertility decisions and women’s empowerment. In particular, the results point to the 
direction that women’s empowerment is one of the main channels through which the 
Grameen Bank may affect fertility decisions. In villages where the Grameen Bank is 
well established, between 1993 and 1996 there has been a reduction in women’s ideal 
number of children and the number of births in the year prior to the survey, and an 
increase in the use of family planning methods. In villages where the Grameen Bank 
entered between 1993 and 1996 there has been an increase in husbands’ approval of 
family planning methods. Having the Grameen Bank in the village shows positive 
relationship with women’s empowerment as measured by contribution to family sup­
port and mobility. Women who contribute to family support or have a high level of 
mobility are less likely to have given birth in the year prior to the survey.
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4.1 Introduction
Bangladesh has experienced a sharp decline in fertility from a total fertility rate1 of 6.3 
in 1971-75 to 3.3 in 1994-96 despite the absence of conditions believed to be necessary 
for such changes, such as economic growth. Researchers argue that something must 
have occurred during the period that changed people’s perception regarding family 
size and family planning (Cleland et al., 1994). The basis for this argument is 
that in the 1960s family planning programs were considered a failure, however, since 
the 1970s family planning programs have been highly successful. Pakistan, on the 
other hand, had a very slow fertility decline, although both Pakistan and Bangladesh 
started with a similar level of total fertility rate in 1970s and had a similar level of 
real GDP growth per year between 1980 and 1996 (Morduch, 2001).
One of the major changes in Bangladesh in the 1970s is the emergence of non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) after the war of independence in 1971. At 
that time, the country was in a state of turmoil and many NGOs sprung up to 
help resettle the refugees who were returning home. Many NGOs later evolved 
into development agencies providing services in many areas including micro-credit, 
education, health, and agriculture. Micro-credit has become one of the main activities 
of NGOs in Bangladesh, and the 1980s and early 1990s saw rapid expansion of micro­
credit programs by the Grameen Bank and replication by other NGOs.
The Grameen Bank initiated group lending programs for the poor in 1976. Muham­
mad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, felt that most villagers were unable 
to obtain credit at reasonable rates and that lack of credit hindered productive self- 
employment (Morduch, 1999). One special characteristic of micro-credit is that 
collateral is replaced with peer monitoring. Micro-credit members form groups and
1 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as “the average number of children that would be bom alive 
to a woman (or a group of women) during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing 
years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year.” This rate is sometimes stated 
as the number of children women are having today.
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all members of the group become ineligible for further loans if any member defaults. 
95% of the Grameen Bank members are women. Group members meet weekly to 
repay loans, and during these meetings social issues such as education and family 
planning are raised.
Micro-credit programs may affect fertility decisions in many ways. Having micro­
credit programs in the village of residence affects people’s perception regarding family 
size and family planning, their knowledge of family planning methods, and economic 
opportunities that they face. Moreover, as the majority of micro-credit recipients 
are women, it is possible that micro-credit programs have an impact on women’s 
empowerment.2 Mahmud (2003) and Hashime et al. (1996), among others, document 
the positive impact of micro-credit program membership on women’s empowerment 
in Bangladesh. Research findings have confirmed the negative impact of women’s 
empowerment and education on fertility.3
Evidence regarding the relationship between micro-credit and fertility in Bangladesh 
has been mixed. Studies including Amin et al. (1994) and Hashemi et al. (1997) 
show positive associations of micro-credit participation and the probability of using 
family planning methods. However, the studies employ cross-sectional data and do 
not explicitly address the possibility of self-selection into programs.
On the other hand, two recent studies have found positive associations between 
micro-credit and fertility. P itt et al. (1999) use 1991 cross-sectional data to esti­
mate the impact of micro-credit participation on reproductive behavior, controlling 
for choice-based sampling, self-selection into programs, and non-random program 
placement. The findings suggest that female participation in credit programs has
2 “Empowerment” has been defined as the process by which the powerless gain greater control 
over the circumstances of their fives. It includes both control over resources (physical, human, 
intellectual, financial) and over ideology (beliefs, values, and attitudes) (Baltiwala, 1994). Variables 
used to proxy for women’s empowerment include economic decision-making authority, child-related 
decision-making authority, mobility, freedom from threat, and access to economic resources (Jejeeb- 
hoy, 2000).
3 For example, see Jejeebhoy (1995), Dyson and Moore (1983), Abadian (1996), G. Sen (1993), 
and Presser and Sen (2000).
114
a positive effect on fertility relative to non-participant, although the effect is not al­
ways significant. The paper suggests that the income effect of access to micro-credit 
dominates the substitution effect.4 Morduch (2001) uses a longitudinal data set with 
information on almost 1200 women during the years 1981 to 1991 to investigate the 
finks between access to micro-credit and reproductive behaviors. The study mea­
sures the impact of eligibility rather than participation, using program rules that bar 
households owning over half an acre of land from participating.5 The results show 
surprising positive associations of micro-credit access and fertility rates, confirming 
the findings in P itt et al. (1999).
In this chapter I investigate the effects of having the Grameen Bank in the village 
of residence on fertility decisions and women’s empowerment. Unlike Pitt et al. 
(1999) and Morduch (2001), I do not analyze the impact of micro-credit on actual 
participation or eligibility. Instead, I focus on the presence of the Grameen Bank 
in the village of residence, and the timing of the Grameen Bank’s entrance into the 
village. I study how fertility decisions change over time in different groups of villages.
Using nationally representative data from the Bangladesh Demographic and Health 
Survey (BDHS), I study the changes in fertility decisions and women’s empowerment 
between 1993 and 1996 in villages with and without the Grameen Bank. Due to non- 
random program placement of the Grameen Bank, I employ pooled cross-sectional 
analysis and focus on the changes over time in different groups of villages. This is 
possible since the 1993 and 1996 rounds of the BDHS surveyed the same villages. I 
can therefore control for village fixed effects. Due to the possibility of self-selection of
4 The Neoclassical model presented in the paper suggests that higher income from access to credit 
raises the demand for children while the higher opportunity cost of time in raising children lowers the 
demand. However, the employment generated by micro-credit is usually based at home, therefore 
the opportunity cost of child rearing is likely to be small.
5 However, the author notes that the rule was followed laxly in the program villages, where 20- 
30% of participants were over the line and thus were excluded from the analysis. The procedure of 
choosing households in the controlled villages followed the rule strictly.
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Grameen Bank members6 and the likely spill-over effects of social norms7, instead of 
focusing on the difference between members and non-members, I study all individuals 
in different groups of villages.
Findings suggest the role of the Grameen Bank in affecting people’s perception 
regarding family size and family planning. In villages where the Grameen Bank is 
well established, between 1993 and 1996 there has been a reduction in women’s ideal 
number of children and the number of births in the year prior to the survey, and an 
increase in the use of family planning methods. In villages where the Grameen Bank 
entered between 1993 and 1996 there has been an increase in husbands’ approval 
of family planning methods. Moreover, having the Grameen Bank in the village 
is associated with an increase in women’s empowerment in terms of contribution to 
family support and mobility. In line with ear her studies, there is evidence that 
women’s empowerment is negatively correlated with fertility.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the change in 
fertility in Bangladesh and the Grameen Bank’s micro-credit program. Section 4.3 
describes the data while section 4.4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4.5 
concludes.
4.2 Background
Bangladesh has undergone a considerable decline in fertility in the last few decades 
although the country’s economic circumstances appeared unfavorable. Bangladesh 
is in fact the only country among the world’s twenty poorest countries where such 
a change has occurred (Khuda and Hossain, 1996). The rapid decline in fertility 
in Bangladesh has challenged conventional demographic transition theory, which as­
6It is possible that more active and outgoing women self-select themselves into joining the 
Grameen Bank.
7 The knowledge of family planning methods and the perception regarding family size are some 
changes that can easily spill-over to non-members in the village.
sociates fertility decline with economic development, and researchers have tried to 
understand the factors that have contributed to this change in Bangladesh.
A World Bank study (Cleland et al., 1994) attributes the decline in fertility to 
the activities of national family planning program, as, according to the study, the 
decline occurred in spite of social, economic, and institutional circumstances that 
are unfavorable to reproductive change. Living standards hardly improved, very few 
women were engaged in cash-generating activities, and the Bangladeshi society has 
remained conservative, traditional, and agrarian. Children, particularly sons8, are 
seen as an insurance against risks for women in the case that they divorce. This is 
because women are usually unable to seek employment and would therefore rely on 
their sons for support. The study states that the crucial change that has taken place 
concerns acceptability of and access to birth control and not economic growth that has 
driven down the demand for children. The Bangladesh government intensified family 
planning program efforts from about 1973, and achieved considerable momentum by 
1975. Because the family planning program of the 1960s was considered a failure, it 
is believed that a change in the outlook of the people, perhaps encompassing demand 
factors, was a prerequisite for the success of the family planning program in the late 
1970s and 1980s.
Caldwell et al. (1999), on the other hand, do not agree with Cleland et al. (1994) 
that little change occurred to the Bangladeshi society during the two decades between 
1970s and 1990s. Their qualitative research, based on their fieldwork in Chittagong 
Division, found that the main reason given for using family planning methods is to 
allow for children’s education and other family needs. Limited amounts of land 
means that more employment has to be found outside of farming, and education 
is recognized as the main route to such employment. Therefore, the reduction in 
fertility is likely to have resulted from the change in society to one which parents
8Bangladesh is a society where there is a preference for sons over daughters, most vividly demon­
strated by the excess mortality of daughters in childhood (Cleland et al., 1994).
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need to carefully plan for their children’s education and employment.
Female education is found to be the most important variable affecting both contra­
ceptive use and fertility regulation in Bangladesh (Khuda and Hossain, 1996). There 
is also evidence that improvement in women’s status in terms of employment, mo­
bility, and decision-making power has contributed to increased contraceptive use and 
consequent fertility decline.
NGOs in Bangladesh are likely to have affected the Bangladeshi society in many 
ways, including female education and women’s empowerment in areas such as em­
ployment, mobility, and decision-making. The number of NGOs has increased signif­
icantly from when NGOs started to emerge after the war of independence in 1971. In 
1998 there were about 20,000 NGOs operating in Bangladesh’s 86,000 villages (The 
Economist, 1998). In 2000, 83% of the women interviewed by the Bangladesh Demo­
graphic and Health Survey lived in villages where NGOs are operating (BDHS, 2000). 
NGOs in Bangladesh are involved in many areas of public service and are documented 
as being one of the most active in the world (Sharafuddin, 1998). NGOs provide 
services in many areas including education, health, and micro-credit. In many cases, 
NGOs focus on the poorest people and women. For example, micro-credit programs 
are aimed at women and NGOs’ non-formal schools target girls.
The Grameen Bank is probably the most well-known NGO providing micro-credit. 
The Grameen Bank initiated group lending programs for the poor, and its model for 
group lending has been used for delivering credit in over 40 countries (Pitt et al., 
1999). The Grameen Bank was founded in 1976 by Muhammad Yunus, a professor 
in economics, based on an idea that lack of capital was the main obstacle to productive 
self-employment among the poor. The Grameen Bank formally began functioning 
as a specialized bank in 1983, providing finance for nonagricultural self-employment 
activities. Common loan uses include rice processing, livestock raising, and tradi­
tional crafts (Morduch, 1999). The Grameen Bank provides credit to members who
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form self-selected groups of five. Collateral is replaced with peer monitoring, as all 
members in the group become ineligible for further loans if any member defaults.9 
The groups meet weekly to make repayments on their loans as well as mandatory 
contributions to savings and insurance funds.
The Grameen Bank personnel supervise the utilization of loans and guide bor­
rowers through their use of loan resources. Members of each group are of the same 
sex, and 95 percent of the borrowers are women. The Grameen bank lends at the 
same rate of interest as commercial banks, and the repayment rate is over 90 percent. 
Strict rules of weekly repayment and peer pressure are believed to account for the 
high repayment rates.
The Grameen Bank also promotes an idea of low fertility and an alteration of 
the attitude towards women. At each weekly meeting, members jointly recite the 
“sixteen decisions”, which include the following: “We will keep our families small,” 
“We shall not take any dowry in our sons’ wedding, neither shall we give any dowry 
in our daughters’ wedding,” and “We shall not practice child marriage.”
From the day Muhammad Yunus lent his own money to some poor villagers, the 
Grameen Bank has grown significantly in size and coverage. As of July 2004, the 
Grameen Bank has 3.7 million borrowers, 1267 branches, and provides services in 
46,000 villages, covering more than 68 percent of the total villages in Bangladesh 
(www.grameen-info.org).
In this chapter I investigate how the Grameen Bank affects fertility decisions and 
women’s empowerment. I study how fertility decisions and women’s empowerment 
have changed between 1993 and 1996 in villages with and without the Grameen 
Bank, using data from the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS), as 
described in the next section.
9The enforcement mechanisms rely on informal insurance relationships and threats, ranging from 
social isolation to physical retribution.
119
4.3 D ata
Data used in this paper come from the 1993/94 and 1996/97 rounds of the Bangladesh 
Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS). Both the 1993/94 and 1996/97 BDHS 
employed a nationally-representative, two-stage sample.10
For the first stage, selection was made from the Integrated Multi-Purpose Master 
Sample (IMPS), created by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. The primary sam­
pling units in the IMPS were selected with probability proportional to size from the 
1991 census frame. In rural areas the primary sampling unit was the mauza, and 
in urban areas it was the mahalla. Bangladesh is divided into five administrative 
divisions, 64 districts, and 489 thanas. In rural areas, thanas are divided into unions 
and then mauzas, an administrative land unit. Urban areas are divided into wards 
and then mahallas. The 1993/94 BDHS covered 301 sample points. The 1996/97 
BDHS covered the same sample points (though not necessarily the same households) 
as the 1993/94 BDHS, together with 12 additional sample points in the new division 
of Sylhet. A total of 313 points were covered.
For the second stage, after the selection of the BDHS sample points a systematic 
sample of households was selected from a prepared household list, with an average of 
25 households in urban clusters and 37 households in rural clusters. For the BDHS 
1993/94, a total of 9174 households (9640 women and 3284 men) were interviewed. For 
the BDHS 1996/97, 8682 households (9127 women and 3346 men) were interviewed.
There are four types of questionnaires:
(i) Household Questionnaire. All the usual members and visitors were listed, and 
some basic information was collected, including age, sex, education, and relationship 
to the head of the household.
(ii) Women’s Questionnaire. Ever-married women aged 10-49 were interviewed. 
The topics covered include background characteristics (such as age, education, and
10 Details of the sampling technique are discussed in the Data Appendix.
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religion), reproductive history, knowledge and use of family planning methods, ante­
natal and delivery care, vaccinations and health of children under age three, marriage, 
fertility preferences, husband’s background, and respondent’s work.
(iii) Husband’s Questionnaire. The questions are the same as in Women’s Ques­
tionnaire, except that questions regarding birth history, maternal care, breast-feeding 
and child health are omitted.
(iv) Service Availability Questionnaire. This part of the survey contains infor­
mation on the family planning and health services available in and near the sampled 
areas.
Table 4.1 shows how the Grameen Bank entered and left rural villages between 
1993 and 1996. The analysis in this paper focuses on rural villages, as the Grameen 
Bank works almost exclusively with the rural poor.11 Out of 202 rural villages 
with information on the Grameen Bank for both 1993 and 1996, 60 villages have the 
Grameen Bank for both years. There are 42 villages where the Grameen Bank left 
sometime during 1993 and 1996, and 10 villages where the Grameen Bank entered 
between 1993 and 1996.
For the purpose of the analysis, I construct the indexes of women’s empowerment 
in the following areas:
(i) Discussion of family planning. This index is constructed from the question 
“Do you discuss family planning with your partner?” A score of 0 is assigned if the 
answer is ‘never’, 3 if the answer is ‘once or twice’, and 6 if the answer is ‘more often.’
(ii) Contribution to family support. I use the following three questions: “Are you 
currently working?”, “Do you earn cash for work?”, and “Is the employment all year 
or seasonal?”. A score of 2 is assigned if the respondent was currently working, and 
0 otherwise. An addition score of 2 is given if the respondent earns cash for work. 
And, for the last question, a score of 2 is given if the respondent works all year, 1
11 Only 10 cities/towns covered in the data has had the Grameen Bank at some point in time, 
while the corresponding figure is 118 for rural villages.
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if the work is seasonal, and 0 if the work is occasional. The index for contribution 
ranges from 0 to 6.
(iii) Mobility. The index for mobility is constructed from the following two 
questions: “Are you allowed to go out of town alone or with young children?”, and 
“How often do you go shopping?”. A score of 3 is assigned if the respondent said she 
could go out of town alone, or with children or husband, and 0 if the respondent said 
she could not go out of town. For the frequency of shopping, a score of 3 is assigned 
if the answer is “once a month or more”, 2 if “several times per year” , 1 if “once a 
year or less” , and 0 if “never”. The index for mobility ranges from 0 to 6.
An overall index of empowerment is an average of the three indexes above. The 
overall index of empowerment ranges from 0 to 6.
Table 4.2 gives means and standard deviations of the main variables. The rural 
villages are divided into four groups: (i) those without Grameen for both 1993 and 
1996, (ii) those with Grameen for both 1993 and 1996, (iii) those with Grameen only 
for 1993, and (iv) those with Grameen only for 1996.
Panel A shows individual level means of women aged 10 to 49 surveyed in the 
four different groups of villages in 1993 and 1996. For all villages associated with 
the Grameen Bank at some point in time, the ideal number of children has decreased 
between 1993 and 1996. On the other hand, in villages where the Grameen Bank 
never entered, there is a slight increase in the ideal number of children. The number 
of children born in the past year also appears highest in the group of villages where 
the Grameen Bank never entered, although we have to take into account the non- 
random program placement of the Grameen Bank.12 Villages with the Grameen 
Bank for both 1993 and 1996 are those with the highest proportion of women using 
family planning method, and the highest proportion of husbands who approve of 
family planning methods. Differences in other areas regarding fertility decisions and
12 For example, it is possible that the Grameen Bank did not enter some villages for reasons such 
as difficulty to access, and those villages are the ones with higher fertility rates.
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women’s empowerment can be seen among the four groups of villages.
Panel B gives the village level means of the characteristics of the four groups of 
villages using data from 1993. It appears that the Grameen Bank has programs in 
more easily accessible villages. Villages where the Grameen Bank never entered are 
on average further away from the Thana Headquarter compared to villages associated 
with the Grameen Bank at some point in time. Moreover, villages where the Grameen 
Bank never entered have a smaller proportion of households with electricity, and lower 
average education of adults. The summary statistics suggest non-random program 
placement of the Grameen Bank, which will be taken into account when the data are 
analyzed in the next section.
4.4 Empirical A nalysis
This chapter investigates how micro-credit provided by the Grameen Bank affects fer­
tility decisions and women’s empowerment. First I find out how having the Grameen 
Bank in the village of residence affects fertility decisions as shown by the ideal number 
of children, the number of children born in the past year, and family planning related 
decisions. The second part of the analysis studies how having the Grameen Bank in 
the village affects women’s empowerment, as proxied by mobility, contribution to fam­
ily support, and discussion with their husbands regarding family planning. I further 
analyze the relationship between women’s empowerment and fertility decisions.
When analyzing the impacts of a non-random program, such as micro-credit in this 
case, we need to take into account non-random program placement and selection bias. 
For non-random program placement, programs may be implemented in areas with 
certain characteristics, therefore a cross-sectional analysis which finds a relationship 
between the implementation of a program and an outcome of interest may not report 
the true effect of the program. The relationship found could be biased due to the
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characteristics of the areas where the program is implemented. To deal with non- 
random program placement, I use pooled cross-sectional analysis and focus on the 
changes through time in different groups of villages.13 I use two specifications, 
one which I control for village characteristics and the other village fixed effects. In 
interpreting the results, the identification assumption is that there is no omitted 
time-varying and region specific effects correlated with the placement of the Grameen 
Bank.
Regarding selection bias, it is possible that members of a program self-select them­
selves into joining the program. It has been argued that relatively more empowered 
women self-select themselves into programs such as micro-credit (Mahmud, 2003). 
Therefore, the difference in the outcomes between members and non-members could 
partly be due to the pre-program characteristics of members and non-members. Due 
to the possibility of selection bias, I study how the presence of the Grameen Bank in 
the village affects all individuals, including both members and non-members. Any 
effect found includes both direct and spill-over effects.
4.4.1 Micro-credit and Fertility Decisions
First I explore how having the Grameen Bank in the village of residence affects fertility 
decisions.
I estimate the following equation:
Yij =  Q;o H” ot\Gj -f- <22^96 * Gj -\- Q!3F96 -1- OL^ Cij -I- Oi$Vcj -I- olqA -j
-l-error term (4.1)
where represents
(i) the ideal number of children as reported by individual i in village j ,
13Pooled cross-sectional analysis is employed because the same villages, but possibly different 
households, were surveyed for each round of the 1993 and 1996 BDHS.
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(ii) the number of children born in the past year, and
(iii) family planning related decisions (i.e. whether the respondent was using a 
family planning method at the time of the survey, and whether her husband approves 
of family planning).
The villages are divided into four groups: (i) those without Grameen for both 1993 
and 1996, (ii) those with Grameen for both 1993 and 1996, (iii) those with Grameen 
only for 1993, and (iv) those with Grameen only for 1996. I create a dummy variable 
for each group of villages, using those without Grameen for both 1993 and 1996 as 
the baseline comparison group.
Gj is a vector of dummy variables indicating whether (i) the village has Grameen 
for both years (Grameen Both), (ii) the village has Grameen only in 1993 (Grameen 
Exit), or (iii) the village has Grameen only in 1996 (Grameen New). Y 96 is a dummy 
variable indicating data from the 1996 round. Cij is a vector of individual and family 
characteristics, Vcj is a vector of village characteristics, and Aj is a dummy variable 
for the stratum in which village j  is located. Separate regressions are estimated for 
each round of the data, where the interaction terms are excluded. In this specification, 
and all others that follow, standard errors are clustered at the village level.
I also estimate the following equation which includes village fixed effects:
Yij = ao +  aiY96  * Gj +  0 ^ 9 6  +  otzC%j +  <24 Vj +  error term (4.2)
where Vj represents village fixed effects. All other variables are as defined above.
The results are reported in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Table 4.3 shows the results 
regarding fertility preference. Columns (1) to (4) show the analysis for all women 
aged 10 to 49. Columns (5) to (8) limit the analysis to those aged 10 to 29, while 
columns (9) to (12) limit the analysis to those aged 30 to 49. It is possible that micro­
credit has different effects on women in different age groups, as they face different
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circumstances such as how many children they already have.
Column (2) shows that, in 1996, being in villages with the Grameen Bank in both 
1993 and 1996 is significantly correlated with a lower ideal number of children for 
all women. In column (3) the coefficient of ‘Year 96*Grameen Both’ is negative 
and statistically significant, suggesting that, in villages with Grameen for both years, 
women’s ideal number of children has decreased between 1993 and 1996. Column 
(4), where village fixed effects are included, confirms this result.
Columns (5) to (12) suggest that it is among women aged 30 to 49 years old that 
the change in fertility preference occurred. As shown in columns (7) and (8), for 
women aged 10 to 29, the coefficient of ‘Year 96*Grameen Both’ is negative though 
not statistically significant. On the other hand, columns (11) and (12) show that 
there has been a significant decrease in the ideal number of children between 1993 and 
1996 for women aged 30 to 49 in villages where the Grameen Bank is well established, 
i.e., villages with the Grameen Bank for both years.
For women aged 30 to 49, column (9) suggests that, in 1993, villages with the 
Grameen Bank (Grameen Both and Grameen Exit) are associated with higher ideal 
number of children compared to villages where the Grameen Bank has never entered. 
However, in 1996, as column (10) shows, villages where the Grameen Bank is well 
established is associated with lower ideal number of children.
Most individual characteristics have the expected signs. Older women are likely 
to report a higher ideal number of children. This appears to be the case for women 
aged 30 to 49, but not for those aged 10 to 29. Higher education is associated with 
lower ideal number of children, for women of all age groups. In most specifications, 
husband’s education is also associated with lower ideal number of children. Women 
who married when older are more likely to want fewer children.14
14 Age when married is often used as one of the proxies for women’s empowerment. Thus the 
results point to the direction that women’s empowerment is associated with lower ideal number of 
children.
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Taken together, the results suggest that, in villages where the Grameen Bank is 
well established, women’s ideal number of children has significantly decreased between 
1993 and 1996. Moreover, it is among women aged 30 to 49 years old that the change 
in fertility preference occurred.
Table 4.4 shows the effects of having the Grameen Bank in the village of residence 
on the number of children born in the past year. The results appear similar to the case 
of fertility preference. As columns (3) and (4) show, the number of births in the year 
prior to the survey appears to have decreased between 1993 and 1996 in villages where 
the Grameen Bank is well established. The coefficient of ‘Year 96*Grameen Both’ is 
negative and almost statistically significant in column (3), when village characteristics 
and stratum effects are controlled for. In column (4), when village fixed effects are 
controlled for, the coefficient of ‘Year 96*Grameen Both’ is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Moreover, it is among women aged 30 to 49 that the 
change has taken place, as columns (11) and (12) show.
For women aged 10 to 29, age is positively correlated with the number of children 
born in the past year. On the other hand, for women aged 30 to 49, age is negatively 
correlated with the number of children born in the past year.15 This shows the 
fertility pattern, where women in their 20s and 30s are more likely to have given birth 
in the past year compared to younger or older women.
Education appears negatively correlated with the number of births in the past 
year for year 1996 and pooled regressions. Husband’s education is not statistically 
correlated with the number of births in the past year. For most specifications, age 
when married is not statistically correlated with the number of births in the past 
year.16
Overall, the results suggest that between 1993 and 1996 there has been a significant
15 Age square is included in the regressions, though not shown in the table.
16 The exception is column (1), when age when married is positively correlated with the number 
of births for women aged 10 to 49 in 1993.
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reduction in the number of births in the past year in villages where the Grameen Bank 
is well established, and it is mainly among women aged 30 to 49 that the change has 
taken place.
Next, I turn to family planning related decisions. Table 4.5 shows how having 
the Grameen Bank in the village affects the use of a family planning method and 
husbands’ approval of family planning methods.
As columns (1) and (2) show, between 1993 and 1996, in villages where the 
Grameen Bank is well established there has been a significant increase in the proba­
bility of a respondent using a family planning method at the time of the survey. The 
coefficients of ‘Year 96*Grameen Both’ are positive and significant at the 5% level for 
both columns (1) and (2). The effect appears to have come from women aged 10 to 
29, as columns (5) and (6) show.17
Villages where the Grameen Bank is well established is associated with a higher 
probability of husbands’ approval of family planning methods, as shown in column 
(3). The coefficient of ‘Grameen Both’ is positive and significant at the 5% level. It 
is among women aged 30 to 49 that this relationship holds, as shown in column (11). 
However, there does not seem to be a significant change during the period between 
1993 and 1996 in these villages, either for all women or for women aged 30 to 49.
On the other hand, in villages where the Grameen Bank entered sometime between 
1993 and 1996, there has been a significant increase in husband’s approval of family 
planning methods among respondents aged 30 to 49, as shown in columns (11) and
(12). The coefficients of ‘Year 96* Grameen New’ are positive and significant at the 
5% level. Thus it appears that an immediate impact of the presence of the Grameen 
Bank in the village on fertility decisions is that husbands are more likely to approve 
of family planning methods.
Together, the results suggest that, between 1993 and 1996, there has been a sig­
17Although the coefficients of ‘Year 96*Grameen Both’ are less strong in columns (5) and (6) 
compared to columns (1) and (2), they are statistically significant at the 10% level.
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nificant increase in the use of family planning method in villages where the Grameen 
Bank is well established. In villages where the Grameen Bank entered between 
1993 and 1996, there has been a significant increase in husbands’ approval of family 
planning methods.
To conclude, the results in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 point to the role of the Grameen 
Bank in affecting fertility decisions in rural villages in Bangladesh. In villages where 
the Grameen Bank is well established, between 1993 and 1996 there has been a 
reduction in women’s ideal number of children and the number of births in the year 
prior to the survey, and an increase in the use of family planning methods. In villages 
where the Grameen Bank entered between 1993 and 1996 there has been an increase 
in husbands’ approval of family planning methods.
4.4.2 Micro-credit, Women’s Empowerment, and Fertility
The previous section has shown how the Grameen Bank affects fertility decisions. 
The objective of this section is to analyze how the Grameen Bank affects women’s 
empowerment, and how women’s empowerment and fertility decisions are related.
To find out how having the Grameen Bank in the village of residence affects 
women’s empowerment, I estimate equations (4.1) and (4.2) above, with repre­
senting the indexes of different areas of women’s empowerment. The four indexes I 
consider axe: (i) discussion of family planning with husband, (ii) contribution to fam­
ily support, (iii) mobility, and (iv) overall index of empowerment. The construction 
of these indexes are as discussed in section three.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.6 show that being in a village where the Grameen 
Bank is well established is significantly associated with higher levels of contribution 
to family support and mobility for women aged 10 to 49. As shown in column (4), 
being in a village where the Grameen Bank is well established is also associated with 
a higher level of the overall index of women’s empowerment. These associations
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appear similar in the case of women aged 10 to 29 and those aged 30 to 49, as shown 
in columns (6) to (8) and (10) to (12).
For villages where the Grameen Bank is well established, there appears to be little 
or no change through time for most of the indexes of women’s empowerment. One 
exception is column (9), where the coefficient of ‘Year 96* Grameen Both’ is positive 
and significant at the 10% level in the case of whether a woman in the age range of 
30 to 49 discusses family planning with her husband. Thus in villages where the 
Grameen Bank is well established there appears to be an increase in the proportion 
of women aged 30 to 49 who discuss family planning with their husbands.
The coefficients of ‘Grameen Exit’ are also positive and significant at the 10% 
level for columns (2) to (4), (6), (7), and (12). These results suggest that, in 1993, 
when these villages had the Grameen Bank, women’s levels of contribution to family 
support and mobility were higher than villages where the Grameen Bank did not 
enter. In column (7), the coefficient of ‘Year 96*Grameen Exit’ is negative and 
almost significant at the 10% level for mobility, suggesting that during 1993 and 
1996, the period when the Grameen Bank left the villages, the level of mobility has 
decreased in these villages for women aged 10 to 29. The results suggest that having 
the Grameen Bank in the village of residence is associated with a higher level of 
women’s empowerment, particularly as measured by contribution to family support 
and mobility.
The coefficients of ‘Grameen New’ and ‘Year 96*Grameen New’ are statistically 
insignificant across all columns. One possible explanation is that it takes time before 
the Grameen Bank has a visible impact on women’s empowerment in a village.18 In 
column (7), however, the coefficient of ‘Year 96*Grameen New’ is positive with the 
t-value of 1.53, suggesting an increase in the level of women’s mobility, although the
18For villages in the ‘Grameen New’ group, the Grameen Bank entered the villages at some point 
between 1993 and 1996, therefore when the data was collected in 1996 the Grameen Bank might 
have been there for only a short period of time.
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effect is not statistically significant.
For individual characteristics, age appears positively correlated with the indexes 
of empowerment. Education is positively correlated with whether the respondent 
discusses family planning matters with the husband, and mobility. However, edu­
cation does not appear to be significantly correlated with the level of contribution 
to family support. Husband’s education is positively correlated with whether the 
couple discusses family planning matters, and negatively correlated with the level of 
the wife’s contribution to family support. Husband’s education appears positively 
correlated with the wife’s mobility for women aged 10 to 29, though not for women 
aged 30 to 49.
Overall, the results suggest that having the Grameen Bank in the village is asso­
ciated with an increase in women’s empowerment in terms of contribution to family 
support and mobility.
Next, I analyze the relationship between women’s empowerment and fertility de­
cisions. I estimate the following equation:
Yij =  a 4- bEij +  cF96 +  dCij -1- eVj +  error term (4.3)
where represents (i) the ideal number of children as reported by individual i in 
village j ,  and (ii) the number of children born in the past year. Here Eij represents
(i) the indexes of women’s empowerment, as discussed above, and (ii) the overall 
index of empowerment. All other variables axe as defined above.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 4.7 show that women who discussed family 
planning with their husbands are likely to want fewer children, controlling for other 
factors. However, the causal relationship may be either because more empowered 
women who discuss family planning tend to want fewer children, or because women 
who want fewer children axe more likely to discuss family planning with their hus­
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bands. To find the direction of the causality, further investigation is needed. The 
coefficients of ‘mobility’ are negative and strongly significant for all columns, suggest­
ing that women who have a higher level of mobility are likely to want fewer children, 
controlling for other factors.
Columns (2), (4), and (6) show that the overall index of empowerment has a 
negative and strongly significant relationship with the ideal number of children, and 
the relationship holds for women of all age groups.
Two other indicators often used to proxy for women’s empowerment are level of 
education and age when married. Across all columns, the coefficients of ‘education’ 
and ‘age when married’ are negative and statistically significant, confirming previous 
research findings that women’s empowerment has a negative impact on fertility.
Together, the results suggest that a women’s level of mobility is negatively cor­
related with her ideal number of children. Moreover, women who discuss family 
planning with their husbands are likely to want fewer children, controlling for other 
factors.
Table 4.8 explores the relationships between women’s empowerment and the num­
ber of children born during the year prior to the survey. Columns (1), (3), and (5) 
show that women with a higher level of contribution to family support are less likely 
to have given birth in the past year. The relationship is statistically significant for 
women aged 10 to 29, though not for those aged 30 to 49. Women in the age group 
of 10 to 29 who have a higher level of mobility are also less likely to have given birth 
in the previous year. On the other hand, women in the age group of 30 to 49 who 
discuss family planning with their husbands are more likely to have given birth in the 
past year.19
Columns (2), (4), and (6) show that the coefficients of the overall index of em­
19 This suggests that the causality between discussion of family planning with husbands and the 
number of births in the previous year might be that those who have given birth in the past year are 
likely to want to use a family planning method.
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powerment are negative though not statistically significant for all women and women 
aged 10 to 29. The relationship is marginal for women aged 30 to 49.
For individual characteristics, age is positively associated with the number of 
children born in the past year for women aged 10 to 29. On the other hand, age is 
negatively associated with the number of children born in the past year for women 
aged 30 to 49, similar to the results in Table 4.4. The coefficients of ‘education’ are 
negative and statistically significant across all columns. The coefficients of ‘husband’s 
education’ and ‘age when married’ are marginal and insignificant across all columns.
Overall, the results suggest that contribution to family support and mobility are 
negatively correlated with the number of children born the year prior to the survey 
for women aged 10 to 29.
To conclude, the results suggest that having the Grameen Bank in the village 
is associated with an increase in women’s empowerment in terms of contribution to 
family support and mobility. Moreover, women with a higher level of mobility tend 
to want fewer children, and women aged 10 to 29 who contribute to family support 
or have a high level of mobility are less likely to have given birth in the year prior to 
the survey.
4.5 Conclusion
The Grameen Bank’s micro-credit program may affect fertility in many ways. By 
generating employment and raising income, micro-credit possibly increases the de­
mand for children through the effect of higher income or reduces the demand through 
higher opportunity cost of time. The Grameen Bank’s weekly meetings and the 
recitation of the “sixteen decisions” which include “We will keep our families small.” 
possibly affects members’ perception regarding family size. These meetings and other 
educational programs could be a place where the knowledge of contraceptive methods
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is promoted and new perspectives are introduced. Moreover, the Grameen Bank’s 
micro-credit program targets women. It is possible that the program contributes 
to women’s empowerment and thus lowers fertility, as one factor that is generally 
believed to have contributed to lower fertility is the empowerment of women.
This chapter investigates the effects of having the Grameen Bank in the village 
of residence on fertility decisions and women’s empowerment. The results point 
to the role of the Grameen Bank in affecting fertility decisions in rural villages in 
Bangladesh. In villages where the Grameen Bank is well established, between 1993 
and 1996, there has been a reduction in women’s ideal number of children and the 
number of births in the year prior to the survey, and an increase in the use of family 
planning methods. In villages where the Grameen Bank entered between 1993 and 
1996 there has been an increase in husbands’ approval of family planning methods. 
Having the Grameen Bank in the village shows positive relationship with women’s 
empowerment as measured by contribution to family support and mobility. Moreover, 
women with a higher level of mobility tend to want fewer children, and women aged 
10 to 29 who contribute to family support or have a high level of mobility are less 
likely to have given birth in the year prior to the survey.
The results in this chapter suggest that the Grameen Bank plays a role in empow­
ering women and affecting their fertility decisions in addition to providing funds for 
income generating activities. As Mohammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank, 
declares, “Credit is a powerful weapon, and anyone possessing this weapon is certainly 
better equipped to maneuver the forces around him to his advantage”, the Grameen 
Bank has clearly empowered many poor women in Bangladesh.
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4.6 Appendix 1: D ata Appendix
The 1993/94 and 1996/97 rounds of the BDHS were conducted under the authority 
of the National Institute of Population Research and Training of the Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare. The survey was implemented by Mitra and Associates, 
a private research firm located in Dhaka. Both the 1993/94 and 1996/97 BDHS 
employed a nationally-representative, two-stage sample. For the first stage, selection 
was made from the Integrated Multi-Purpose Master Sample (IMPS), created by 
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. The primary sampling units (the mauza for 
the rural areas and the mahalla for the urban areas) in the IMPS were selected 
with probability proportional to size from the 1991 census frame. The units for the 
BDHS were subselected from the IMPS with equal probability to make the BDHS 
selection equivalent to selection with probability proportional to size. For the 1993/94 
BDHS, a total of 304 primary sampling units were selected, out of the 372 in the 
IMPS. Fieldwork in three sample points was not possible so a total of 301 points 
were covered. The 1996/97 BDHS covered the same sample points as the 1993- 
94 BDHS, together with 12 additional sample points in the new division of Sylhet. 
A total of 313 points were covered. For the second stage, after the selection of 
the BDHS sample points a systematic sample of households was selected from a 
prepared household list, with an average of 25 households in urban clusters and 37 
households in rural clusters. Every second household was identified as selected for 
the husband’s survey, i.e., in addition to interviewing all ever-married women aged 
10-49, interviewers also interviewed the husband of any woman who was successfully 
interviewed. The contents of the questionnaires were based on the DHS Model A 
Questionnaire, which is designed for use in countries with relatively high levels of 
contraceptive use.
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T A B LE 4.1
HOW  TH E G RAM EEN BA N K  EN TER ED  A N D  LEFT VILLAGES
Num ber o f  v illages with: 1993 1996 Both
Grameen Bank 102 70 60
(50.5% ) (34.7% ) (29.7% )
Grameen Bank only in 1993 (Grameen 42
left) (20.8% )
Grameen Bank only in 1996 (Grameen 10
entered) (4.9% )
T he total num ber o f rural villages w ith inform ation on the G ram een  B ank fo r both 1993 and 1996 is
202 .
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TABLE 4.2
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES
P anel A : In d iv id u a l L evel 
M ean s*
Grameen
Both
Gram een
E xit
Grameen
N ew
N o
Grameen
93 96 93 9 6 93 9 6 93 9 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ideal number o f  children 2.45 2 .37 2 .54 2 .49 2 .45 2.41 2.51 2 .55
(.78) (.72) (-89) (.83 ) (.83) (.75) (.85) (.85)
Num ber o f  children bom  in .14 .13 .14 .15 .13 .13 .16 .16
the past year (.36) (.33) (.35) (.35) (.33) (.34) (.37) (.37)
Proportion: currently using .47 .52 .44 .46 .40 .46 .41 .43
fam ily planning m ethod (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50 ) (.49) (.50) (-49) (.50)
Proportion: husband approves .86 .90 .83 .85 .80 .87 .79 .81
o f  fam ily planning m ethod (.34) (.30) (.37) (.35 ) (.40 ) (.33) ( 4 0 ) (.40)
Index: d iscussion  fam ily 3.2 2.4 3 .0 2.1 2.9 1.9 2.9 1.9
planning with husband (2.3) (2 .3) (2 .4) (2 .2 ) (2 .2 ) (2 .3 ) (2 .4) (2 .2)
Index: contribution to fam ily 1.1 2.0 1.0 1.8 1.2 2.1 .74 1.8
support (2 .3) (2 .5) (2 .2 ) (2 .5 ) (2 .3 ) (2 .5 ) (1 .9) (2 .5)
Index: m obility 2.8 2.7 2.7 2 .6 2 .4 2 .6 2.5 2.5
(1.3) (1.5) (1 .4 ) (1 .6 ) (1 .6) (1 .5 ) (1-5) (1 .6)
Index: em pow erm ent 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2 .0 2 .0
(1 .2) (1 .3) (1-2) (1 .3 ) (1 .3 ) ( 1 4 ) (1 .2) (1 .3 )
A ge 2 8 .9 28.7 29.1 2 9 .4 2 8 .8 29 .4 28 .8 2 9 .0
(8.9) (9 .2) (8 .8 ) (9 .2 ) (9 .5) (9 .2 ) (8 .9 ) (9 .2 )
Education (years) 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 2 .0
(3 .1) (3 .2) (2 .9 ) (3 .4 ) (3 .1 ) (3 .0 ) (2 .8 ) (3-0)
H usband’s education (years) 3.8 3.9 3.3 3.7 3.1 2.9 3 .2 3.2
(4 .3) (4 .3 ) (4 .3 ) (4 .5 ) (4 .2 ) (4 .1 ) (4 .1) (4 .1 )
A ge when married 14.1 13.8 13.9 13.9 14.2 13.8 14.0 13.7
(2 .8) (2 .6) (2 .8 ) (3-0) (2 .8) (2 .9 ) (2 .7 ) (2 .7 )
Proportion: working .19 .41 .19 .37 .20 .43 .13 .38
(.39) (.49) (■39) ( 4 8 ) ( 4 0 ) (.50) (-34) (.49)
P an e l B : V illa g e  L evel Grameen Gram een Grameen N o
M ea n s in  1993 Both E xit N ew Grameen
(1) (2) (3 ) (4)
D istance from Thana 
Head Quarter (km) 
D istance from D istrict 
H ead Quarter (km) 
Proportion o f  households  
w ith electricity  
Proportion o f  households  
w ith land
A verage education (adults)
5.8  
(3 .8) 
17.2 
(8-7) 
.12  
(.20) 
.61 
(.17)
2 .9  
(1 .1)
5 .4
(4 .2 )  
16.1
(10 .3)
.11
(.1 4 )
.60
(.16 )
2.5
(1 .2 )
3 .9
(3 .4 )
22
(9 .0 )
.14
(.19 )
.55
(.21)
2 .5
(.89)
6 .6
(4 .6)
19.4
(12 .1)
.08
(.20)
.57
(.17)
2.3
(1-1)
N um ber o f  observations 60 42 10 9 0
* Individual level means are those of women aged 10 to 49 living in rural villages who were covered 
under the Women Questionnaire. Due to several missing data, the number o f  observations varies for 
each individual characteristic. The minimum numbers o f observations for columns (1) to (8) are as 
follows: 1955 ,1396 ,320 ,2838 , 1572, 1152, 250, and 2400.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
140
TABLE 4.3
MICRO-CREDIT AND WOMEN’S FERTILITY PREFERENCE
Dependent variable: Ideal number o f children
Married women aged 10-49 Married women aged 10-29 Married women aged 30-49
1993 1996 Pooled 93 and 96 1993 1996 Pooled 93 and 96 1993 1996 Pooled 93 and 96
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) G O (12)
Grameen Both 0.023 -0.091 0.018 -0.038 -0.065 -0.028 0.103 -0.124 0.080
(0.69) (2.26)* (0.53) (1.05) (1 6 1 ) (0.78) (2.08)* (2.25)* (1.61)
Year 96*Grameen Both -0.104 -0.105 -0.052 -0.057 -0.181 -0.165
(2.46)* (2.46)* ( l .U ) (1.23) (2.72)** (2.42)*
Grameen Exit 0.051 -0.015 0.048 -0.006 -0.033 -0.001 0.125 0.010 0.114
(1-12) (0.34) (1.04) (0.12) (0.83) (0.02) (1.99)* (0.16) ( 1.8 1)t
Year 96*Grameen Exit -0.060 -0.058 -0.039 -0.042 -0.088 -0.067
(1.44) (1.39) (0.82) (0.93) (1.27) (0.95)
Grameen New 0.053 -0.051 0.050 -0.016 -0.028 -0.008 0.139 -0.078 0.128
(1.07) (0.56) (0.98) (0.31) (0.28) (0.15) (I .7 4 )t (0.67) (1.60)
Year 96*Grameen New -0.102 -0.108 -0.033 -0.040 -0.196 -0.170
(1.35) (1-42) (0.40) (0.46) ( l .8 2 )t (1 4 5 )
Year 96 0.038 0.036 0.013 0.013 0.071 0.050
(1.47) (1 4 0 ) (0.41) (0.40) ( l .7 4 )t (1.22)
Age 0.026 0.014 0.020 0.020 0.007 0.045 0.023 0.015 0.080 0.115 0.099 0.083
(3.61)** (1.89)t (3.50)** (3.54)** (0.24) (1.57) (1 0 4 ) (0.71) (1 .88)t (2.57)* (3.17)** (2.76)**
Education -0.023 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.027 -0.018 -0.022 -0.020 -0.018 -0.022 -0.021 -0.017
(4.79)** (4.08)** (6.16)** (5.77)** (5.23)** (3.64)** (5.97)** (5.56)** (1.92)t (2.54)* (3.23)** (2.69)**
Husband’s education -0.003 -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007
(0.80) (3.28)** (2.75)** (2.86)** (0.41) (2.67)** (2.01)* (1.89) (0.55) (2.05)* ( l.8 4 )t (L 7 4 )t
Age when married -0.025 -0.017 -0.021 -0.023 -0.018 -0.012 -0.015 -0.017 -0.032 -0.021 -0.027 -0.029
(5.54)** (4.14)** (6.38)** (6.82)** (3.62)** (2.62)** (4.08)** (4.57)** (4.38)** (2.97)** (4.95)** (5.28)**
Other individual charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village characteristics Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Village effects No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 6483 5965 12448 12448 3771 3420 7191 7191 2712 2545 5257 5257
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.16
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, t ,  *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. 
Other individual characteristics include: age squared, whether the respondent is working, whether the respondent is the head o f household, whether the household has land, and 
religion o f the respondent. Village characteristics include: distance from Thana Head Quarter, distance from District Head Quarter, proportion o f households with electricity, 
proportion o f households with land, and average education o f adults 20 years old and above.
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TABLE 4.4
MICRO-CREDIT AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN
Dependent variable: Number o f children bom in the past one year
Married women aged 10-49_________________ Married women aged 10-29_______________ Married women aged 30-49
1993 1996 Pooled 93 and 96 1993 1996 Pooled 93 and 96 1993 1996 Pooled 93 and 96
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (I I ) (12)
Grameen Both -0.005 -0.024 -0.002 -0.013 -0.019 -0.007 0.001 -0.028 0.000
(0.47) (2.48)* (0.21) (0.80) (1.24) (0.40) (0.10) (2.90)** (0.03)
Year 96*Grameen Both -0.027 -0.028 -0.022 -0.023 -0.028 -0.027
(1.97)+ (2.08)* (1.02) (1.08) (2.11)* (1.97)*
Grameen Exit -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.019 0.000 -0.013 -0.005 -0.011 -0.004
(1.08) (0.35) (0.77) (L 14) (0.01) (0.83) (0.46) (0.95) (0.41)
Year 96*Grameen Exit -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(0.21) (0.20) (0.05) (0.13) (0.49) (0.44)
Grameen New -0.022 -0.007 -0.015 -0.032 -0.018 -0.021 -0.009 0.009 -0.007
(1.16) (0.31) (0.78) (1.02) (0.56) (0.66) (0.49) (0.38) (0.36)
Year 96*Grameen New -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -0.013 0.012 0.019
(0.09) (0.07) (0.34) (0.34) (0.45) (0.65)
Year 96 0.019 0.019 0.029 0.028 0.006 0.006
(2.09)* (2.14)* (2.01)* (1.91)+ (0.61) (0.60)
Age -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 0.081 0.064 0.073 0.072 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021
(1.53) (2.89)** (2.94)** (2.83)** (5.79)** (4.20)** (7.18)** (6.98)** (1.82)+ (1.98)* (2.62)** (2.65)**
Education -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.000 . -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(0.26) (3.78)** (2.66)** (2.59)* (0.45) (3.04)** (2.44)* (2.33)* (0.06) (3.29)** (2.05)* (2.51)*
Husband’s education -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.62) (1.07) (0.22) (0.30) (0.21) (1 1 8 ) (0.63) (0.64) (0.60) (0.38) (0.25) (0.32)
Age when married 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(2.03)* (0.74) (1.80)+ (1.48) (1.81)+ (0.02) (1.21) (1.22) (0.17) (0.20) (0.16) (0.83)
Other individual charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village characteristics Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Village effects No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 7144 6273 13417 13417 4092 3546 7638 7638 3052 2727 5779 5779
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.08
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village 
level. O ther individual characteristics include: age squared, whether the respondent is working, whether die respondent is die head o f household, whether the household has land, 
and religion o f the respondent. Village characteristics include: distance from Thana Head Quarter, distance from District Head Quarter, proportion of households with electricity, 
proportion o f households with land, and average education o f adults 20 years old and above.
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TABLE 4.5
MICRO-CREDIT AND FAMILY PLANNING DECISIONS
Married women aged 10-49 Married women aged 10-29 Married women aged 30-49
Currently using 
family planning
Husband approves 
family planning
Currently using 
family planning
Husband approves 
family planning
Currently using 
family planning
Husband approves 
family planning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Grameen Both 0.017 0.032 -0.001 0.018 0.045 0.051
(0.87) (1.99)* (0.03) (1 0 1 ) (1 .70)t (2.16)*
Year 96*Grameen Both 0.041 0.041 0.025 0.021 0.041 0.047 0.021 0.019 0.033 0.028 0.032 0.027
(2.07)* (2.09)* (1.28) (1.05) (1 .68)t (1 .90)t (0.93) (0.82) (L 12) (0.92) (1.14) (0.90)
Grameen Exit 0.017 0.024 -0.003 0.013 0.042 0.036
(0.85) (1.32) (0.13) (0.67) (1 5 6 ) (1.39)
Year 96*Grameen Exit -0.007 -0.004 - 0 . 0 0 1 -0.003 0.027 0.031 0.014 0.015 -0.055 -0.041 -0.022 -0.021
(0.31) (0.17) (0.04) (0.11) (0.95) (1.04) (0.50) (0.54) (1.54) (1 1 6 ) (0.63) (0.60)
Grameen New -0.031 -0.013 -0.023 0.004 -0.043 -0.042
(0.86) (0.47) (0.51) (0.17) (0.83) (1.06)
Year 96*Grameen New 0.032 0.036 0.055 0.054 -0.013 -0.009 0.017 0.015 0.085 0.079 0 . 1 1 1 0 . 1 1 1
(0.72) (0.81) (1.60) (1.54) (0.25) (0.17) (0.45) (0.39) (1 3 6 ) (1.21) (2.10)* (2.09)*
Year 96 0.039 0.039 0.010 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.066 0.062 0 . 0 0 0 0.007
(2.84)** (2.74)** (0.79) (0.99) (1 0 9 ) (1.11) (1.08) (1-19) (3.30)** (2.95)** (0.00) (0.32)
A ge 0.081 0.078 0.026 0.025 0.036 0.036 0.052 0.052 0.145 0.146 0.021 0.029
(24.35)** (23.07)** (9.41)** (9.00)** (2.77)** (2.81)** (4.70)** (4.89)** (8.27)** (8.35)** (1.33) (1.8 l) t
Education 0.011 0.012 0.009 0 . 0 1 0 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.005 0.008
(5.40)** (5.72)** (6.45)** (6.71)**
**ST00 (4.96)** (6.49)** (6.49)** (2.89)** (3.81)** (2.04)* OO 00 * *
Husband’s education 0.002 0.001 0 . 0 0 1 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0 . 0 0 0 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.02) (0.88) (L 23) (0.97) (2.09)* (2.04)* (0.52) (0.16) (0.70) (1.11) (1 2 9 ) (0.90)
A ge when married -0.012 -0.011 0.002 0.003 -0.016 -0.014 - 0 . 0 0 0 0.001 -0.002 - 0 . 0 0 1 0.006 0.006
(6.81)** (5.93)** (1.50) (1.97) (6.56)** (5.45)** (0.14) (0.39) (0.80) (0.35) (2.49)* (2.55)*
Other individual charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village characteristics Y es No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Y es No
Stratum effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Village effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 12357 12357 12091 12091 7261 7261 7145 7145 5096 5096 4946 4946
R-squared 0.13 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.16
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, t ,  *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5% , and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. 
O ther individual characteristics include: age squared, whether the respondent is working, whether the respondent is the head o f  household, w hether the household has land, and 
religion o f  the respondent. Village characteristics include: distance from Thana Head Quarter, distance from District Head Quarter, proportion o f  households with electricity, 
proportion o f  households with land, and average education o f adults 20 years old and above.
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TABLE 4.6
MICRO-CREDIT AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT
Married women aged 10-49 Married women aged 10-29 Married women aged 30-49
Discuss Contribu- Mobility Index of Discuss Contribu­ Mobility Index of Discuss Contribu­ Mobility Index of
FP tion empower­
ment
FP tion empower­
ment
FP tion empower­
ment
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (H ) (12)
Grameen Both 0.068 0.317 0.167 0.180 0.024 0.283 0.179 0.158 0.136 0.365 0.144 0.213
(0.61) (2.88)** (2.26)* SJ 00 00 * * (019) (2.23)* (196) (2.21)* (0.98) (2.94)** (1.83)t (2.94)**
Year 96*Grameen Both 0.160 -0.096 -0.112 -0.019 0.056 -0.075 -0.070 -0.028 0.340 -0.110 -0.169 -0.001
(1.19) (0.61) (1 09) (0.22) (0.37) (0.47) (0.60) (0.33) (1.87)t (0.52) (151) (0.01)
Grameen Exit 0.013 0.234 0.161 0.136 -0.078 0.243 0.174 0.109 0.155 0.221 0.128 0.175
(0.11) (1 -92)+ (l.82 )t (1.90)+ (0.53) (1.87)t (1.78)t (1.35) (1.10) (148) (1.34) (2.17)*
Year 96*Grameen Exit -0.001 -0.273 -0.139 -0.114 0.003 -0.249 -0.250 -0.139 -0.037 -0.293 0.009 -0.090
(0.00) (1.45) (1.10) (110) (0.02) (1.37) (1.71 )t (1.27) (0.20) (115) (0.07) (0.73)
Grameen New -0.149 0.231 -0.181 -0.036 -0.238 0.281 -0.185 -0.076 -0.041 0.171 -0.185 0.014
(0.63) (0.96) (1.51) (0.28) (0.97) (1 03) (1.33) (0.48) (0.13) (0.62) (1.02) (0.10)
Year 96*Grameen New -0.071 -0.228 0.218 0.010 -0.001 -0.251 0.313 0.095 -0.201 -0.220 0.084 -0.151
(0.30) (1.09) (1.27) (0.07) (0.00) (1.03) (1.53) (0.65) (0.49) (0.80) (0.42) (0.77)
Year 96 -0.981 1.049 -0.002 0.004 -1.146 0.918 0.038 -0.087 -0.731 1.216 -0.059 0.139
(11.31)** (11.14)** (0.03) (0.07) (12.89)** (9.20)** (0.47) (1.51) (6.19)** (9.47)** (0.84) (1.93)t
Age 0.215 0.225 0.144 0.186 0.293 0.139 0.261 0.226 0.125 0.309 0.088 0.158
(14.12)** (17.27)** (13.78)** (22.27)** (4.52)** (2.55)* (5.71)** (6.40)** (1.49) (4.06)** ( 1.79)+ (3.36)**
Education 0.083 0 .011 0.093 0.064 0.090 0.006 0.088 0.065 0.086 0.021 0.104 0.072
(8.76)** (1.22) **«4 OQ * * (10.71)** (7.58)** (0.58) (9.44)** (9.39)** (4.98)** (1.16) (8.59)** (6.22)**
Husband’s education 0.029 -0.030 0.014 0.005 0.031 -0.024 0.023 0.009 0.024 -0.038 0.002 -0.003
(4.32)** (4.66)** (2.93)** (117) (3.77)** (3.01)** (3.53)** (1.88)t (2.13)* yj bo © * * (0.35) (0.46)
Age when married -0.003 -0.021 - 0 . 0 1 1 -0.010 -0.044 -0.043 -0.030 -0.039 0.045 0 . 0 0 1 0.005 0.021
(0.30) (2.76)** (190) (2.12)* (3.77)** (3.96)** (3.67)** (5.69)** (3.74)** (0.13) (0.66) (3.06)**
Other individual charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village effects No No No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 11579 13417 12551 12017 7035 7638 7364 7245 4544 5779 5187 4772
R-squared 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.11
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, t , *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village 
level. Other individual characteristics include: age squared, whether the respondent is the head of household, whether the household has land, and religion of the respondent. 
Village characteristics include: distance from Thana Head Quarter, distance from District Head Quarter, proportion o f households with electricity, proportion o f households 
with land, and average education o f adults 20 years old and above.
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TABLE 4.7
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND FERTILITY PREFERENCE
Dependent variable: Ideal number o f children
Women aged 10-49 Women aaed 10-29 Women aged 30-49
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discuss FP -0.016 -0.018 -0.011
with husband (4.65)** (4.19)** (1.92)+
Contribution to -0.003 0.000 -0.005
family support (0.70) (0.04) (0.79)
Mobility -0.025 -0.023 -0.032
(4.79)** (4.45)** (2.67)**
Index of -0.037 -0.037 -0.035
empowerment (5.82)** (5.00)** (3.22)**
Year 96 -0.026 -0.012 -0.032 -0.014 -0.028 -0.017
(1.44) (0.68) (1-72)+ (0.75) (0.89) (0.57)
Age 0.029 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.113 0.112
(4.80)** (4.70)** (1 1 0 ) (0.97) (3.18)** (3.15)**
Education -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.014 -0.016
(5.19)** (5.57)** (5.02)** (5.32)** (1.94)+ (2.24)*
Husband’s -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007
education (2.13)* (2.32)* (1.16) (1.39) (1 6 4 ) (1.67)+
Age when -0.024 -0.024 -0.018 -0.018 -0.031 -0.031
married (6.58)** (6.58)** (4.54)** (4.54)** (4.85)** (4.85)**
Other
individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
Village effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11138 11138 6818 6818 4320 4320
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, t ,  *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Other individual 
characteristics include: age squared, whether the respondent is working, whether the respondent is the 
head of household, whether the household has land, and religion of the respondent.
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TABLE 4.8
WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT AND NUMBER OF CHLDREN BORN
Dependent variable: Number o f  children born in the past one year
Women aged 10-49 W omen aged 10-29 W omen aged 30-49
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D iscuss FP 0.003 0.003 0.004
with husband (1 .80)t (1.26) (2.14)*
Contribution to -0.006 -0.008 -0.002
fam ily support (4.33)** (3.72)** (1.41)
M obility -0.004 -0.006 -0.003
(1-67)+ (1.70)+ (0.97)
Index o f -0.006 -0.010 -0.000
empowerment (2.06)* (2.02)* (0.09)
Year 96 0.020 0.011 0.028 0.017 0.008 0.003
(2.91)** (1.73)+ (2.76)** (1.72)+ (1.02) (0.39)
A ge -0.003 -0.003 0.077 0.078 -0.021 -0.021
(1.13) (1.16) (7.20)** (7.19)** (2.17)* (2.20)*
Education -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(3.00)** (2.91)** (2.56)* (2.46)* (2.63)** (2 .64)**
Husband’s 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0 .000 0.000
education (0.19) (0.39) (0.62) (0.77) (0.03) (0.17)
A ge when 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
married (1.70)+ (1.78)+ (1.27) (1.30) (0.59) (0.51)
Other individual Y es Y es Yes Y es Y es Y es
characteristics
Village effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 12017 12017 7245 7245 4772 4772
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09
A bsolute t-statistics are in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5% , and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. O ther individual 
characteristics include: age squared, whether the respondent is the head o f  household, whether the 
household has land, and religion o f the respondent.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of non-governmental organiza­
tions’ impacts on human capital and women’s empowerment in Bangladesh. The 
thesis studies the effects of NGOs’ innovations in the provision of education and 
credit.
In the area of education, NGO schools in Bangladesh started as a response to 
the state’s failure to provide primary education to the poorest children in remote 
areas. For the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), their Non- 
formal Primary Education Programme was innovated in response to demands from 
the parents who took part in the adult literacy class and whose children did not have 
a chance to attend formal schools. In 1985, BRAC set up 22 experimental village 
schools, with the help of a staff of educators and a consultant from Dhaka University 
School of Education. After the first two years, BRAC developed a model of primary 
education program which has become highly successful and has been duplicated by 
other NGOs both in Bangladesh and other countries.
Chapter Two of this thesis studies how the entry of NGO schools has affected 
educational outcomes of girls and examine the mechanisms which account for the 
relative performance of NGO versus state schools in improving female educational
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outcomes. The findings suggest that the entry of NGO schools has significantly 
increased girls’ enrollment and class passed as compared to boys. For children aged 11 
to 20 years old, being exposed to NGO schools significantly increases the probability 
of having been enrollment for girls as compared to boys. A child is considered exposed 
to an NGO school if he/she was 10 years or younger when the first NGO school in 
the village was established, as most NGO schools enrol 8 to 10 years old children. 
Similar to the case of enrollment, being exposed to NGO schools also significantly 
increases the last class passed for girls as compared to boys.
I also analyze the enrollment status of children aged 6 to 10 years old, which is 
the primary school age in Bangladesh. The results show that being in a village with 
at least one NGO school is associated with higher probability of being enrolled for 
girls as compared to boys. On the other hand, being in a village with at least one 
government school does not show different effects on the probability of being enrolled 
for girls as compared to boys. Similar results are obtained when I study the effects 
of being in a village with more NGO school involvement. Here ‘the involvement of 
NGO schools in a village’ is defined as the percentage of children aged 6 to 10 years 
old enrolled in NGO schools among children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in school 
in each village. Together the results point to the role of NGO schools in increasing 
girls’ enrollment as compared to boys.
Further analysis shows that the effects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enroll­
ment are stronger in the case of rural, as compared to urban, areas. One possible 
reason NGO schools seem to increase female enrollment mainly in the rural areas is 
that in rural villages government schools and other types of schools are likely to be far 
away from children’s homes. Therefore having an NGO school in the village would 
encourage parents to send the girls to school. Studies have noted that one reason 
parents are reluctant to send the girls to school is that they worry about having the 
girls far away from home. NGO schools are built right in the village, nearby to chil­
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dren’s homes. This is one example of how NGOs incorporate the needs and concerns 
of rural villagers to provide an effective program of service delivery.
The results also show that NGO schools have stronger effects in increasing relative 
female enrollment for BRAC target households compared to non-target households. 
BRAC target households are defined as households with less than 0.5 acre of land and 
at least one person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year. BRAC tar­
get households are considered the poorest group of the population. When BRAC first 
started NGO schools, they aim to enrol children from BRAC target households. How­
ever, as there were many children from non-target households who were non-enrolled 
or have dropped out of school, later on they also enrol children from non-target 
households as well. The results suggest that the effects of NGO schools in increasing 
relative female enrollment is stronger for BRAC target households, although there is 
evidence of some effects in the case of non-target households as well.
The statistics from the Education Watch data show that girls from poorer house­
holds have higher enrollment rates compared to boys, while the opposite is true for 
richer households. The findings in this Chapter strongly suggest that the increase 
in female versus male primary school enrollment in Bangladesh in recent years is at 
least partly driven by the exposure of poor rural households to NGO schools.
Results from analyzing the school level data suggest that the two most important 
characteristics of NGO schools which encourage enrollment for both boys and girls 
are the high percentage of female teachers and having Parent-Teacher Associations. 
In particular, the high percentage of female teachers appears the most significant 
characteristic which encourages girls’ enrollment. This is in line with the general 
perception that in Bangladesh many parents do not want to send the girls to school 
where there are male teachers. Here is another example of how NGOs’ understanding 
of people’s concerns has led to the design of schools which encourage girls’ enrollment.
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As NGO schools differ from government schools in many aspects, an important 
question is how the students are learning as a result of attending NGO schools. Using 
test score data from the Education Watch project, I find that attending an NGO 
school significantly increases test scores in all sections of the Assessment of Basic 
Competencies (ABC) test.1 For each section’s test scores, the effects of attending 
an NGO school do not differ between boys and girls. The effects of attending NGO 
schools are actually stronger than the effects of attending a government school in all 
sections of the ABC test, controlling for other factors. Statistics from the Education 
Watch data show that NGO school students actually perform better than government 
school students in all sections of the test. This is surprising given that NGO schools 
enrol children from disadvantaged households who did not have a chance to attend 
formal schools.
Besides the high test scores achieved by the students, NGO schools also have very 
high teacher attendance rates and student attendance rates compared to other types 
of school. While the average attendance rate of government school teachers is 86%, 
the corresponding figure for NGO school teachers is 97%. Student attendance rate 
is 55% in the case of government schools, and 84% in the case of NGO schools.
Chapter Three investigates the factors which affect teacher presence, student at­
tendance, and parents’ participation in school meetings in NGO schools and other 
types of schools. I focus on three types of schools: government, private, and NGO 
schools.2 I also find out whether there axe school characteristics which affect teacher 
presence and student attendance differently for NGO schools compared to other types 
of schools.
The results show that, after controlling for other factors, NGO schools axe asso­
ciated with higher teacher presence and student attendance rates, and guardians of
1The four sections are life skills, reading, writing, and numeracy.
2 Although there are 11 types of schools in Bangladesh, these three types of schools enrol over 
90% of students in primary schools.
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NGO school students axe more likely to participate in school meetings compared to 
guardians of students in other types of schools. Compared to other types of schools, 
higher teacher presence in NGO schools appears to come from teacher motivation, 
teacher monitoring, and school facilities in the case of toilet facility. For teacher 
motivation, NGO school teachers are more likely to be present compared to teachers 
in other types of school when the number of teachers in the school is smaller. As 
most NGO school teachers have only one teacher, the results suggest that a teacher 
in an NGO school is more likely to be present when he/she is the only teacher in the 
school. When a teacher is the only teacher in the school, there will be no school if 
he/she is absent. Therefore the sense of responsibility, or motivation, is one possible 
interpretation of the results.
I also focus only on NGO school teachers, and test several hypothesis regarding 
the factors which are likely to explain teacher presence. The results suggest that 
motivation appears the most important factor explaining high teacher attendance in 
NGO schools. Monitoring and school facilities do not appear to play a significant role. 
NGO school teachers are more likely to be present when they are the only teacher in 
the school, when they have received training from the NGO providing the schools, and 
when they have attended several refresher’s courses the past year. Having received 
training from NGO and having attended refreshers’ courses could be either a source 
of professional motivation, or a signal of intrinsic motivation when more motivated 
teachers choose to attending training and refreshers’ courses. Given the data, it is 
not possible to distinguish between the two. However, for BRAC schools, before a 
school is open NGO staff would try to motivate the teacher and develop a sense of 
responsibility in teaching poor children. This motivational work is likely to play a 
role in the high teacher presence in NGO schools.3
3From a personal experience, I also find BRAC personnel to be highly motivated. During my 
internship with BRAC in the summer of 2002, I met several BRAC personnel who worked in the 
area of education, and attended meetings where field staff came to the headquarter to exchange 
ideas and discuss experiences and problems. The experience impressed on me how motivated and
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NGO schools also have much higher student attendance rates compared to other 
types of schools. The findings suggest that, for all types of schools, the percentage 
of teacher presence is an important determinant of student attendance. Moreover, 
the percentage of female teachers appears to increase the attendance of girls.
Several characteristics of NGO schools affect student attendance differently com­
pared to other types of schools. The high rate of teacher presence in NGO schools 
appears to increase the attendance of boys while the level of classroom crowdedness 
appears to discourage girls’ attendance, with an effect over and above that found 
in all schools. For NGO schools, larger class size and having the students sing the 
national anthem appear to encourage attendance for both boys and girls. Whether 
or not students in NGO schools sing the national anthem could be correlated with 
whether the school includes singing as a school activity. This possibly suggests that 
including singing as part of the curriculum might lead to higher student attendance.4
The findings suggest that high student attendance rates in NGO schools could 
be explained by high teacher attendance rates as well as other factors relating to 
curriculum and school facility.
As community involvement is an important characteristic of NGO schools, it is 
possible that parents of NGO school students become interested in their children’s 
schooling and attend school meetings. Findings show that parents and other mem­
bers of the household are more likely to attend a school meeting when a child is 
enrolled in an NGO school, and the effect is strongest in the case of mothers. For 
parents of NGO school students, education does not appear to be an important deter­
minant of their participation in school meetings. For parents of students attending 
government and private schools, on the other hand, education appears to play a role 
in explaining whether they attend school meetings or not. In fact, parents of NGO
enthusiastic BRAC personnel were.
4It is recognized that students in NGO schools particularly enjoy activities such as singing and 
dancing, therefore having activities that the children enjoy might lead to higher attendance.
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school students are mostly poor villagers who have little or no education. The results 
suggest that NGOs have succeeded in encouraging guardians, especially the mothers, 
to attend school meetings regardless of their education. Moreover, there is evidence 
that guardians’ participation in school meetings is positively correlated with certain 
sections’ test scores.
Results in Chapter Three highlight how NGO schools function differently from 
government and private schools. Teacher motivation appears to play the most im­
portant role in explaining teacher presence. Moreover, NGO schools appear to have 
encouraged guardians of the students, who are mainly poor and uneducated villagers, 
to attend school meetings.
In Chapter Four I study the impacts of another important NGO innovation, the 
micro-credit programs. I investigate the effects of having the Grameen Bank in the 
village of residence on fertility decisions and women’s empowerment. Here women’s 
empowerment is proxied by mobility, contribution to family support, and discussion 
with husband regarding family planning.
The Grameen Bank is an excellent example of an NGO innovation which stems 
from an accurate understanding of the needs, constraints, and circumstances of the 
poor. The Grameen Bank’s founder, Muhammad Yunus, initiated micro-credit in 
1976. It is documented that, after talking with several poor villagers, he was sur­
prised to find out that they only needed a small amount of money to start their own 
businesses. However, commercial banks would not lend to them, as they do not have 
collateral. Muhammad Yunus began by lending them his own money. After some 
experiments, he formed the model of group-lending program which came to be known 
as micro-credit. Collateral is replaced with peer pressure, as all members of the group 
become ineligible for further loan if one member defaults.
The results in Chapter Four suggest the role of the Grameen Bank in affecting 
people’s perception regarding family size and family planning. In villages where the
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Grameen Bank is well established, between 1993 and 1996 women’s ideal number 
of children has significantly decreased, and it is mainly among women aged 30 to 
49 years old that the change in fertility preference occurred. The Grameen Bank 
supports the idea of having a small family, and the results suggest that this idea has 
become more widespread among women in villages where the Grameen Bank is well 
established. Moreover, between 1993 and 1996 there has been a reduction in the 
number of births in the year prior to the survey, as well as an increase in the use of 
family planning methods, in villages where the Grameen Bank is well established.
In villages where the Grameen Bank entered between 1993 and 1996 there has 
been a significant increase in husbands’ approval of family planning methods. The 
results suggest the role of the Grameen Bank in bringing in new ideas and perspectives 
into the villages. There has been a general change in the perception of husbands 
regarding the use of family planning methods, which is an important step before a 
couple actually uses family planning methods.
Moreover, having the Grameen Bank in the village is associated with an increase 
in women’s empowerment in terms of contribution to family support and mobility. 
The effects found are effects for all women in the village, and not only members of the 
Grameen Bank. Therefore the effects found include both direct effects on members 
and spill-over effects on non-members. For members of the Grameen Bank, having 
access to micro-credit allows women to undertake small businesses, which usually 
generates income and therefore increases women’s contribution to family support. 
Moreover, being a member of the micro-credit program means that they have to 
attend weekly meetings. They therefore have to travel outside of the house to attend 
the meetings. This would likely lead to the acceptance that they could travel to 
other places as well.
There is evidence that women with a high level of mobility are likely to want fewer 
children, and women aged 10 to 29 who contribute to family support or have a high
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